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ABSTRACT 
Assurance in corporate sustainability reporting in the United Kingdom: 
Stakeholder and corporate perspectives 
Angela Pinilla-Urzola 
 
Sustainability assurance is developing rapidly in the United Kingdom, despite a 
negative stance from management. Previous studies have examined the practice 
as represented in statements from 2001 to 2004, companies reasons for 
commissioning assurance services, and the views of assurance providers on 
stakeholder-centred practice. Despite the importance of stakeholder 
participation within sustainability assurance exercises, far too little attention has 
been paid to stakeholders and their views on the phenomenon of sustainability 
assurance. This research identifies the trends and emerging issues in the practice 
between 2001 and 2007, investigates corporate management views on those 
issues, and examines stakeholders perspectives on the potentialities and 
problems of assurance practice. 
The research follows a mixed-methods two phase explanatory model. A content 
analysis of assurance statements issued by a sample of FTSE100 companies was 
used to collect quantitative data on tendencies as to the choice of provider, 
standards used, level of assurance adopted, procedures employed, and methods 
of stakeholder inclusion used. Then, these issues were explored via a programme 
of semi-structured interviews conducted with ten representatives of FTSE100 
companies, and eight representatives of different stake
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resulting data analyzed through the lens of key strands of Michael Powers 
theory, and legitimacy and stakeholder theories. 
Emerging trends of hiring accountancy firms and using the AA1000AS in tandem 
with the ISAE3000 standard indicate change in the practice. Assurance exercises 
conducted with substantive test procedures, and of limited level, persist. The 
AA1000 is the most used standard, however, is not leading to direct participation 
of stakeholders. While there is some evidence of stakeholder interest, 
particularly on the part of nongovernmental organisations, the real driving force 
behind assurance is internal. Organisational constraints, particularly cost 
considerations, influence further development of the practice. Corporate 
management did express a desire to bring stakeholder involvement through 
stakeholder panels.  
Corporate management view sustainability assurance as creating value by 
delivering organisational legitimacy and enhancing reputation. In the current 
climate of voluntarism, there is a high risk of sustainability assurance being used 
as greenwashing. For management, sustainability assurance should serve the 
interest of the organisation and shareholders over other stakeholders. Through 
the assurance process, organisations manage and control key stakeholder 
groups.  This view is supported by one influential stakeholder group, the 
investment community. Therefore, the role of stakeholder groups representing 
other civil society needs is fundamental to ensure that through sustainability 
assurance accountability is discharged to society at large.  
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1 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter introduces the main characteristics of the research presented 
in the thesis Assurance in corporate sustainability reporting in the United 
Kingdom: Stakeholder and corporate perspectives. This thesis was 
funded and part of it published by the Certified Accountants Educational 
Trust (CAET) in the form of the ACCA Research Report No.115: Key issues 
in sustainability assurance by David Owen, Wendy Chapple and Angela 
Pinilla-Urzola. Extracts from the ACCA Research Report No.115 are 
included in chapters five, six, and seven of this thesis. These extracts 
correspond to the preliminary empirical findings of this thesis. Extracts 
are reproduced with the kind permission of ACCA. 
 
 This chapter comprises five sections. The first section sets the scene by 
providing definitions of the terms audit and assurance used 
throughout this thesis, together with an overview of the main 
international standards that assist companies to develop their 
sustainability assurance processes; the second provides the justifications 
for the study; the third section illustrates key characteristics of the 
research; the fourth presents the objectives of the study; the fifth section 
describes the organisation of the thesis. 
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1.1 SETTING THE SCENE 
1.1.1 Defining the term assurance 
In the United Kingdom, the term assurance began to be used by 
companies in the context of sustainability reports in the early 2000s as an 
alternative to the terms audit or verification (see Al-Hamadeen, 2007). 
Although the term is not defined by the International Auditing and 
Assurance Standards Board (IAASB), the Fédération des Experts Comptables 
Européens (FEE) notes that assurance refers to the enhancement of the 
credibility of information (2004:63). This thesis will use the definition 
suggested by AccountAbility (2003:5): an evaluation method that uses a 
specified set of principles and standards to assess the quality of an 
organisations subject matter and the underlying systems, processes and 
competencies that underpin its performance.  The term assurance is 
used in conjunction with the term engagement (see IAASB, 2010); 
through the assurance engagement, a practitioner expresses a conclusion 
designed to enhance the degree of confidence of the intended users 
(IAASB, 2010:4).  
 
The FEE (2004) has called for the use of the term assurance instead of 
audit in the context of sustainability reporting, to avoid confusion in 
their meaning. According to the FEE (2004), the difference between the 
two terms lies in the level to which the credibility of information in 
enhanced. Throughout this thesis the term audit will refer to an 
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assurance engagement conducted with a systematic process whereby the 
credibility of the information is enhanced to a high level (FEE, 2004:64). 
Conversely, an assurance engagement could be conducted with limited or 
reasonable levels of assurance1
 
 (IAASB, 2004). The level of assurance 
provided conveys the degree of confidence that the intended user may 
place in the credibility of the subject matter (Soltani, 2007:16). The 
intended users, or expected beneficiaries, are those constituencies whose 
decisions affect an organisation (Soltani, 2007). 
Therefore, ODwyer and Owen (2005:226) argue that the real motivation 
behind the use of the term assurance in the context of sustainability 
reporting is an organisational strategy to emphasize the added-value 
agenda for organisations and for their strategic stakeholders. It appears 
that the underlying idea is to move away from the social audit 
terminology. In the United Kingdom, the term social audit has been 
linked to the activities of Social Audit Limited (Ltd), which carried out  a 
small number of (generally highly critical) audits of the social and 
environmental performance of major companies  during the 1970s 
(Humphrey and Owen, 2000:44) in order to enhance stakeholder-centred 
accountability. Social audits were conducted by agents outside the 
organisations, who released reports on the social and environmental 
performance of organisations into the public domain. 
                                                        
1
 The version of the AA1000AS (2008b) specifies high and moderate levels of assurance 
that are compatible with the levels articulated in the ISAE3000 standard. 
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This thesis investigates the phenomenon of sustainability assurance in the 
UK. That is, it examines the practice of providing assurance on corporate 
sustainability reports prepared by organisations. The analysis is 
conducted using the lens of the work of Michael Power, who has theorized 
on the role of auditing in society. Power provides a philosophical 
foundation to the audit process in the UK.  He has discussed several 
critical areas in auditing, such as audit procedures, the nature of the 
auditors work, the role of audit in society, and problems associated with 
the practice.  
 
1.1.2 Towards the standardization of the sustainability 
assurance practice 
Zadek, Raynard and Forstater (2006:42) describe three forms of 
standards that can be used to inform the practice of sustainability 
assurance. These comprise normative frameworks that inform on the 
duties and expectations in sustainability matters, management standards 
which guide on organisational performance in sustainability issues, and 
process and reporting standards which provide criteria for sustainability 
reporting and associated assurance. Relevant international assurance 
standards are the AA1000 (2003, 2008), and the ISAE3000 (2004) (Zadek, 
2006:42).  
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Iansen-Rogers and Oelschlaegel (2005) note differences between the two 
international standards.  For example, whilst the ISAE3000 standard is 
generic in nature for any assurance engagement other than financial 
audits and reviews of historical information (Iansen-Rogers & 
Oelschlaegel, 2005:16), the AA1000 Assurance Standard (AA1000AS) is 
expressly designed to provide a comprehensive way of holding an 
organisation to account for its management, performance and reporting 
on sustainability issues by evaluating the adherence of an organisation to 
the AA1000 AccountAbility principles and the quality of the disclosed 
information on sustainability performance (AccountAbility, 2008b:6).   
 
In terms of scope, Iansen-Rogers and Oelschlaegel (2005:17) note that the 
ISAE3000 standard requires assurance providers to agree the subject 
matter of the assurance engagement with the reporting organisation, and 
to consider issues of materiality in relation to this prearranged scope. The 
ISAE3000 standard lacks any specific attention to issues of stakeholder 
inclusivity in the assurance process, albeit that it notes that considering 
materiality requires the practitioner to understand and assess what 
factors might influence the decisions of the intended users (IAASB, 2004: 
paragraph 23).  
 
Conversely, the AA1000AS takes an open-scope approach, whereby 
materiality is stakeholder-based defined (Iansen-Rogers & Oelschlaegel, 
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2005:17), underpinned by the principle of inclusivity: For an 
organisation that accepts its accountability to those on whom it has an 
impact and those who have an impact on it, inclusivity is the participation 
of stakeholders in developing and achieving an accountable and strategic 
response to sustainability (AccountAbility, 2008a:10).  This focus on 
stakeholders is also present in the other principle of the standard, 
responsiveness, which emphasizes that an organisation should actively 
respond to the needs of stakeholders who affect organisational 
performance. According to the AA1000AS, the principle of responsiveness 
must be integrated with the participation of stakeholders in the decision-
making process, actions and performance of the organisation 
(AccountAbility, 2008a:14).   
 
A further difference between the standards lies in the level of assurance 
suggested to conduct the exercise. The ISAE3000 standard makes a clear 
distinction between limited and reasonable assurance engagements 
(IAASB, 2004). According to the standard, whilst reasonable levels of 
assurance produce a positive form of conclusion, limited levels provide a 
basis for a negative form of expression (IAASB, 2004). Conversely, the 
AA1000AS specifies high and moderate levels of assurance, which are 
designed to be consistent with the reasonable and limited levels 
articulated in the ISAE3000 standard (AccountAbility, 2008b). The 
AA1000AS suggests that assurance providers engage directly with 
stakeholders in cases where high level assurance is sought 
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(AccountAbility, 2008b:19). Further significant features of the AA1000AS 
are the encouragement to assurance providers to offer evaluations on the 
reporting organisations systems and processes (AccountAbility, 
2008b:19), together with a requirement to specify the intended users of 
the assurance statement (AccountAbility, 2008b:21).  
 
1.2 RATIONALE OF THE STUDY 
This research is underpinned by the core argument of Medawar (1976), 
who called for an accountability process whereby corporations provide 
answers, rectify their actions (see Mulgan, 2000) and offer redress to 
society at large for the impacts of corporate activities, which create 
widespread damage and distress in social and environmental matters. 
Medawar (1976) argues that through auditing, corporate power could be 
controlled, and accountability achieved. This research started from an 
interest to investigate the purpose of auditing in society, issues in the 
practice, and specifically the role of auditing in holding corporations to 
account, hence achieving social and environmental accountability.  
 
The conceptualization of this study is therefore based mainly on the work 
of Michael Power, who theorizes on the role of auditing in society; it also 
adopts a framework of system-oriented theories, viz, stakeholder and 
legitimacy theories. First, Power (1997/1999) theorizes about the 
purpose of audit in society, and provides critiques on the problems of 
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actual audit practices. Therefore, this study aims to provide an overview 
on the purpose of sustainability assurance, and key issues faced by the 
practice. Second, Power (1994b) argues for an audit practice within which 
the voices of citizens are heard, in order to achieve accountability. 
Consequently, this study focuses mainly on understanding the role of 
stakeholders in the sustainability assurance practice.  Further, the 
framework of system-oriented theories assists the conceptualization of 
the driving force behind organisations adoption of sustainability 
assurance practices. Stakeholder theory is particularly helpful in 
conceptualizing demands made of sustainability assurance by specific 
stakeholder groups.  
 
Finally, the motivation to conduct this research in the United Kingdom 
context is fourfold. First, assurance practice in the UK is undergoing rapid 
development (Jones & Solomon, 2010); therefore, it is expected that the 
practice exhibits emerging trends relevant for investigation. Second, albeit 
that companies in the UK commission sustainability assurance services 
(see KMPG, 2005; 2008), there is a manifest reluctance to fully endorse 
external assurance (see Jones & Solomon, 2010). Hence, a further 
examination of the motivation behind the commission of this assurance 
service is needed.  Third, there is in the UK an emerging approach 
whereby the views of stakeholders are included indirectly within the 
assurance process (Edgley, Jones and Solomon, 2010). Hence, an 
investigation of this development seems necessary. Finally, far too little 
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attention has been paid to stakeholders and their views on the 
phenomenon of sustainability assurance. Therefore, an investigation of 
the views of stakeholders groups on the sustainability assurance process 
is at the heart of our understanding of whether stakeholder-centred 
accountability could be achieved. 
 
1.3 KEY CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RESEARCH 
This study was designed with the general purpose of identifying emerging 
trends in the practice of sustainability assurance in the UK, and seeking to 
explain them via a programme of interviews conducted with 
representatives of companies and stakeholder groups. First, trends and 
emerging issues in the practice over a period of seven years were 
identified through the examination of key features in sustainability 
assurance exercises in the UK, viz, the commission of sustainability 
assurance services, sustainability assurance provision, the use of 
assurance standards, the level of assurance, assurance procedures, and 
participation of stakeholders within the assurance process. Second, these 
issues were investigated with representatives of companies and 
stakeholders groups. Thus, this is an empirical explanatory follow-up 
study following a mixed-methods research design consisting of a 
sequential analysis, from a quantitative phase to a qualitative phase. 
This research, therefore, is underpinned by a pragmatic paradigm, located 
within the framework of the body of work known as the social accounting 
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project (Gray, 2002), and sharing elements of the critical accounting 
project. Hence, for the researcher the imperative is to focus on achieving 
the research objectives to understand the phenomenon of sustainability 
assurance, with the goal of challenging the privileged position of 
corporations in society, and generating incremental change in society in 
the long term. This belief in the likelihood of generating change in society 
through academic research in the field of sustainability assurance is 
consistent with the conceptual framework through which the empirical 
set of qualitative data was understood and its contribution contextualized.  
 
Part of the work of Power (1997/1999) focuses on understanding audit as 
an idea symbolizing ideals of efficiency and quality, governance, 
transparency and accountability. However, Powers (1994b) key thesis 
concerns the failure of actual auditing practices to provide a base for 
substantive change. Power (1994b) advocates a form of audit in which the 
voices of stakeholders can be heard, and stakeholder-centred 
accountability achieved. Therefore, his work seeks to revolutionize 
existing auditing practices. Conversely, stakeholder theory explores 
relations between stakeholders and organisations. In general terms this 
theory attempts to understand how organisations could integrate the 
views of stakeholders in order to change their strategies to become 
accountable in society. Moreover, legitimacy theory postulates that 
organisations create strategies to move to a stage where they achieve the 
status of legitimacy in society. Thus, stakeholder and legitimacy theories 
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explain changes in organisational behaviour. Figure 1.1 describes the 
connections between these key conceptual strands, and the research 
design. 
 
1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The general research purpose described above was operationalized in the 
form of specific objectives. The aim of the quantitative phase of the 
research was to:   
x Analyze trends and to identify emerging issues as represented in 
the text of sustainability assurance statements of companies in the 
UK between 2001 and 2007.   
 
During the second, qualitative, phase of the research design, the aims were 
to:  
x Investigate  companies reasons for commissioning sustainability 
assurance, and the factors underpinning the choice of assurance 
approaches, assurance standards, role of internal audit function, 
and restrictions in level of assurance; 
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Figure 1-1 Research Map 
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x Elicit the views of companies representatives about the 
appropriate level of stakeholder inclusion in the assurance process, 
together with their suggestions for further developing assurance 
processes; 
 
x Examine stakeholder views on sustainability assurance process, 
together with their suggestions for further developing assurance 
processes in order to promote a greater degree of stakeholder 
accountability. 
 
1.5 THESIS STRUCTURE 
This introductory chapter provides an overview of the main 
characteristics of the research, and the research objectives. Next, two 
conceptual chapters will discuss the most important areas of relevant 
literature, and a subsequent chapter will explain the research philosophy, 
research design, and research methods. This chapter acts as a research 
gearbox linking the preceding conceptual chapters to the empirical 
chapters that explain research findings.  Next, three empirical chapters 
will present the evidence gathered during the quantitative and qualitative 
phases of this research.  The first of these empirical chapters, chapter five, 
describes the delay in the commission of sustainability assurance services 
among the FTSE100 companies, the new tendency of adopting a more 
rigorous approach by using a combination of assurance standards, and the 
emerging trend of using the accountancy approach. Chapter five highlights 
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that most of the assurance procedures found in this study concern 
substantive tests, aimed at providing limited levels of assurance, while 
there was no significant evidence of the use of the AA1000AS leading to 
direct stakeholder participation in the practice.  Chapters six and seven 
examine the purpose and meaning of sustainability assurance in society 
through the lens of the views of representatives of companies and of 
stakeholder groups. These chapters also analyze emerging issues 
regarding assurance practice. The final chapter brings together all the 
analysis to suggest the real motivation behind the commission of 
sustainability assurance services, and the public policy implications. This 
concluding chapter also highlights the role of specific stakeholder groups 
in moving to a stage where the practice of sustainability assurance serves 
the purpose of discharging accountability to society at large. 
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2 CHAPTER TWO: ASSURANCE IN CORPORATE 
SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING  
 
This chapter has the following aim: 
x To locate the contributions of the present research in the context of 
prior research on sustainability assurance. 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
There is a small but sound body of research material available in the field 
of sustainability assurance to help understand the development of the 
practice during the past 15 years. The material includes descriptive 
studies examining global, regional and country (United Kingdom) trends 
and features of sustainability assurance practices. Research in this field 
has become more sophisticated and analytical; for example, motivated by 
a desire to offer richer explanations to understand the patterns observed, 
some statistical studies have been conducted to examine the factors 
associated with the voluntary commission of sustainability assurance 
services. There are also interview-based studies which provide the views 
of companies and assurance providers on the benefits arising from 
commissioning sustainability assurance services. An important body of 
research has examined critically these assurance exercises, exposing the 
huge expectation gap and the lack of added value for external 
constituencies, and the failure to promote accountability to stakeholders.  
There are also studies evaluating whether these assurance practices are 
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stakeholder-centred. Recently, there has been an interest in examining the 
participation of stakeholders in sustainability assurance practices.  
 
This chapter discusses the results of these studies.  It comprises six 
sections: the first describes current trends in the commission of 
sustainability assurance services; the second provides an overview of the 
key features of sustainability assurance practices; the third discusses 
drivers and benefits of commissioning sustainability assurance services; 
the fourth examines the critical perspectives on sustainability assurance 
practices, the fifth discusses the issue of participation of stakeholders in 
sustainability assurance practices. The final section presents conclusions 
from the discussions in this chapter. 
 
2.2 COMMISSION OF SUSTAINABILITY ASSURANCE SERVICES2
Several studies have revealed that during the last decade there was a 
significant growth in the commission of external assurance services. For 
example, a recent study by CorporateRegister.com (2008:28)
 
3
                                                        
2 In this section the term assurance statements refers to statements provided by formal 
assurance providers. 
 notes that 
between 1997 and 2007 the average annual rate of growth of 
sustainability assurance services was about 20%. However, their analysis 
shows that the growth was not steady from 1992 to 2007. There were 
3 The sample for this analysis consists of the comprehensive reports directory of 
CorporateRegister.com. Period of study: early 90s to 2008. Total sample: 17000 
published reports.  
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periods of growth (1992-1998 and 2003-2007) and of decline (1998-
2003). CorporateRegister.com (2008:28) explains that the reason for this 
falling trend is that during the most dynamic period in the production of 
sustainability reports, from 1998 to 2003, companies might have delayed 
the commission of sustainability assurance until later years, when systems 
and reports would be more developed.  
 
The CorporateRegister.com (2008) study also shows that from 1992 to 
2007, there was a steady growth in the commission of sustainability 
assurance services in Europe. In 2007, of the 650 assurance statements 
issued worldwide, 64% were from European reporters 
(CorporateRegister.com, 2008:30). The results of the 
CorporateRegister.com (2008) study evidence that Europe is the leading 
geographical region, while Asia evidences a new growing tendency, but in 
North and South America and in Africa the commission of sustainability 
assurance has been very limited.  
 
In other major studies, KPMG (2005, 2008)4
                                                        
4 The sample for this analysis consists of the top 250 companies of Fortune Global 500 
(G250). The KPMG report also surveys reporting and assurance practices of the N100 
companies, comprising the 100 largest companies by revenue in 16 (for the KPMG 2005 
survey) and 22 (for the KMPG 2008 survey) countries across the globe. Period of study: 
September 2004 to January 2005 (KPMG, 2005); mid 2007 to mid 2008 (KPMG, 2008). 
Total sample: not specified.  
 show that from 2002 to 2008 
there was an increment of ten percent in the number of G250 companies 
which commissioned sustainability assurance services. Initially, from 
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2002 to 2005, the figure was stable at around 29-30%, but this was 
followed by growth, settling at 40% in 2008. A study conducted by Kolk 
and Perego (2010:190)5 reveals similar patterns of stabilization in the 
G250 companies, at around 31-30% between 2002 and 2005. The KPMG 
(2005, 2008)6 studies also reveal that there are differences in trends in 
the commission of external assurance services across countries. For 
example, from 2002 to 2008, France experienced a high growth of 59%; in 
the USA, growth was slow, with an increment of 12%; in Japan, the trend 
was to have slight increments of 5% and decreases of 7%; Sweden 
underwent first a period of decrease (10%) and then one of high 
increment (28%). In Australia and the UK, the commission of 
sustainability assurance services remained stable at around 42-43% and 
53-55% respectively. The result for the UK concurs with the findings of 
the study conducted by Al-Hamadeen (2007)7
 
, which shows that on 
average, 56% of the sustainability reports issued by FTSE100 companies 
from 2000 to 2004 included an assurance statement. 
2.2.1 Summary 
The issue of trends in the commission of external sustainability assurance 
services has been examined in a number of studies. The contribution of 
                                                        
5 The sample for this analysis consists of the first half of the top 250 companies of 
Fortune Global 500 (G250). Period of study: 1999, 2002, and 2005. Total sample: panel of 
212 firms. 
6 The sample for this analysis consists of the top national companies N100 (including the 
FTSE100).  
7 The sample for this analysis consists of companies listed in the FTSE100 index.  Period 
of study: 2000 to 2004. Total sample: 196 assurance statements. 
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these studies lies in their capacity to provide a description of the state of 
the commission of sustainability assurance services from the early 1990s 
to 2008 by examining different sets of databases at global, regional and 
country level.   
 
2.3 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ASSURANCE PRACTICES 
Key features in the practice of sustainability assurance are the type of 
assurance provider, type of assurance standard, level of assurance, and 
type of assurance procedures. The CorporateRegister.com (2008) study 
and the KPMG (2005, 2008) surveys evidence distinct patterns in these 
features, albeit that their findings lead to the calculation of different 
percentage figures, as a result of the very different samples used. The 
samples analyzed by Deegan, Cooper and Shelly (2006) and Al-Hamadeen 
(2007) evidence the patterns of these features at European and UK level.  
 
2.3.1 Assurance provision 
The sustainability assurance market is controlled by three types of 
assurance providers: accountancy firms (Big Four), certification bodies, 
and specialized assurance consultants. The CorporateRegister.com study8
                                                        
8 The sample for this analysis consists of the comprehensive reports directory of 
CorporateRegister.com. Period of study: 90s to 2008. Total sample: 17,000 published 
reports.  
 
claims that collectively, these three types of provider moved from a 65% 
market share in 1997 to 89% in 2007 (2008:29). However, major 
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accountancy firms (predominantly the Big Four) dominate the 
sustainability assurance market globally. Table 2.1 illustrates the 
participation of accountancy firms in the assurance market worldwide. As 
shown in the table, the CorporateRegister.com (2008) study reveals an 
increment of 12% in accountancy-based assurance provision from 1997 to 
20079. A similar pattern of growth is observed for the KPMG (2005, 
2008)10 sample of G250 companies between 2005 and 2008.  However, 
the results of Kolk and Perego (2010)11
Table 2-1 Participation of accountancy firms in the sustainability assurance market 
worldwide 
 evidence that the growth in 
accountancy-based assurance provision has not been steady in the G250 
companies.  
 Year CorporateRegister.com 
(2008) 
KPMG (2005, 
2008) 
Kolk and Perego (2010) 
2005   58 %   
2008   70 %   
1997 28 %     
2007 40 %     
1999     61,10 % 
2002     65,70 % 
2005     53,30 % 
 
There has been regular participation by specialized assurance consultants 
in the sustainability assurance market. Table 2.2 illustrates the 
                                                        
9 Data taken from the Figure: (%) External Assurance Statements by provider type 1997-
2007 (CorporateRegister.com, 2008:29). 
10 The sample for this analysis consists of the top 250 companies of Fortune Global 500 
(G250). The KPMG report also surveys reporting and assurance practices of the N100 
companies comprising the 100 largest companies by revenue in 16 (for the KPMG 2005 
survey) and 22 (for the KMPG 2008 survey) countries across the globe. Period of study: 
September 2004 to January 2005 (KPMG, 2005); mid 2007 to mid 2008 (KPMG, 2008). 
Total sample: Not specified. 
11 The sample for this analysis consists of the first half of the top 250 companies of 
Fortune Global 500 (G250). Period of study: 1999, 2002, and 2005. Total sample: 212 
assurance statements. 
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participation of certification bodies and specialized assurance consultants 
worldwide between 1997 and 2008. The CorporateRegister.com (2008) 
study claims that the use of specialized assurance consultants as 
assurance providers was stable from 1997 to 2007. However, the KPMG 
(2005, 2008) surveys note that from 2005 to 2008, there was an 
increment of 15% in the use of this type of assurance provider in the G250 
companies. Conversely, whilst the CorporateRegister.com (2008) study 
proves that there was a growth in the use of certification bodies from 
1997 to 2007, the KPMG (2005, 2008) surveys evidence a decrease in use 
from 2005 to 2008 in the G250 companies. 
Table 2-2 Participation of certification bodies and specialized assurance consultant firms 
in the sustainability assurance market worldwide 
Study Year Certification 
Bodies 
Specialized 
Assurance 
Consultants 
CorporateRegister.com 
(2008) 
1997 12%  27%  
2007 24%  24%  
KPMG (2005, 2008)12 2005  21%  2%  
2008 13%  17% 
 
 
KPMG (2005, 2008) surveys also refer to the emergent use of commentary 
from external parties on management performance and progress on key 
sustainability issues. In 2008, 27% of the G250 sample provided a 
commentary in their corporate sustainability reports. Of these external 
commentaries, 15% were by stakeholder panels, 29% by a panel of 
independent experts and 13% by nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) 
(KPMG, 2008:60). In 2008, almost 7% of the G250 sample combined the 
                                                        
12 See KPMG (2008:63) Figure 6.8; the percentage number summarizes percentages of 
technical expert firms together with specialized assurance providers.  
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formal assurance provision with an external commentary. Albeit that the 
CorporateRegister.com (2008) study did not address this issue, 
accompanying data13
 
 show a trend in the CorporateRegister.com database 
towards using external commentaries by individuals, advisory panels, 
NGOs and academic institutions.  
Conversely, the study conducted by Al-Hamadeen (2007)14 reports that in 
the FTSE100 companies, from 2000 to 2004, specialized assurance 
consultants (the percentage number includes certification bodies) were 
the main assurance provider (76%), followed by accountancy firms 
(23%). This trend in the UK is worthy of examination considering that 
accountancy firms are the preferred type of assurance provider in Europe 
(Deegan et al., 2006; CorporateRegister.com, 2008). Indeed, the study of 
Deegan et al. (2006:337)15
                                                        
13 See CorporateRegister.com (2008:29) Figure 15. 
 shows that in the CPA sample, from 2000 to 
2003, the level of participation of UK accountancy firms appears to have 
been lower than the rate of participation of European accountancy firms. 
This reveals that there are international differences in the type of 
assurance provider commissioned to conduct the assurance exercises. In 
this context, Deegan et al. (2006:337) call for an investigation of what 
factors influence the appointment of a particular assurance provider in the 
UK. 
14 The sample for this analysis consists of companies listed in the FTSE100 index.  Period 
of study: 2000 to 2004. Total sample: 196 assurance statements.  
15 The sample for this analysis consists of companies listed in the CPA Australia website. 
Period of study: 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003. Total sample: 149 assurance statements 
representing Australian, UK, European and Japanese companies.  
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2.3.2 Assurance standards 
The ISAE300 is the most commonly employed assurance standard. Table 
2.3 illustrates the types of assurance standard used worldwide.  According 
to the KPMG (2005, 2008) surveys, there was an increase of 38% in the 
use of the ISAE3000 standard, and of 15% in the use of the AA1000AS 
among the G250 companies from 2005 to 2008. The additional analysis 
conducted by CorporateRegister.com16 (2008:13), The Study, indicates 
the dominance of the ISAE3000 assurance standard (37%) over the 
AA1000AS (31%)17. This latter analysis also points out that 31% of the 
assurance exercises were conducted with two assurance standards, and a 
further 5% referenced three. However, the study of Mock, Strohm and 
Swartz (2007:71)18
Table 2-3 Types of assurance standard used worldwide 
 reports that almost half of the assurance statements 
(42%) in their sample of analysis made no reference to the use of an 
assurance standard from 2002 to 2004. 
Study Year ISAE3000 AA1000AS 
KPMG  
(2005; 2008) 
2005 24%  18% 
2008 62%  33% 
 
 
                                                        
16 This analysis of CorporateRegister.com focuses on the top 18 companies, by market 
capitalization, across the five leading countries in numbers of published reports: 
Australia, Germany, Japan, the UK and the USA. Period of study: May 1 2006 to May 1 
2008. Total sample: 90 assurance statements.  
17 The percentage number for the AA1000AS figure includes both statements which are 
fully compliant with the standard, and statements that are not fully compliant. 
18 The sample for this analysis consists of companies listed in three different databases.  
Period of study: 2002 to 2004. Total sample: For descriptive analysis: 130 assurance 
statements; For statistical analysis: 126 assurance statements. 
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Conversely, the study conducted by Al-Hamadeen (2007) claims that from 
2000 to 2004, the most common type of assurance standard used in the 
FTSE100 companies was the AA1000AS, followed by the ISAE3000 
standard. However, Al-Hamadeen (2007) and Deegan et al. (2006) report 
that the majority of the assurance statements in the UK made no reference 
to the use of an assurance standard.  In contrast, Deegan et al. (2006) 
show that in Europe from 2000 to 2003 most of the assurance statements 
(63%) did make mention of standards. Hence, Deegan et al. (2006:353) 
argue that there are differences internationally as to whether standards 
are referred to.  
 
2.3.3 Levels of assurance and opinion offered 
Limited level of assurance is the most cited level in the assurance 
statements. The additional analysis conducted by CorporateRegister.com 
(2008), The Study, indicates that 83% of the exercises conducted by 
accountancy firms were of limited assurance19. The Study reveals that in 
line with this limited level approach, accountancy firms framed their 
conclusions negatively (83%). Conversely, certification bodies (92%) and 
specialized consultancy firms (73%) framed their conclusions positively20
                                                        
19 It is worth noting here that accountancy firms have the ISAE3000 standard, which 
defines assurance levels expressed in terms of risk. Hence, accountancy firms are more 
aware of the necessary conditions to achieve reasonable levels of assurance. The notion 
of level of assurance is also used by some other assurance providers.  
. 
Similarly, The Study shows that in delivering an opinion, over half (61%) 
20 In the sample of Mock et al. (2007), the majority of the assurance exercises released 
from 2002 to 2004 were conducted by non-accountancy firms; hence, most of the 
assurance statements made reference to a positive assurance (74%).  
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of statements offered some discussion on performance, while a smaller 
majority (53%) included recommendations for improvement. The KPMG 
(2008) survey reveals that in 2008 the majority of the exercises in the 
G250 companies were conducted with limited assurance (51%), and only 
30% were conducted with reasonable level.   
 
Conversely, the study of Al-Hamadeen (2007) shows that for the FTSE100 
companies, from 2000 to 2004, the majority of the assurance statements 
did not make reference to the level of assurance; of those that did, the 
most referenced level was reasonable level, followed by limited level (Al-
Hamadeen, 2007:145). In delivering an opinion, only 23% of the 
assurance statements offered some discussion on performance (Al-
Hamadeen, 2007:194). Albeit that Deegan et al. (2006:363) do not 
examine the issue of the level of assurance, their findings indicate that 
from 2000 to 2003 most of the conclusions in the UK and European 
samples of statements were of a positive form.  Deegan et al. (2006:364) 
point out that in offering an opinion, 42% of the UK assurance statements 
included some form of praise. They argue that accountancy firms tend not 
to provide praise. In contrast, only 12% of the European sample provided 
praise. For these authors, this issue gives rise to a situation where the 
independence of the assurance provider is compromised. 
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2.3.4 Assurance procedures 
Albeit that procedures are a key element of sustainability assurance 
provision, the KPMG (2005, 2008) surveys do not examine this feature. 
The additional analysis conducted by CorporateRegister.com (2008:15), 
The Study, indicates that 88% of the assurance statements described the 
procedures undertaken. The Study also reveals that the most commonly 
used assurance procedures were conducting internal interviews (80%), 
examining internal data systems (73%), review of internal documents 
(68%), doing field work (49%), reviewing external documents (21%) and 
interviewing external stakeholders (12%).  Similarly, Mock et al. 
(2007:71) reveal that procedures used from 2002 to 2004 were 
analytical, reviewing documentation, testing data collection and 
reporting systems, and relying on the work of internal auditors. 
Intriguingly, the results of the analysis of both samples evidences that the 
participation of stakeholders in the assurance exercise was either minimal 
or not considered.  
 
The research conducted by Al-Hamadeen (2007:179) shows that in the 
FTSE100 companies, from 2000 to 2004, the most commonly used 
assurance procedures were conducting internal interviews (78%), 
examining internal data systems (67%), review of internal documents 
(60%), and doing field work (57%). Only 12% of the assurance statements 
made reference to interviews with stakeholders (Al-Hamadeen, 
2007:185). Deegan et al. (2006) claim that most of the assurance 
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statements in the UK and Europe from 2000 to 2003 included some 
description of the work performed.  They provide a list of fourteen 
assurance procedures employed21
 
, and find great variability in the 
description of the work provided.  
2.3.5 Inclusion of stakeholder views 
A common result among all the studies is that an overwhelming majority 
of the assurance statements do not specify an intended audience. For 
example, the additional analysis conducted by CorporateRegister.com 
(2008), The Study, shows that 80% of their sample did not specify an 
intended audience. In cases where the audience is specified, this is 
generally company management (16%). Similarly, the research of Al-
Hamadeen (2007) shows that in the FTSE100 companies from 2000 to 
2004 the majority of assurance statements did not make reference to an 
intended audience. Deegan et al. (2006) note similar results for the 
European and UK samples from 2000 to 2003. They argue that possible 
reasons as to why the addressee is mainly company management (in the 
cases where the audience is specified), are that the assurance engagement 
might stipulate who is to be the addressee.  There could also be issues 
associated with the perceived legal implications of nominating different 
addressees (Deegan et al., 2006:341).  
 
                                                        
21 Deegan et al. (2006:354-355) see table VIII. 
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2.3.6 Additional characteristics 
Further significant features of sustainability assurance provision are 
identified by two statistical studies conducted by Mock et al. (2007)22 and 
Al-Hamadeen (2007)23
 
. Mock et al. (2007:73) pinpoint that accountancy 
firms are less likely to give positive assurance. Their study also evidences 
that accountancy firms are less likely to issue a recommendation in the 
report (73), and are more likely to disclose the assurance framework used 
to conduct the exercise. Mock et al. (2007:74) conclude that a key factor 
associated with [the] level of assurance [provided] is the type of assurance 
provider. Additionally, the type of recommendation provided and the 
type of assurance standard used are associated with the type of assurance 
provider and thus with the level of assurance (74). Conversely, Al-
Hamadeens (2007:239) study affirms that the assurance standard is the 
most significant factor associated with the type of information disclosed in 
the assurance statement. He concludes that there is a weak association 
between the type of assurance provider and the content of the assurance 
statement (239). 
 
                                                        
22 This research study uses logistic regression to perform a statistical analysis to 
investigate the association between factors that may affect the type of assurance provider 
and the likelihood that a positive assurance statement is issued (Mock et al, 2007: 73).   
23 This research conducted a hypothesis test using the Chi-Square statistical technique 
and the phi coefficient (Cramérs V, and Goodman and Kruskals lambda). However, on 
the grounds that several other researchers in the field have used the logistic regression 
model for similar panel data characteristics, there are questions as to the 
appropriateness of this method to analyse the data.  
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2.3.7 Summary 
Key characteristics of the sustainability assurance provision have been 
examined in a number of descriptive and statistical studies. The 
contributions of the descriptive studies lie in their capacity to illustrate 
the state of these key features from the early 1990s to 2008 by examining 
different sets of data at global level,  and in the databases constructed by 
the researchers. In the case of the UK, one study focused on examining key 
features of the sustainability assurance provision adopted by the FTSE100 
companies. The contribution of the statistical studies lies in their proving 
of existing associations between key features disclosed in the 
sustainability assurance statements.  
 
Nevertheless, in the case of the UK, there is a need to update the analysis 
of key patterns in sustainability assurance provision, as the last year of 
analysis was 2004. Albeit that Al-Hamadeen (2007) evaluated the extent 
to which the AA1000AS principle of responsiveness was reflected in the 
assurance statements, his study fails to examine in detail trends in 
stakeholder participation within sustainability assurance practices. What 
is now needed is an investigation of the trends with regard to the 
participation of stakeholders in the sustainability assurance practices, and 
the mechanisms used to involve stakeholders in those practices to ensure 
accountability to them.  
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The trends and patterns illustrated by the descriptive studies raise 
questions that need to be resolved. Albeit that a small body of statistical 
studies do begin to provide explanations for some of these patterns, they 
are limited and do not provide complete clarification of the issues. 
Therefore, further work drawing on more recent empirical evidence 
would be useful to examine trends and emerging issues of key features of 
the sustainability assurance practices in the UK, and to investigate the 
views of companies, one of the main constituencies of this type of 
assurance exercises, on those issues. 
 
2.4 DRIVERS AND BENEFITS OF COMMISSIONING SUSTAINABILITY 
ASSURANCE 
The question of what reasons drive companies to commission 
sustainability assurance services has been examined by both statistical 
and qualitative studies.  
 
First, the adoption of voluntary sustainability assurance services appears 
to be influenced by institutional arrangements such as the legal systems 
(common law or code law systems), law enforcement mechanisms and 
institutional factors (pressures towards corporate responsibility due to 
public policy, for example) in which companies operate. Simnett, 
Vanstraelen and Chua (2009) and Kolk and Perego (2010) studied the 
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factors associated with the demand for voluntary assurance services24. 
Simnett et al. (2009) examined a comprehensive database of 655 
assurance statements released from 2002 to 200425
 
.  Their findings 
suggest that the likelihood that companies will assure their sustainability 
reports increases if (1) they are based in stakeholder oriented countries; 
(2) they are based in stronger legal systems; (3) they are large social 
footprint companies, and (4) they have higher need to enhance credibility 
(Simnett et al., 2009:965).  
Conversely, Kolk and Perego (2010) evaluated a database of 341 
sustainability reports published in 1999, 2002 and 200526
                                                        
24 Both studies developed hypotheses from the international accounting and financial 
auditing literature; relying heavily on the work of Choi and Wong, they both used the 
logistic regression model (logit) to analyze the data statistically. 
. Their findings 
confirm that companies based in stakeholder countries are more likely to 
assure their sustainability reports. They also postulate that the likelihood 
that companies will assure their corporate sustainability reports increases 
if they are in countries where there is more pressure for corporate 
sustainability. However, the results differ from those of Simnett et al. 
(2009) in that the likelihood of adoption of assurance services is found to 
be higher in companies residing in countries with weaker enforcement 
mechanisms (Kolk & Perego, 2010:191). For these authors, assurance 
services fulfil a substitute role in ensuring control over the credibility of 
disclosed information in weak legal systems (191).  
25 This database was constructed with reports from CorporateRegister.com, GRI database 
and companies on the Dow Jones Sustainability index. 
26 This database was drawn from the first half of the Fortune Global 500 companies list. 
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Second, the qualitative research studies conducted by Park and Brorson 
(2005), Kotonen (2009) and Jones and Solomon (2010) examine the views 
of company representatives on the benefits of commissioning 
sustainability assurance services. Park and Brorson (2005) conducted 
interviews with 28 representatives of Swedish companies in 2004; Jones 
and Solomon (2010) interviewed 20 representatives of UK companies in 
2004, whilst Kotonen (2009) interviewed four representatives of Finnish 
companies in 2008. The findings of these studies evidence that from a 
company perspective, important drivers for the voluntary adoption of 
sustainability assurance services are the need to improve reporting 
systems and to enhance credibility of the information reported with 
external constituencies (Park & Brorson, 2005; Kotonen, 2009; Jones & 
Solomon, 2010)27
 
.   
In Sweden, companies representatives claimed that sustainability 
assurance is essential in cases where companies face critical social and 
environmental issues to increase credibility, or need to defend their 
position regarding the issues reported (Park & Brorson, 2005:1099). 
However, they acknowledged that there are difficulties in finding 
empirical evidence that the credibility of organizations improve as a result 
                                                        
27 Park and Brorson (2004) selected the companies to be interviewed based on the 
following criteria: (1) experience with assurance at least once, (2) more than 5 years 
publishing reports, and (3) good reporting practices; Jones and Solomon (2010) selected 
companies listed in the FTSE100 index; Kotonen (2009) selected companies listed in the 
OMX Nordic Exchange Helsinki list. 
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of the assurance process (1105). In Finland, representatives of companies 
perceived assurance as a management tool used to promote the 
development of management and reporting systems (Kotonen, 2009:228). 
Similarly, in the UK, sustainability assurance was perceived as a 
management tool, an ingredient of the internal control system (Jones & 
Solomon, 2010:30). In the UK, companies representatives also argued 
that the need for assurance is exacerbated by the lack of trust in 
companies among stakeholders (25). However, similar to the Swedish 
case, representatives of UK companies were less convinced that assurance 
adds credibility (30). 
 
A recent study examines the views of assurance providers on the benefits 
arising from commissioning sustainability assurance services.  Edgley et 
al. (2010) conducted interviews between 2005 and 2007 with 20 
assurance providers (12 consultancy firms and 8 accountancy firms) in 
the UK. The view of these assurance providers concurred with the views of 
companies representatives that sustainability assurance improves 
management systems, enhances reputation and defends the management 
position with stakeholders (Edgley et al., 2010:538). Providers argued 
that sustainability assurance assists companies to detect deficiencies and 
prevents them from issuing misleading information (541). Intriguingly, 
assurance providers also asserted that sustainability assurance adds value 
to stakeholders, as in their view it enhances accountability (in the sense 
that it makes the report more transparent), improves relationships 
  
34 
 
between stakeholders and companies, and makes reporting more credible.  
According to Jones and Solomon (2010), accountancy firms tend to focus 
their rhetoric on selling the added value for companies to a greater extent 
than do consultancy firms.  
 
The views of representatives of companies reveal that although they 
perceive benefits arising from these exercises, they manifest a general 
reluctance to endorse external sustainability assurance. In Sweden, 
companies representatives cited as the main reasons for being reluctant 
to engage sustainability assurance services: (1) the high cost of assurance, 
(2) the certainty that reporting systems are well developed and credible 
(making external assurance unnecessary), (3) the underdevelopment of 
reporting systems, and (4) the absence of stakeholder pressures (Park & 
Brorson, 2005:1100). In Finland, representatives of companies expressed 
similar views to those of their Swedish peers, with one company arguing 
that sustainability assurance is a cumbersome and time consuming 
process (Kotonen, 2009:228). 
 
In the UK, representatives of companies also provided reasons why they 
did not support sustainability assurance. Companies representatives 
echoed the views of their Swedish counterparts in that financial reasons 
(cost in both economic and managerial resources terms) influence the 
commission of the sustainability assurance service; one interviewee stated 
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that the cost of sustainability assurance is disproportionate to the 
potential benefits (Jones & Solomon, 2010:27). They reiterated the views 
of Swedish company representatives, arguing that reports under process 
of development do not justify the commission of assurance. 
Representatives of UK companies also argued that social, environmental 
and ethical issues are too complex for assurance to be straightforward. 
They claimed that there is a problem in the perceived lack of 
independence on the part of assurance providers. Indeed, the assurance 
exercises were perceived to be relatively unimportant (as, to some extent, 
was sustainability reporting itself), with the main accrued benefits 
regarded as primarily for the assurance providers themselves (29).  Jones 
and Solomon (2010:28) claim that there was a belief that sustainability 
assurance was a logical extension of financial auditing and that it should 
therefore be performed by financial auditors, and follow a financial 
framework. 
 
2.4.1 Summary 
Several statistical and interview-based studies have examined factors 
influencing the decision by companies to commission voluntary 
sustainability assurance services, and the perceived benefits arising from 
these assurance services.  The contribution of the statistical studies lies in 
their capacity to explain the country-level institutional factors that 
influence the adoption of sustainability assurance services among 
international companies. While the results of these studies agree that 
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companies operating in stakeholder oriented countries are more likely to 
commission a sustainability assurance service, there are contradictory 
results as to the influence of the law enforcement regime. Hence, there is a 
need to conduct statistical studies with larger samples of data to clearly 
establish the relationships between the country law enforcement 
mechanisms and the voluntary commission of the sustainability assurance 
service. The contribution of interview-based studies lies in their capacity 
to illustrate the managerial reasons for commissioning voluntary 
sustainability assurance services. One interview study describes the 
arguments put forward by assurance providers to support the 
commissioning of sustainability assurance services. The examination of 
the perceptions of representatives of companies in different European 
countries (UK, Sweden and Finland) reveals that they are similar. Whilst 
the UK interview data analysis exhibits a rich and in-depth understanding 
of the perceptions of companies representatives, the Swedish and Finnish 
data analysis fails to provide in-depth explanations concerning motives 
behind the commission of sustainability assurance services. Albeit that 
Jones and Solomon (2010) provide important preliminary insights 
concerning the views of representatives of companies on the motives to 
commission sustainability assurance services, a number of issues remain 
unresolved. For example, the generally negative stance of UK companies 
towards sustainability assurance practices seems in conflict with the high 
prevalence of sustainability assurance commissioned (see section 2.1). 
Therefore, a further in-depth investigation of the motives of UK companies 
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in commissioning sustainability assurance, and of the reasons behind their 
favoured approaches, is needed.  
 
2.5 CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SUSTAINABILITY ASSURANCE PRACTICES  
There is a small body of academic empirical research that investigates the 
added value of sustainability assurance practices, their efficacy in 
enhancing corporate transparency and accountability to stakeholder 
groups, and issues of managerial capture and control, assurance 
providers capture, assurance providers approaches and expectation gap. 
 
An early empirical study (Maltby, 1995) conducted in 1991 examined the 
differences in assurance approaches adopted by environmental firms 
(environmental science and engineering background) and managerial 
firms (accountancy, management consultants, and lawyers). The research 
method consisted of a survey-questionnaire completed by 21 members of 
the Association of Environmental Consultancies (AEC). Maltby notes that 
managerial firms attached more importance to the audit objectives of 
testing and developing reporting systems than did the environmental 
firms (22). Only the managerial group supported the proposition that 
environmental audit is essentially a review of systems (22). The two 
groups attached equal importance to risk assessment. Both groups viewed 
this type of assurance more or less equally as a management aid, a test of 
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compliance and a means of improving environmental performance 
(Maltby, 1995:22).  
 
Ball, Owen and Gray (2000) and Kamp-Roelands (2002) conducted desk-
based studies examining assurance practices applied to environmental 
reports28
                                                        
28 Ball et al. (2000) examined reports produced from 1991 to 1998; their research 
method was content analysis.  Kamp-Roelands examined reports produced from 1993 to 
2002 using a multi-method approach. 
 during the 1990s, raising fundamental concerns about rigour, 
usefulness and expectation gap. Kamp-Roelands (2002:230-234), for 
example, highlights major inconsistencies in terms of subject matter 
addressed, scope of the exercise carried out, objectives, assurance criteria 
and procedures adopted, level of assurance provided and wording of 
opinions offered. Kamp-Roelands (2002:135) provides evidence of a huge 
expectation gap, in the sense that there are differences in the 
interpretation of the audit results, the audit engagement, and the meaning 
of the words true and fair between companies and assurance providers. 
Similarly, more fundamental questions are raised by Ball et al. (2000) over 
issues of assurance providers independence and the degree of rigour with 
which their work was conducted. Ball et al. (2000) point out that emphasis 
is placed on management systems (control of control) as opposed to 
performance-based issues. They argue that these issues place significant 
constraints on the potential of the assurance practices to enhance 
corporate transparency and accountability to stakeholder groups (Ball et 
al., 2000). 
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The concern as to whether similar weaknesses in assurance practices are 
noticeable in the wave of sustainability reporting produced during the 
early 2000s has been addressed in the work conducted by ODwyer and 
Owen (2005, 2007) and Deegan et al. (2006). These researchers examined 
sustainability assurance practices in the light of guidelines issued by 
influential bodies such as the FEE (2002, 2004), the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI) (2002) and AccountAbility (1999, 2003, 2005)29
 
. Despite 
the introduction of these authoritative assurance standards, these 
researchers find that ambiguity and variability remain inherent in current 
practice.  
ODwyer and Owen (2005) studied 41 assurance statements appearing in 
reports of leading edge companies short-listed for the 2002 ACCA UK 
and European sustainability reporting awards scheme. ODwyer and Owen 
(2005) revisited the issue of differences in assurance approaches 
                                                        
29 According to ODwyer and Owen (2005:211-212), the FEE(2002, 2004)  and the GRI 
(2002) have issued assurance and reporting guidelines based on an accountancy 
approach, concerned with examining data accuracy rather than addressing issues of 
transparency and completeness. This accountancy based approach has been supported 
by the publication of the ISAE3000 standard (IAASB, 2004). By contrast, ODwyer and 
Owen (2005:211-212) explain that the AccountAbility series of AA1000 assurance 
standards adopt an approach explicitly underpinned by the principle of stakeholder 
inclusivity, with an emphasis on assurance providers addressing the principles of 
materiality, completeness and responsiveness from a stakeholder perspective. With this 
model of assurance, providers are encouraged to adopt a strategic view in offering 
evaluative comment on the reporting organisations systems and processes, together 
with the highlighting of perceived strengths and weaknesses in both the reporting and 
performance domains. 
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addressed by Maltby (1995), and found that whilst accountants tend to 
adopt a cautious approach, limited in scope and offering low levels of 
assurance, the consultancy firms take an evaluative approach, and appear 
to provide higher levels of assurance.  ODwyer and Owen (2005:224) 
claim that assurance providers are being appointed by management, who 
can place any restrictions they wish on the exercise. Hence, value is 
provided mainly for management. They point out that stakeholder 
participation in the assurance process, and stakeholder engagement with 
the reporting organisation, is minimal (224). Indeed, there is a reluctance 
to address assurance statements to external stakeholders.  
 
A further study conducted by ODwyer and Owen (2007) extended their 
earlier work (ODwyer & Owen, 2005) by examining assurance statements 
appearing in reports short-listed for the 2003 ACCA UK and European 
awards scheme. It shows the beginnings of a more holistic stakeholder-
centred approach in the assurance practices, with AA 1000AS increasingly 
used as a reference point. However, they point to the continued lack of 
stakeholder involvement in the assurance practices, together with a 
paucity of evaluations of corporate responsiveness to stakeholder 
concerns and continued reluctance to address statements to stakeholders.    
 
Deegan et al. (2006), in their study examining assurance statements from 
UK and European companies published from 2000 to 2003, point to a 
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number of problematic areas. First, assurance statements are unclear 
about the work conducted, and the wording of conclusions can be 
ambiguous (Deegan et al., 2006:333). There is a huge degree of variability 
in the assurance practices, both within and between countries; therefore, 
they note that caution is needed when using aggregate data as ODwyer 
and Owen (2005) have done. The researchers claim that there has not 
been any change in the assurance practice and that the issues raised by 
Kamp-Roelands (2002) still remain. They argue that there are issues 
related to the independence of the work conducted, the tendency to give 
praise in the assurance statement, the tendency not to identify the 
addressee, the wide range of objectives for and scope of the assignment 
(with the latter typically prescribed by management), variation in the 
extent of description of the nature, timing and extent of procedures 
employed, and variability in the wording of any conclusions offered. The 
researchers question whether assurance approaches are adding value to 
the reporting process (Deegan et al., 2006:368).   
 
Al-Hamadeens (2007) study of 196 assurance statements issued by the 
FTSE100 companies from 2000 to 2004 confirms Deegan et al.s (2006) 
and ODwyer and Owens (2005, 2007) results, in the sense that he finds a 
huge variability in assurance practice, and evidence of managerial control. 
As ODwyer and Owen (2005) did, he analyzed differences in assurance 
approaches, finding that there is a third assurance approach, the 
certification body approach, which in his view is very similar to the 
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accountancy approach but might add more value to external 
constituencies as this type of assurance provider demonstrates 
independence in the assurance process by complying with internal 
protocols created to govern the relationship with the commissioning party 
(Al-Hamadeen, 2007:233). His findings illustrate that there is little 
evidence that assurance providers are evaluating the inclusion of 
stakeholders views in the report, or that they evaluate companies efforts 
to identify and respond to stakeholders interests and concerns; they also 
show a reluctance to address the statements to external stakeholders, 
confirming the results of ODwyer and Owen (2005).  
 
2.5.1 Summary 
A number of desk-based studies have provided a critique of the current 
practices of sustainability assurance in the UK and Europe. Their 
contribution lies in exposing fundamental questions about the value 
added to internal and external constituencies by these assurance 
practices, and about their role in promoting accountability to the 
stakeholders.  A limitation of these studies is that they rely solely upon the 
examination of assurance statements; however, assurance statements do 
not convey enough information to understand the sustainability assurance 
phenomenon in depth and in detail (see Deegan et al., 2006). A more 
recent study, conducted by ODwyer, Owen and Unerman (2011) 
examines why sustainability assurance has developed in the manner 
described by Maltby (1995), Ball et al. (2000), Kamp-Roelands (2002), 
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ODwyer and Owen (2005; 2007) and Deegan et al. (2006), analyzing this 
question from the perspective of assurance providers.  Arguably, there is a 
need to investigate the problems and potentialities of sustainability 
assurance practices from the perspective of companies. There is also a 
need to canvass the views of stakeholders as to the current and potential 
role of the assurance process in promoting inclusivity and accountability 
to stakeholders.  
 
2.6 STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT IN SUSTAINABILITY ASSURANCE 
The issue of stakeholder inclusion in sustainability assurance practices 
has been examined in a couple of studies. The study conducted by Park 
(2004), based on interviews held in 2003 with 28 representatives of 
Swedish companies and five representatives of assurance providers, gives 
a preliminary insight, revealing the views of these interviewees as to the 
added value that stakeholder involvement could bring to the assurance 
practices. Half of the interviewees from companies perceived two main 
benefits: adding credibility to the assurance process and strengthening 
relationships with stakeholders.  For this sample of companies, the best 
way to bring the views of stakeholders into the assurance process was via 
the mediation of assurance providers. They did not support radical 
changes in the structure of the company-stakeholders power relationships 
(Park, 2004:73), nor did they support the involvement of NGOs in the 
assurance process, or the use of stakeholder panels of evaluation. 
Conversely, all the representatives of assurance providers had a negative 
  
44 
 
attitude towards the involvement of stakeholders in the assurance 
process.  
 
Edgley et al. (2010) advance the analysis by evaluating issues of assurance 
benefits, the extent of stakeholder inclusion in the assurance process, and 
managerial capture, from the perspective of assurance providers in the 
UK. The views of interviewees point to a growing focus on stakeholder 
inclusion in the assurance practice. This leads Edgley et al. (2010) to 
conclude that assurance is now providing benefits for management and 
stakeholders (542), and that sustainability assurance practices are 
undergoing significant change (553).  Edgley et al. (2010) also examined 
the impediments to bringing about more stakeholder inclusion in the 
assurance practices, chiefly ignorance and lack of interest on the part of 
stakeholders (551). These are fundamental reasons, as without 
stakeholders driving the agenda forward, [sustainability reporting] and 
[sustainability assurance] are unlikely to develop significantly (Edgley et 
al., 2010:551). Interestingly, assurance providers also apparently see 
themselves as representing the voice of the stakeholders to the company. 
 
2.6.1 Summary 
Although Park (2004) and Edgley et al. (2010) provide some preliminary 
insights concerning the views of Swedish corporate managers and 
Swedish and UK assurance providers on the inclusion of stakeholders 
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views in sustainability assurance practices, there is much scope for field 
work initiatives to explore in more depth the practicalities of including the 
views of stakeholders in the assurance practice. Whilst the UK interview 
data analysis shows a rich and in-depth understanding of the perceptions 
of assurance providers, the Swedish data analysis makes no attempt to 
analyze motives behind the practices adopted by companies. To date there 
are no studies addressing this issue from the perspective of UK 
companies; therefore a further in-depth investigation of companies 
perspectives on this issue, and of their favoured approaches to 
stakeholder inclusion in sustainability assurance practices, seems needed. 
Additionally, there are no previous studies examining the views of 
stakeholders about this issue in the UK context. There is a need to canvass 
the views of stakeholders as to the practicalities of involving them in 
assurance practices.  
 
2.7 CONCLUSION 
The discussion in this chapter can be summarized in four key points:  
(1) The discussion of the literature illustrates recent trends and features 
of sustainability assurance practices. 
(2) The discussion of the literature examines the drivers and benefits of 
commissioning sustainability assurance services. 
(3) The discussion of the literature points to critical issues in 
sustainability assurance practices. 
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(4) The discussion of the literature illustrates the views of companies and 
assurance providers on the inclusion of stakeholders views in 
sustainability assurance practices.  
 
First, KPMG (2005, 2008) and CorporateRegister.com (2008) reveal that 
there are clear regional and country differences in the growth of the 
provision of sustainability assurance statements within published 
corporate sustainability reports. Europe is the geographical region with 
the greatest number of corporate sustainability reports accompanied by a 
form of externally prepared assurance statement. KPMG (2005, 2008), 
CorporateRegister.com (2008), Deegan et al. (2006), Al-Hamadeen (2007) 
and Mock et al. (2007) illustrate that there are international differences in 
the main features of the sustainability assurance practices.  These include 
differences in the type of assurance provider commissioned to conduct the 
exercise. Whilst accountancy firms dominate the assurance market 
worldwide, in the UK specialized assurance consultants are the most 
preferred (Al-Hamadeen, 2007).  There are also differences in whether or 
not assurance standards are referred to. Whilst the ISAE3000 is the most 
referenced standard worldwide, in the UK the AA1000AS is the most 
mentioned (Al-Hamadeen, 2007). There are also differences as to whether 
the level of assurance is mentioned. Whilst most of the assurance 
exercises worldwide are conducted with limited levels of assurance, in the 
UK most of the assurance statements do not refer to the level of assurance 
(Al-Hamadeen, 2007). These studies also reveal common patterns in the 
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sustainability assurance features in that there is great diversity in the 
assurance procedures, and assurance statements do not specify an 
intended audience (Deegan et al., 2006). The practice of sustainability 
assurance is evolving rapidly (Jones & Solomon, 2010); therefore a 
detailed investigation of the assurance practices in the UK seems needed 
to clarify recent developments in the growth of the provision of 
sustainability assurance statements within the wave of published 
corporate sustainability reports, and their key features. To date there are 
no studies examining in detail trends and developments with regard to the 
participation of stakeholders in the sustainability assurance practices in 
the UK; therefore such investigation is worth doing. Further, the trends in 
features of sustainability assurance practices revealed by these studies 
raise questions that require answers and explanations. Therefore, there is 
a need to investigate the views of companies on these issues. 
 
Second, the studies of Simnett et al. (2009) and Kolk and Perego (2010) 
reveal that the likelihood that companies will assure their sustainability 
reports increases if they are based in stakeholder oriented countries. This 
likelihood increases further if the companies are large, have higher need 
to enhance credibility (Simnett et al., 2009), and if they are in countries 
where there is more pressure for corporate sustainability (Kolk & Perego, 
2010). The case of the UK is worthy of investigation given that, despite 
being a shareholder oriented country, the practice of sustainability 
assurance has been popular. Studies conducted by Park and Brorson 
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(2005), Kotonen (2009) and Jones and Solomon (2010) reveal that from a 
company perspective, important drivers for the voluntary adoption of 
sustainability assurance services are the need to improve reporting 
systems and the need to enhance credibility of the information reported 
with external constituencies. These studies also evidence that across 
countries there is a general reluctance to endorse external sustainability 
assurance. The generally negative stance of UK companies towards 
sustainability assurance practices seems at odds with the high prevalence 
of sustainability assurance commissioned. Therefore, a further in-depth 
investigation of the motives of UK companies and their favoured 
approaches towards assurance is needed. 
 
Third, leading researchers in the field have raised fundamental concerns. 
There exist differences in the assurance approaches of different assurance 
providers (Maltby, 1995; Ball et al., 2000; ODwyer & Owen, 2005). There 
is also a huge expectation gap, illustrated by the differences in the 
interpretation of audit results, audit engagement, and the meaning of the 
opinion offered by companies and assurance providers (Kamp-Roelands, 
2002). Further, when comparing exercises conducted in 1997 with those 
conducted from 2000 to 2003, there is no evidence of improvement in the 
practice of sustainability assurance (Deegan et al., 2006). In addition, 
these sustainability assurance exercises are conducted mainly to serve the 
corporate agenda rather than as stakeholder accountability exercises 
(ODwyer & Owen, 2005). The studies are limited in that they rely solely 
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upon the examination of assurance statements.  Arguably, there is a need 
to explore the problems and potentialities of sustainability assurance 
practices from the perspective of companies. There is also a need to 
canvass the views of stakeholders as to the current and potential role of 
the assurance practices in promoting inclusivity and accountability to 
stakeholders.  
 
Fourth, the inclusion of stakeholders views in the practice of 
sustainability assurance is crucial in order to enhance corporate 
accountability to stakeholders. There are international differences in the 
inclusion of the views of stakeholders in sustainability assurance 
practices. Whilst in Sweden companies and assurance providers do not 
support direct participation of stakeholders in the assurance practice 
(Park, 2004), in the UK assurance providers are supportive of stakeholder 
participation; they argue that there is a growing focus on the inclusion of 
stakeholders in assurance practice (Edgley et al., 2010). There is a need to 
investigate in detail this new tendency in the UK of including stakeholders 
views in the sustainability assurance practice. Therefore, an examination 
of the perspectives of companies and stakeholders on the problems and 
practicalities of involving stakeholders in sustainability assurance 
practices in the UK seems necessary. 
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Finally, the following Table 2.4 provides a clarification of what this thesis 
investigates: 
Table 2-4 Gap in knowledge 
Extended work of Gap in knowledge 
 
Research direction 
 
Al-Hamadeen (2007) 
 
Trends and features in 
assurance practice in the UK 
 
Descriptive study;  
Longitudinal study; Content 
analysis of assurance statements 
Edgley et al. (2010) 
 
Trends in stakeholder 
participation in sustainability 
assurance practices in the UK 
 
Descriptive study;  
Longitudinal study; Content 
analysis of assurance statements 
Deegan et al. (2006); 
Al-Hamadeen (2007); 
Jones and Solomon (2010); 
Edgley et al. (2010) 
 
Identify emerging issues in the 
assurance practice in the UK 
 
Descriptive study;  
Longitudinal study; Content 
analysis of assurance statements 
 
Jones and Solomon (2010); 
Edgley et al. (2010) 
 
Explain emerging issues in the 
assurance practice in the UK 
 
Explanatory study; Semi-structured 
interviews with representatives of 
UK companies and representatives 
of stakeholder groups 
Jones and Solomon (2010) 
 
Investigate motives, reasons 
behind commission of 
sustainability assurance 
services in the UK 
 
Explanatory study; Semi-structured 
interviews with representatives of 
UK companies  
 
Kamp-Roelands (2002); 
 ODwyer and Owen (2005; 
2007) 
Al-Hamadeen (2007) 
Investigate problems and 
potentialities of sustainability 
assurance practices in the UK 
 
Explanatory study; Semi-structured 
interviews with representatives of 
UK companies and representatives 
of stakeholder groups 
 
Edgley et al. (2010) 
 
Investigate views on 
stakeholder participation, and 
favoured approaches in 
participation in the UK 
 
Explanatory study; Semi-structured 
interviews with representatives of 
UK companies and representatives 
of stakeholder groups 
 
The present study contributes to the body of literature in the field of 
sustainability assurance by addressing the following research questions: 
x What are the trends and emerging issues in the practice of 
sustainability assurance as represented in the text of assurance 
statements of companies in the UK between 2001 and 2007?  
x What are the managerial perceptions on emerging issues of 
sustainability assurance practices in the United Kingdom?  
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x What are the managerial perceptions on stakeholder-centred 
sustainability assurance practices? 
x What are the managerial views on how to further develop 
sustainability assurance practices with added value? 
x What are the perceptions of various stakeholder groups towards 
sustainability assurance practices in the United Kingdom? 
x What are the perceptions of various stakeholder groups on 
stakeholder-centred sustainability assurance practices?  
x What are the perceptions of various stakeholder groups on how to 
further develop sustainability assurance practices with added 
value?  
The first of these research questions is answered in chapter five; chapter 
six deals with research questions two, three and four. Finally, chapter 
seven addresses research questions five, six and seven. 
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3 CHAPTER THREE: AUDIT, STAKEHOLDERS AND 
LEGITIMACY 
 
This chapter has the following aims: 
(1) To introduce Michael Powers theory on auditing; 
(2) To describe elements of Powers theory used in previous researches 
that examine the sustainability assurance phenomenon; 
(3) To describe critical elements of Powers theory relevant to this 
research; 
(4) To illustrate key elements of legitimacy and stakeholder theories 
relevant to this research. 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Michael Powers theoretical work on auditing is the accepted analytical 
perspective used by several academic researchers to examine and explain 
key features of the development of sustainability assurance practices. 
Powers concerns with regard to the scale and significance of audit in 
society have been noticeable in the practice of sustainability assurance. 
This chapter illustrates how Powers work has been used to examine the 
emerging practice of sustainability assurance in the UK. It also describes 
key strands of Powers work used in this research as determinants for the 
analysis of data and for the drawing of conclusions. It explores the 
application of legitimacy and stakeholder theories to examine motivations 
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behind the practice of sustainability assurance. It comprises five sections: 
the first describes the main strands of Powers theoretical work; the 
second provides an overview of academic research examining 
sustainability assurance practices through the lens of Powers theory; the 
third discusses in detail key theses of Powers theoretical work used to 
examine the findings emerging from this research; the fourth explores the 
application of legitimacy and stakeholder theories to analyze findings in 
this research. Finally, section five draws conclusions from the discussions 
in this chapter. 
 
3.2 MICHAEL POWERS THEORY OF AUDITING 
Humphrey and Owen (2000) provide an overview on Powers 
(1997/1999) main theses concerning the scale and significance of audit in 
society. Powers work The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification 
(1997/1999) contains his ideas concerning the importance of audit and its 
potential added value in society. His work also provides a critique on the 
state of actual auditing practices, and the consequences of audit failure. 
For Humphrey and Owen (2000:31-36), Powers main theses are 
concerned with: 
 
x The indeterminacy of the audit function. Power (1997/1999) 
argues that the idea of audit has spread in society mainly as a result 
of the indeterminacy of the notion and function of audit. Albeit 
  
54 
 
several definitions of the idea of audit are provided in different 
contexts, they are incapable of describing the real function of audit 
practices.  However, Power (1997/1999) attempts to provide clear 
characteristics of audit by using the normative (programmatic) and 
operational (technological) elements of audit. 
 
x The condition of auditing as control of control. Power (1997/1999) 
is concerned with the perception of audit as control of control, 
whereby the audit activity focuses on examining internal 
management control systems, rather than the impact of 
organisations actions.  Humphrey and Owen (2000:35) note that 
rather than promoting change in organisational activities, the audit 
practice remains a surface function with potentially questionable 
ethical foundations.  
 
x The scale of change in different aspects of governance and 
accountability. Power (1997/1999) argues that changes in public 
sector administration, shifts towards regulatory styles of 
governance and demands for accountability, and the rise of quality 
assurance, have been influential in the rise of audit in society.  
 
x The spread of the idea of audit in society. Power (1997/1999) 
identifies two main factors which contribute to the spread of audit. 
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First, the expectation gap allows audit failure to go unrecognized, 
and disconnects audit collapses from inefficiencies in the 
regulatory system. Second, audit is capable of moving across 
several contexts, from providing assurance to examining 
performance, from examining quality of operations to examining 
the quality of management systems of control, from critical 
external examination to internal managerial examination.  
 
x The construction of the audit process. Power (1997/1999) claims 
that the construction of the audit process is fundamental to 
maintain the legitimacy of the idea of audit in society.  He terms 
this process of construction making things auditable, and 
describes it as a high level negotiation between the auditor and the 
auditee, aimed at reproducing the audit knowledge system and 
sustaining the institutional role of audit. Power raises concerns 
that legitimacy is achieved even in cases where there is no clarity 
on the objective or capacity of the audit practice.  
 
x The organisational consequences of attempts to apply audits and 
make them work. Power (1997/1999) argues that there are two 
main consequences: decoupling and colonization. Decoupling exists 
when the audit process is remote from the organisational process. 
Colonization is the effect of being colonized by an audit process 
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which spreads and inserts the idealized values that support its 
demands. For Power, colonization and decoupling produce reverse 
effects which ultimately frustrate and undermine the goals of 
control and effectiveness.  
 
x The contributions of audit in terms of accountability to society. 
Power (1997/1999) expresses concerns regarding the changing 
bases of trust in society, and the role of auditing in that shift.  He 
calls for new forms of social control based on face-to-face 
responsiveness. For Power, this face-to-face accountability 
requires a readiness to accept changes in the audit practices (or 
even to undo audit arrangements).  
 
Power (1997/1999) discussed many of these theses in earlier work (1991, 
1992a, 1992b, 1994a, 1994b, 1996), and subsequently extended a number 
of the ideas (Power, 2000, 2003a, 2003b, 2007a, 2007b). Several of these 
arguments have been used by academic researchers with the goal of 
responding to Powers (1997/1997, 2003b) calls for empirical 
examination of auditing practices, benefits, and consequences.   
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3.3 STUDIES UTILIZING THE WORK OF POWER TO EXAMINE THE 
SUSTAINABILITY ASSURANCE PHENOMENON 
Maltby (1995), Ball et al. (2000), ODwyer and Owen (2005), Jones and 
Solomon (2010), Edgley et al. (2010), ODwyer et al. (2011) and Al-
Hamadeen (2007) provide empirical evidence of Powers theses on the 
phenomenon of auditing practices by evaluating the waves of verification 
of corporate environmental reports and assurance of corporate 
sustainability and environmental reports.  The most examined theses are 
related to the issue of managerial control and professional capture, the 
differences between accountancy and consultancy approaches to auditing, 
the question of whether assurance statements add any value to external 
constituencies, and their failure to provide a deliberative base to achieve 
accountability. 
 
Preliminary work by Maltby (1995) evaluated Powers (1991) claim 
concerning the conflict between two normative views of environmental 
auditing: as managerial aid or as instrument of protest. She found that in 
the view of selected environmental and management consultants, there is 
no conflict of interest between these two concepts of auditing. It can be 
inferred from this that these consultants were willing to capture the 
environmental auditing practice. Maltby (1995) also examined Powers 
(1991) arguments regarding the competing approaches of the scientific 
and accounting communities to environmental auditing. She found no 
noticeable distinction between scientific and accounting approaches, 
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although she acknowledges that the result could have been affected by the 
disadvantages of collecting the data via the questionnaire-survey method.  
 
In a more recent and more detailed investigation, Ball et al. (2000) analyze 
Powers (1996) argument regarding the issue of managerial control over 
auditing practice. From the analysis of a sample of verification statements, 
Ball et al. infer that the auditee influences and controls  what is reported 
to the public, as  environmental corporate reports manifest managerial 
orientation (2000:17). They also corroborate Powers (1991) claims 
around the capture of environmental auditing by auditors, and the 
delegation of the examination of disclosures to narrow bodies of expertise. 
These authors bear out Powers (1997/1999) criticisms of current 
auditing practices; that is, their focus on examining management control 
systems rather than performance-based first order operations, their 
failure to empower stakeholders and promote transparency, the lack of 
added value of auditing statements for external constituencies, how the 
construction of this type of auditing distorts the environmental discourse, 
and how the fact of being seen to be audited builds organisational 
legitimacy. The authors acknowledge that their analysis is limited, in that 
conclusions about companies intentions and motives are only inferences 
from the analysis of the statements.  
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In another significant study, ODwyer and Owen (2005) re-examine the 
arguments of Power previously analyzed by Maltby (1995) and Ball et al. 
(2000), in the context of the age of sustainability assurance. Their 
inferences from the analysis of selected assurance statements support 
Powers (1996) arguments concerning managerial control over and 
professional capture of the assurance process. Their results validate 
Powers (1991) distinction between the accountancy (cautious) and 
consultancy (evaluative) approaches to auditing. They also confirm 
Powers (1997/1999) claims regarding the lack of added value of the 
assurance statements for external constituencies, and their failure to 
provide a deliberative base to achieve accountability. The authors infer 
that assurance practices do not enable criticism and substantive change, 
as advocated by Power (1997/1999:124). Their results corroborate 
Powers (1997/1999) argument that more auditing does not mean more 
and better accountability. However, albeit that the analysis provided by 
these researchers is perceptive, they recognize a limitation in that their 
conclusions about the intentions and motives of companies and assurance 
providers are only inferences from a small sample of statements.  
 
In a recent longitudinal study, Al-Hamadeen (2007) examines Powers 
(1997/1999) claims on the need to make a distinction between the 
programmatic (normative) and technological (operational) notions of 
auditing.  The statistical inferences from the analysis of selected assurance 
statements provide evidence on the development of the operational 
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notion of sustainability assurance in the form of a codified and formalized 
assurance practice. According to Al-Hamadeen (2007:242), it is difficult to 
evaluate the programmatic side of the sustainability assurance practice as 
it is still a voluntary exercise, and accountability relationships seem to be 
weak. However, key researchers in the field (see for example, Ball et al., 
2000; ODwyer & Owen, 2005; Jones and Solomon, 2010) have been able 
to analyze whether current practices of sustainability assurance enhance 
accountability (one of the core aspects of the programmatic notion of 
auditing). Moreover, Al-Hamadeens analysis is based on inferences from 
assurance statements. The conclusions of this study would have been 
more interesting if the author had adopted an in-depth analytical 
examination of the empirical results based on the theses developed by 
Power; these points represent serious weaknesses. 
 
Jones and Solomon (2010) revisit Powers (1997/1999) thesis on the lack 
of added value in sustainability assurance practices that focus on 
examining management control systems, as previously analyzed by Ball et 
al. (2000). Their results show that in the view of representatives of UK 
companies, the external assurance of management control systems is 
important. However, the authors confirm Powers (1997/1999) claim that 
auditing is perceived mainly as a management tool rather than as an 
instrument for achieving accountability. Further, in the view of one of the 
respondents, the accountancy profession has captured this type of 
assurance practice, which also supports the arguments made by Power 
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(1991). Albeit that the researchers acknowledge a problem of bias in the 
interviewee sample, the major advantage of the analysis of this study is 
that it examines Powers theses based on the views of representatives of 
UK companies.  
 
Another recent study, by Edgley et al. (2010), re-examines Powers (1996) 
argument regarding managerial control over sustainability assurance 
practices. The authors find evidence of managerial capture in that 
assurance statements are addressed to the company management, and the 
process of stakeholder inclusion in sustainability assurance is driven by 
companies. They also corroborate Powers (1991) argument regarding the 
differences in provider approaches, finding that there is a distinction 
between the methods adopted by accountants and those used by 
consultants to incorporate the views of stakeholders in the assurance 
process. The major advantage of the analysis of this study is that it 
examines Powers theses in conjunction with Freires theory30
 
, based on 
the views of representatives of assurance providers.  
ODwyer et al. (2011) examine the views of assurance providers regarding 
Powers (2003a) thesis pertaining to auditors need to secure legitimacy 
for auditing practices. They find that sustainability assurance practices 
have been influenced by the need to secure legitimacy with internal and 
                                                        
30 In Freires model of education, education should be based on dialogue. These 
researchers use this model to analyze the dialogic nature of sustainability assurance. 
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external constituencies, hence supporting Powers (2003a) arguments.  
The major advantage of the analysis of this study is that it advances 
Powers (2003a) thesis by providing empirical evidence on the 
relationships between securing legitimacy and the development of 
assurance practice (ODwyer et al., 2011).  
 
In short, Powers theoretical work has been subject to empirical 
evaluation through analysis of the emerging practice of sustainability 
assurance as portrayed in the assurance statements, and through the 
views of companies and assurance providers. While the contribution of 
these studies has been significant for the understanding of the 
sustainability assurance phenomenon, research in the field is still at the 
emerging stage, and there is ample scope for further study. Therefore, the 
present study extends the analysis of previous researchers by exploring in 
more detail Powers theses on the meaning and purpose of auditing in 
society from the perspectives of representatives of companies and 
stakeholder groups. This research advances the argument by examining 
Powers theses concerning the role of audit in achieving stakeholder 
accountability, and the role of stakeholders in auditing practices and 
corporate governance. It also explores the role of the internal audit 
function in the provision of sustainability assurance. Furthermore, this 
study examines Powers criticisms of current auditing practices related to 
the influence of the cost of assurance on the practice, the issue of 
expectation gap and the problem of displacement of trust.  
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3.4 UNDERSTANDING POWERS THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTION 
This section discusses the key concepts of Powers theory which are 
relevant for this research, and which provide a basis for further discussion 
in later chapters.  
 
3.4.1 The meaning of auditing 
One of Powers main arguments concerns the meaning of auditing. In 
order to achieve clear understanding, he makes a distinction between the 
programmatic31
 
 (normative) and technological (operational) aspects of 
audit. According to Power (1994b, 1997/1999, 2000, 2003a), at 
programmatic level definitions of audit are created by the regulatory 
discourse with the goal of ensuring audit success. This strong desire for 
success requires a commitment to the idea of audit and to the social 
norms and hopes which it represents (Power, 1997/1999:4). At 
technological level, audit is defined as a series of routines and practices. In 
turn, audit practices have their own sub-programmatic discourse which 
develops and affirms the efficacy of specific practices (Power, 
1997/1999:7). 
At programmatic level, Power (1994b) contends that audit is understood 
as representing benefits such as the provision of independent validation 
and the promise of control and efficiency. It also symbolizes ideals of 
                                                        
31 Power bases this argument on the work of Rose and Millers (1992). 
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quality, governance and accountability (Power, 1994b: 47). This aspect 
of audit is important to understand, because the definitions provided in 
governmental policy documents, professional documents and academic 
papers are an idealized normative projection of the hopes invested in the 
audit practice (Power, 1997/1999:4). Hence, what is discussed is the 
potentiality of the audit practice, rather than its real capacity and 
effectiveness. For Power (1994b, 1997/1999), definitions of audit are 
mainly efforts to attach practices to a set of norms, values and ideologies; 
they constitute an attempt to say what it would be capable of doing.   
 
The concept of audit comprises highly idealized elements used in a wide 
variety of contexts (Power, 2000:116). Power (1994b) explains that a 
major characteristic of the idea of audit is that it can be replicated in 
diverse contexts as a means to demonstrate, for example, public sector 
efficiency or the adequacy of environmental and quality management 
systems, or to promote good governance systems in an organisation. 
Indeed, while the concept of audit seems straightforward, based on 
actions of giving and checking accounts, it is difficult to provide a single 
definition (Power, 1994b, 1997/1999). This is because diverse practices 
framed by very different bodies of knowledge are labelled with the word 
auditing (Power, 1994b:4).  Hence, it is wiser to speak of a cluster of 
definitions which overlap but are not identical (Power, 1997/1999:4). 
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At technological level, Power (1994b, 1997/1999, 2003a) argues that 
audit is a craft depending on a series of specialized practices. The four 
main elements of the audit practices are independence from the auditee; 
procedures to collect and analyze evidence; the production of an opinion, 
and a clear subject matter for audit (Power, 1997/1999:5). Power 
(2003a:392) explains that these technical practices are arranged in 
systems comprising standards, technical training, and quality assurance 
procedures.  According to Power (2003a) these systems are subject to 
constant change as a result of political, economic and regulatory 
pressures.  Indeed, audit practices are affected by the normative ideas of 
what audit should be and should do (Power, 2003a). In addition, the 
judgement made by individual auditors based on their skills and 
experience must be trusted by society (Power, 1997/1999).  
 
3.4.2 The purpose of auditing 
Power (1994b, 1997/1999, 2003a) explains that there is no consensus on 
the purpose of audits in society; hence there exist contradictory views as 
to the function of audit. Some, sceptical, views argue that audits produce 
nothing more than paper (Power, 2003a:380); others perceive the audit 
function as an insurance or certification process (Power, 1997/1999:40).   
There are also views promoting the effective added value of audits capable 
of supporting programmes -internal forms of audit - or discipline - in the 
form of external verification - in the public and private sector spheres 
(Power, 1994b). For Power, it is clear that audits have the capability to 
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develop organisations control systems (and thereby change 
environments); to modify reporting systems, and reports; to transform 
organisational performance; to facilitate critiques and provoke change; to 
secure organisational legitimacy, and to operationalize accountability 
(1994b, 1996, 1997/1999, 2000, 2003a, 2007a,2007b).    
  
Audits are capable of transforming organisations control systems; 
however, in the process of doing so, the audit process alters the 
environment in which it operates (Power, 1994b, 1996). Power 
(1996:293) explains that audits influence environments and organisations 
as a result of the process of what auditors do when they [need to] audit 
organisations. Power (1996:291-293) points out that the process of audit 
requires, first, the creation of an audit knowledge base system composed 
of: (1) the auditing rules, regulations and procedures, (2) the formal and 
informal education of auditors, (3) the practice, which according to 
Pentland (Power, 1996:293) involves personal judgement and high level 
negotiations between the auditor and auditee, and (4) quality control of 
audit procedures and practices. This audit knowledge base must be 
legitimate and institutionally acceptable (Power, 1996:289); hence, 
Power (1996) states that there is also a need to create environments open 
to new ideas and able to accept new audit knowledge bases.  
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Power (1996) contends that audits play a decisive role in the development 
of reporting systems and reports. Audit is an agency of organisational 
change (Power, 2000:114). Power (1996) argues that auditors possess 
knowledge in risk assessment procedures, technologies of control and the 
rules guiding reporting process, which enables them to provide 
recommendations for the improvement of these three areas. He notes that 
in the process of auditing there is a co-evolution between the auditing 
itself and the organisations systems of control. This co-evolution is also 
noticeable in the development of reporting systems. Power (1996:290), 
citing Pentland, contends that audit influences the reporting process to the 
extent that accounts and audits are co-produced. 
 
Indeed, Power (1997/1999) argues that the relationship between audits 
and reports goes beyond the validation of reports; audit is also a style of 
processing which influences organisational performance, modifying it and 
developing it in critical ways (Power, 1994b:8). Power explains that 
auditors not only evaluate auditee performance, but also shape the 
performance standards and public perceptions of the problems for which 
audits are the solution (1994b:8, 2000). The paradox here is that the 
process of audit itself lacks clear indicators of its own performance.  
 
According to Power (1994b, 1996, 1997/1999, 2000), in society, an 
important role for audits is to uncover problems, provide proof to external 
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constituencies, and serve as instrument to facilitate external critique. 
However, Power (1997/1999) claims that the current predominant view 
of audit is as an instrument that serves the institutional need to deliver 
comfort in society; in other words, to provide assurance. Power 
(1997/1999:21) explains that there has been a transformation in the role 
of audit over the last fifty years, from detecting fraud or providing a view 
on management performance, to the provision of an opinion on the 
statements (see Lee, 1986, cited by Power, 1997/1999). The 
responsibility for fraud detection has been reallocated from the auditors 
to the company management. In environments where audit arrangements 
emphasize the production of comfort, audit is designed not to be too 
successful in reporting on issues for open debate or in making criticisms 
(Power, 1997/1999:126). Power (1997/1999:126) claims that this 
antagonism between producing comfort or critiques has serious 
implications for the use of auditing as an instrument for public dialogue. 
Hence, audit is a catalyst for change only in environments open to facing 
judgement, distress and even embarrassment.  
 
Power (2003a:392) contends that the audit system imports and exports 
legitimacy. Audits contribute to a style of evaluation from which 
organisations emerge as legitimate, safe, efficient, and cost-effective and 
so on (Power, 1997/1999:8). Power (2003a) asserts that audits produce 
assurance or an increased confidence in the accounts subject to the audit. 
Hence, audit is a decisive factor for securing legitimacy of organisational 
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actions (Power, 1997/1999). According to Power, the process of 
evaluating and providing assurance on the accounts that represent 
organisational performance provides an indication of the integrity and 
legitimacy of management (2007b:43). However, Power (1994b, 
1997/1999) raises concerns that audit is a new form of image 
management, which encourages positive feelings about organisational 
practices; Power claims that being seen to be audited is more important 
than the how of the audit, or the performance of the auditee (1994b:48).    
 
The actual process of auditing confers legitimacy on the audit system and 
the auditors themselves. Pentland (Power, 2003a:384) explained that 
audit is a socially constructed process in which micro-interactions sustain 
the macro-construction of professionalism, independence of the auditor 
and institutional trust in audit practice. Pentland (Power 2003a:385) 
argued that these micro-interactions produce comfort which in turn 
makes possible its macro systemic function of legitimacy. Power 
(2003a:385) also notes that these micro-interactions facilitate solidarity 
among members of the audit team, impression management, and the 
efficiency of the audit practice.  Hence, the legitimacy of the systems of 
audit, the work of the auditor and the auditee are co-produced (Power, 
2003a:380).  In this context, Power (1996:310) claims that the process of 
auditing aims to safeguard institutionalized images of assurance which 
are externally legitimate and which are consistent with the claimed 
practicalities of cost. Power (2003a:392) explains that this export/import 
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of legitimacy goes in cycles of permanent change which must be 
legitimated under circumstances in which there exists an increased 
expectation gap about and within the audit system.  
 
Finally, Power (1997/1999:134) argues that audits have the capacity to 
operationalize and realize accountability. This is the core programmatic 
value of audit. Indeed, for Power what makes auditing auditing is the 
legitimate requirement for one party to give an account of those actions 
relevant to its relation to another party (1997/1999:134). Audit is a form 
of social control in which auditors are social control specialists who 
oversee the proceduralization of information flows to principals in the 
form of accounting and disclosure requirements (Power 1997/1999:134). 
This aspect of the audit practice will be discussed in more detail later in 
this chapter in sections 3.3.6 and 3.3.7. 
 
3.4.3 The economic added value of auditing 
Power explains that during the 1990s a new type of auditing service 
emerged, which constitut[ed] a new alignment between a need for 
greater cost-efficiency in the audit process and a need for a service that 
could have an added-value (2007b:43).  However, there exists a difficulty 
in demonstrating the added value of auditing, which arises from the 
questioning and comparing of benefits that flow from auditing practices 
with the cost of auditing, the public legitimacy of the accountants and 
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other types of assurance providers, and the efficacy of audits in relation to 
corporate governance (Power, 1994b, 1997/1999). It is not a simple task 
to demonstrate the added value of audits, as the improvement of reporting 
systems and reliability of reports may be a result either of good 
accounting policies or of good auditing (Power, 1994b:29). 
 
In economic terms, the added value of the audit product is the result of a 
relationship between the audit cost and the assurance produced (Power, 
1997/1999). However, it is difficult to demonstrate in tangible terms the 
extent to which audits enhance credibility of the audited object (Power, 
1997/1999). The problem is that the nature of the assurance given by 
audits cannot be observed or measured other than in broad qualitative 
terms or through a consensus among auditors themselves (Power, 
1997/1999:28). The production of assurance depends on the subjective 
opinion of the assurance providers (Power, 1997/1999). 
 
Power (1996, 1997/1999, 2003a, 2007a) indicates clearly that the 
auditing practice is heavily influenced by the business thinking and 
bounded by the financial cost. For example, in reporting a study by 
Humphrey and Moizer, Power (2003a:382-383) notes that the audit 
planning process is built under marketing (selling), technical (traditional) 
and ideological (legitimating) principles simultaneously.  He contends that 
the audit planning process and selling process are linked and have the 
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ability to affect each other. Cost and benefits are traded in the production 
of an optimum audit process (2007a: 3). Power also argues that the 
quality of the audit practice is affected by the audit cost, as auditing 
procedures and techniques are limited by economic factors (1996). 
Indeed, MacNair (Power 2003a: 382) maintained that auditors trade cost 
and audit quality, and that this problem of the quality of auditing being 
limited by cost constraints is resolved through time budgeting and 
reporting process. The cost of audit also influences the extent to which 
the principals are willing to undertake an auditing service (Power, 
1997/1999). However, Power claims that one of the consequences of 
organisations transforming themselves to become more audit ready or 
disciplined in terms of audit values is an increase in the likelihood of 
reducing the cost of auditing over time (Power, 2007a:3). 
 
3.4.4 The rise of internal control and risk management 
systems   
Since the 1990s, there has been a notorious importance of internal 
management systems of control (see Maijoor, 2000), accompanied by an 
audit implosion (Power, 2000:118). The growth of internal management 
control systems is part of a broad process aimed at making organisations 
accountable, auditable and inspectable (Power, 2007b:43), and has been 
referred to as a core value of policy paradigm for corporate governance 
(Hall, 1989, cited in Power, 2007b:60). The process of auditing has been 
facilitated by examining internal control systems, as they are a window on 
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the client organisation, its risk management and strategy (Power, 
2007b:47).  The term audit implosion refers to the rise of auditing 
internal management control systems (Power, 2007b:47). Indeed, audit 
procedures aimed at the inspection of first order activities have been 
displaced by procedures focusing on the examination of systems of control 
(Power, 1994b).  
 
The rise of the audit implosion is a result of the high cost of direct 
inspections (Power, 1994b:19). Auditing has focused on examining the 
self-assessment capability of organisations (Power, 1997/1999:32). 
Power (2007b) claims that, at regulatory level, these structures of self-
control and self-observation have acquired a high importance; however, 
the role of external auditing is still significant. Auditing internal control 
management systems lies at the heart of governance thinking and practice 
(Power, 2007b). Nevertheless, Power (2007b) makes the criticism that 
stakeholders organisations can hold organisations to account for the 
quality of their self-control (rather than for the performance of their 
activities).  
 
Indeed, Power (2007b:39) contends that internal control systems and 
related public disclosures have been transformed into the material 
representation or proxy for trusting organisations and their leaders. In 
consequence, internal management control systems act as a symbol of 
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organisational virtue, whereby external interests are managed and 
represented (Power, 2007b:63). Power explains that the development of 
complex internal control systems influenced auditors to standardize and 
re-categorize them as risk management systems (Power, 2007b:52).  
 
Power (2007b:43) states that during the 1990s and 2000s, the complexity 
of internal control management systems required that auditors rethink 
the auditing task, concentrating on examining critical risks and how 
organisations control and mitigate them.   This shift in the auditing 
process allowed the reformation of the auditor role to that of an added-
value business advisor, with the management letter being a primary focus 
of the advice identifying deficiencies in control systems (Power, 
2007b:44). Another change in the audit process was the transformation 
into a professional service, as a result of the need for auditing to focus on 
examining points in real-time assurance rather than just at the end of the 
year (Power, 2007b:46).  Hence, organisations satisfy demands for 
accountability by showing how they govern themselves by exhibiting 
internal management control systems and management of risk systems, 
rather than showing what they do (Power, 2007b: 95).   
 
Power (1997/1999:32), reporting Russell, argues that in this context, the 
importance of the internal auditors has also grown.  He contends that this 
change has raised questions as to the optimal balance between internal 
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and external arrangements for assurance (Power, 1997/1999:67).  He 
claims that internal audit departments have transformed themselves into 
consultancies (Power, 2007b:60), and that a new model of partnership 
between internal and external auditors has been created as a control of 
control tool (Power, 2007b:48).   For him, only time will tell whether 
there is a long term shift from external to internal self-auditing capacity ( 
Power, 1997/1999:67).  He predicts that in the future, it is highly probable 
that the internal audit function will take on the role of the external audit, 
and the issue of independence in auditing will become unimportant.  
According to his prediction, internal auditors will come to play a 
regulatory role (Power, 1997/1999).  Notwithstanding this view, Power 
acknowledges that during the 2000s the substitution of internal for 
external auditing was still preferred where possible (2007b). 
  
3.4.5 The issue of expectation gap 
There is an essential obscurity in the audit process, its objectives and 
products, which affects the understanding of what audit is for, what audit 
produces and whether audits fail (Power, 1997/1999:30). This 
characteristic allows auditing to move across different contexts, from 
financial to environmental to social spheres. Power claims that the 
obscurity is a result of the vagueness of the knowledge base of the audit 
process (1996:289), as its public face, codified rules and regulations on 
appropriate procedure and behaviour are heavily influenced by subjective 
beliefs and the views of the auditors (1997/1999). He argues that auditing 
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objectives are intentionally obscure in order to avoid evaluation of the 
failure or success of the auditing process in meeting its objectives (Power, 
1997/1999). Power (1994b, 1997/1999) contends that the product of the 
audit process is also obscure.  According to him, what audit promises at 
normative level is not always closely linked to [its] actual operational 
capacity (Power, 2000:112). 
 
Power (1997/1999) argues that the yardstick to measure the 
effectiveness of the audit process is also obscure. Albeit that at normative 
level it is claimed that audit promotes organisational transparency 
(Power, 1994b), the obscure nature of the audit process limits this 
ambition, and prevents it delivering this transparency. Subjectivity as to 
the nature of the assurance provided by the audit process is also 
problematic (Power, 1997/1999), as it can make organisations more 
obscure (Power, 1994b). Another issue, according to Power (1994b), is 
that in reality, audits focus on examining management control systems 
rather than organisational performance, and this fact is ignored by most 
users of audit opinions.     
 
The idea of audit disseminates in the institutional environment, where it 
cannot be controlled by practitioners; hence the expectation gap (Power, 
2000:112). Power (1997/1999:22), in reporting studies by KPMG Peat 
Marwick McLintock, Humphrey, and Humphrey, Moizer and Turley, 
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explains that there is a gap between what the public expects  the 
detection of fraud or [the detection of problems in the social and 
environmental areas on the ground] and what auditors claim to be 
delivering  an opinion of the  statements. Auditors argue that 
management is the entity responsible for fraud detection, or identification 
of problems in the social and environmental areas, as a result of high cost 
and audit feasibility (Power, 1997/1999:22). In these disputes, regulators 
prefer to ignore what audits are for (Power 1994b:25). Hence questions 
are raised as to the value of auditing (Power, 1997/1999).  
 
There is also a problem of perception, a difference between how auditors 
see themselves and how the public sees them (Power, 1994b). Power 
argues that whilst the public believe that auditors responsibility is to 
expose critical issues, auditors affirm that their job is to form a 
professional opinion (1994b:24). Auditors argue that there is a 
misunderstanding among the public (Power, 1997/1999); however, 
discussions as to what audits can and cannot do take place only within the 
auditing profession itself, without considering external constituencies 
(Power, 2000:112).  
 
The solution to the issue of an expectation gap requires that the audit 
process, objectives and products become open and transparent (Power, 
1994b).  Power suggests that there are two options to resolve the 
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problem: either it is necessary to educate users as to what it is acceptable 
to expect from an audit process, or the audit process must be brought 
into line with those expectations that do exist (1994b:24). However, 
Power maintains that a solution might not be achievable as, in his view, 
the expectation gap is a supply drawn upon rather than a cause of distress 
(1997/1999).   
 
Power (1997/1999) postulates that the expectation gap is the source of 
auditors economic success. He explains that regulators, policy makers and 
auditors take advantage of the high expectations generated by the audit 
process, which are superior to what they can deliver in reality (1994b:24). 
For the auditors, this translates into higher fees and professional status 
(Power, 1994b). For policy makers and regulators, the benefits lie in 
providing society with a sense of comfort (Power, 1994b).  However, in 
the light of evidence of audit failure (financial collapse of companies, 
accumulation of social and environmental issues, abuse of public 
revenues, and so on), auditors develop strategies to manage the 
expectation gap (Power, 1997/1999).  
 
One strategy used by auditors to manage the expectation gap is to state 
general auditing objectives, and in terms which do not specify the issue of 
detection of fraud or of material social and environmental issues (Power, 
1997/1999). Another strategy is to communicate in the statement little 
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more than the fact than an audit has been done and the reader is left to 
decode specialized and cautious expressions of opinion (Power, 
1997/1999:13). Auditors also lead campaigns for some kind of shield of 
limited liability, and for a clearer understanding of the auditing role 
(Power, 1997/1999). Despite crises and scandals, audits remain strong, as 
they have become fundamental for public accountability (Power, 
1997/1999).   
 
Audits have the capacity to emerge from crises and scandals 
institutionally secure (Power, 1994b). Power (1994b:30) claims that after 
a crisis, there is a process of blame allocation and reform of the audit 
process. The process of blame allocation is manifested in criticisms from 
the press and in legal judgements; the two main issues discussed are the 
problem of mismanagement, and the incompetence of the auditors 
(Power, 1994b). For Power (1994b), the process of audit reform implies a 
demand for more auditing (7), the development of more extensive audit 
guidance and norms (30), and the promotion of institutional change to 
strengthen audit (26).  Intriguingly, the role and purpose of auditing is 
hardly questioned. Power (1994b) explains that what is important is to 
preserve the normative purpose and role of auditing rather than the name 
and status of the auditors. 
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3.4.6 Audits, trust and accountability 
According to Power, at normative level, audits are demanded in situations 
where there is risk, distrust and a need for accountability (1997/1999). 
Power claims that the idea of auditing is appealed to in environments 
where trust is damaged, and there is a need to restore it (Power, 
1997/1999, 2000).  In these environments, audit is portrayed as the 
solution to achieve accountability; that is, it is a mechanism that facilitates 
the requirement (accountability) for one party (the agent) to give an 
account of its actions to another party (the principal) (Power, 
1997/1999:5)32
 
. In society, audits exist to negotiate and represent 
accountability of independent agents (Power, 1997/1999). The ideas of 
audit and accountability are linked by the idea of transparency. Power 
(1994b:23) notes that audits are normally legitimized as they have the 
ability to enhance the transparency of individual and corporate actions to 
those parties who have an interest in the nature and effects of those 
actions. Audit is required when there is a risk that the agent might act 
against the principal (or there is a likelihood of finding information 
asymmetries), and the principal is unable to conduct a face-to-face 
examination of the agents actions (Power, 1997/1999).   
                                                        
32 Power (1994b:11) explains that specialized academic stories have formalized these 
intuitions about the need for audits. 
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Power (1997/1999) claims that the idea of audit sustains the idea of trust 
in society. The rise of auditing industries that satisfy demands for signals 
of trust, order and accountability has to do with the loss of confidence in 
central society institutions, particularly politics (Power, 2000:118). 
Shapiro (Power, 1997/1999:135) stated that in society, audit provides a 
second order trust relationship which polices trust. The idea of audit is 
at the heart of a control style committed to the principles of checking and 
trust (Power, 1997/1999). The issue here is that, instead of solving the 
problem of trust, audits displace the problem; that is, the focus of trust 
moves to the auditors, or to forms of documentary evidence or 
accreditation, or to the assurance of the integrity of management systems 
(Power, 1994b:13). Intriguingly, Power argues that auditors too cannot be 
trusted; therefore, their work is also subject to examination (1994b). 
Conversely, Power (1997/1999) contends that as a result of the need to 
adapt to the auditing process, organisations become less trustworthy; 
hence, distrust sustains the idea of audit.    
 
Power (1997/1999, 2000) contends that the idea of audit is driven by an 
ideology which, rather than providing the base for rational open 
deliberation, advocates belief in third-party groups.  This is the model of 
accountability that prevails in society, a simplified model of ex-post 
external control that works in low trust environments (Power, 1994b:9). 
There is an alternative style to this model of accountability, a real time 
qualitative examination by internal agencies that stimulates public 
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dialogue and works in high trust environments (Power, 1994b); however, 
Power (1994b) claims that it is difficult for this model to gain acceptance 
in society. Power advocates for the integration of the two models as, in his 
view, it would help the audit process to overcome the expectation gap, and 
enhance the benefits of audit (1994b).  
 
Power (1997/1999:127) contends that although the audit explosion has 
ocurred in the name of improved accountability, in reality, it exists as a 
form of downward accountability. Day and Klein (Power, 
1997/1999:127) stated that such a model has been advocated to resist 
upward accountability. In the downward accountability model, audits 
discharge accountability by demonstrating the existence of management 
systems of control and risk rather than by demonstrating good 
performance in economic, social and environmental practices on the 
ground (Power, 1994b:19). In this model, the issue of auditor 
independence is more important than competence or relevance (Power, 
1994b). The approach is to praise the fact that an audit has been done, 
rather than examine what the audit has done or to whom it is addressed 
(Power, 2000). The strategy has been to discharge downward 
accountability to avoid transparency (Power, 2000). This leads to the 
conclusion that more auditing does not necessarily mean more and better 
accountability (Power, 1997/1999:127). In this game, the form of 
upward or direct face-to-face accountability is rejected, and audits 
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become a dead end in the chain of accountability (Day and Klein, 1987 
cited in Power, 1997/1999:127). 
 
Power (1997/1999:124) contends that the audit process should open 
organisations to independent external scrutiny. He (1997/1999:124) 
argues that in the discharge of accountability, auditors reports (purpose, 
style and content) are important, as they must, like the audit process per 
se, enlighten, inform, influence, and enable criticism and substantive 
change rather than bring inquiry to an end.  Power (1997/1999) makes 
the criticism that the statement created and produced by auditors 
functions more as a quality label. He argues that without clear standards 
of what quality is, this label becomes an ambiguous document (Power, 
1997/1999), which creates expectation gaps between the producers and 
users of the audit opinion; the label exists to produce comfort. Power 
(1997/1999:125) argues that in cases where auditors are dissatisfied, the 
only option is to refuse to produce the label. In other words, the option is 
to avoid the problem of providing a negative opinion rather than to 
express their views and confront company management.   
 
3.4.7 Audits, stakeholders and corporate governance 
One fundamental issue in the conceptualization of accountability is the 
discussion about the principals rights to know. Power (1997/1999) 
argues for the existence of different types of principals, such as 
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shareholders, local residents, taxpayers, and future generations (Power, 
1997/1999). Each of these has different needs, and therefore different 
rights to know (Power, 1997/1999). For example, taxpayers have the 
right to claim information on how their money is being spent, consumers 
are entitled to oversee performance of public and private services. 
Demands for accountability are valid for both the public and private 
sectors (Power, 2000). In the private sector, these demands are linked to 
the concept of corporate governance; that is, the relationship of the 
company with its principals. Power (1994b:43) advocates that corporate 
community is a necessary precondition for corporate governance. Hence, 
Power (1994b:44) argues for the need to have new institutional spaces in 
which stakeholders of every variety can assert their claims as 
principals33
 
.  
One of Powers main theses is that audit provides the bases for enhanced 
control by those parties with the legitimate right to exercise it 
(1997/1999:124).  Audits are thought to shift power; from professionals 
to the public, from experts to stakeholders (Power, 1994b: 23).  He 
advocates for a face-to-face accountability process where audit plays a 
central role, given its capability to facilitate this civic dialogue (Power, 
1994b).  Power (1994b:27) claims that the ideas of accountability and 
direct interaction in society have been disregarded by those who see the 
                                                        
33
 In the context of corporate governance, principals are named stakeholders (Power, 
1994b). 
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model of ex-post external control as a universal panacea, and place high 
faith in it. Power (1994b) contends that these audit arrangements 
discourage dialogue both inside and outside organisations. Albeit that this 
model of ex-post external control encourages transparency, transparency 
alone does not empower (Power, 1994b:27). Power (1994b) argues that 
this encouragement of transparency deactivates forms of accountability 
based in answerability by convincing the public that something has been 
done by someone.   
 
The production of normative frameworks for corporate governance 
embodies two intertwined logics, as Drori (Power, 2007b:60) stated: a 
neoliberal managerial logic which draws heavily on intellectual resources 
of economics, principal-agent theory, and practical disciplines such as 
accounting; and a rights-based participative logic which draws from 
democratic and critical theories. Power advocates for the latter, arguing 
that corporate governance relates to the democratization of 
organisational life, and more radical senses of empowerment which 
include the labour force and other stakeholders with a legitimate interest 
in the workings of the organisations (1997/1999:41). Hence, Power 
(1994b) defends the use of an audit model in which stakeholders needs 
could be represented (and heard). However, he acknowledges that formal 
audit would become redundant in the case that the inclusion of the views 
of stakeholders in the corporate governance is efficient (Power, 
1994b:44).   
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Power (2007b) analyzes how stakeholders can be brought into the system 
of corporate governance. In reporting studies by Larkin and by Friedman 
and Miles, Power (2007b:136) states that the definition of stakeholding 
implies two normative connotations; that is, there is either a [managerial] 
strategic response to the perceived rise of consumer activism and the 
increasingly organized character of social conscience, or a relationship of 
partnership with stakeholders. For him, there is an apparent displacement 
in the power, from corporations to active organisational actors claiming 
their rights to speak and represent society (Power, 2007b). This means 
that, as Friedman and Miles stated (cited in Power, 2007b:137), 
stakeholders have shifted their strategy from confrontational to dialogic, 
and have transformed themselves, as noted by Larkin (Power, 
2007b:139), into legitimate representatives of society and credible 
dialogue partners. Power (2007b) explains that this transformation 
implies that stakeholders have become more business-like, adopting 
similar strategies to those used by the organisations they seek to engage 
and criticize. In essence, as Larkin (Power, 2007b:139) argued, the 
increased stakeholder engagement in corporate governance systems is a 
symptom of lack of faith in experts, science, and authorities.  
 
In short, the present study responds to Powers (1997/1999) calls for 
more questioning of the audit practice and its consequences. In this study, 
representatives of companies and of stakeholders groups provide their 
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views as to the meaning of sustainability assurance, its purpose, and 
benefits in society. There is also a discussion about the consequences of 
implementing sustainability assurance practices (as they are currently 
designed) in society. This study examines one of Powers main arguments, 
that organisations and stakeholders are ready for an auditing process that 
encourages face-to-face accountability and organisational change rather 
than being an empty ritual of verification (Power, 1997/1999:145). 
 
3.5 STAKEHOLDER AND LEGITIMACY THEORIES 
In order to complement key strands of Powers theory, this research relies 
on two additional theoretical perspectives. The current study adds to a 
growing body of literature on the sustainability assurance phenomenon in 
the UK, by examining it through the lens of stakeholder and legitimacy 
theories. Legitimacy theory provides an explanation of the mechanism 
whereby organisations seek to gain legitimacy in society (Deegan & 
Unerman, 2006/2008). Stakeholder theory provides an explanation of 
how organisations manage their stakeholder groups (Deegan & Unerman, 
2006/2008). These two theories were selected on the grounds that they 
provide a basis for understanding the motivations behind the voluntary 
commission of sustainability assurance, the reasons behind the inclusion 
of stakeholders in the assurance practices, and the perspectives of 
different stakeholder groups on the sustainability assurance phenomenon. 
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Legitimacy and stakeholder theories derive from the bourgeois 
perspective of the political economy theory (Deegan & Unerman, 
2006/2008:269).  Their main concern is to examine relationships 
between society and organisations. Deegan (2000) notes that both are 
system oriented theories that see organisations as being part of the 
broader social system, whereby their activities have repercussions in 
society, and they in turn are affected by other groups. The difference 
between the two theories lies in the fact that legitimacy theory examines 
demands from society at large, whilst stakeholder theory focuses on 
examining demands from particular groups within society, viz, 
stakeholder groups (Deegan & Unerman, 2006/2008). 
 
3.5.1 Legitimacy theory 
The notion of the social contract provides the basis for understanding 
legitimacy theory (Deegan & Unerman, 2006/2008). Mathews (Deegan & 
Unerman, 2006/2008:272) states that in society, companies operate via 
the social contract, based on the principle that: 
Society (as a collection of individuals) provides corporations with their legal 
standing and attributes and the authority to own and use natural resources and to 
hire employees. Organisations draw on community resources and output both 
goods and services and waste products to the general environment. The 
organisation has no inherent rights to these benefits, and in order to allow their 
existence, society would expect the benefits to exceed the costs to society.   
 
The implicit and explicit expectations of society are considered in the 
social contract; however, in general, it is expected that organisations 
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provide benefits to society measured in terms of their organisational 
performance (Deegan, 2002). According to legitimacy theory, 
organisations that exhibit a poor economic, social and environmental 
performance find it difficult to obtain the license to operate in society 
(Lindblom, 2010). Indeed, failure to meet the social contract may lead to 
penalties such as legal sanctions, limited resources, and reduced demand 
for their products (Lindblom, 2010:52), that is, to the eventual decline and 
fall of the organisation. From the perspective of society, it is essential that 
organisations consider providing benefits for society as a whole rather 
than focusing only on the benefits for investors (Deegan & Unerman, 
2006/2008:272). 
 
From the perspective of organisations, legitimacy theory states that 
organisations need to secure legitimacy in order to be accepted by society. 
Organisations create strategies to ensure that their activities are 
perceived by outsiders parties as being legitimate (Deegan & Unerman, 
2006/2008:271). Organisations seek to achieve a status of legitimacy, that 
is, a condition or status which exists when an entitys value system is 
congruent with the value system of the larger social system of which the 
entity is a part (Lindblom, 2010:52).  
 
Lindblom (2010:57-60) explains that organisational strategies aimed at 
securing or preserving legitimacy are: 1) to educate and inform society 
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about real changes in performance, hence, closing the legitimacy gap; (2) 
to change the perceptions of society concerning the performance of the 
organisation, without changing organizations actions; (3) to manipulate 
perceptions by changing the discussion from the issues of concern; (4) to 
change society expectations by showing that they are unreasonable.   
These strategies highlight the fact that it is perceptions of performance 
that organisations seek to change, not necessarily performance itself. 
Deegan and Unerman (2006/2008:276) note that another strategy is the 
use of reputation risk management; in other words, the approach is to 
focus on managing activities which question the existence and reputation 
of the organisation.    
 
The notion of legitimacy is developing continuously, as it depends on the 
expectations of society, which are also evolving over time (Lindblom, 
2010). In other words, organisations constantly change their strategies to 
adapt to new societal expectations.  Lindblom (2010:52) explains that this 
continuous change in the notion of legitimacy and the expectations of 
society creates a gap that can fluctuate without any changes in action on 
the part of the corporation. Hence, organisations are careful not to exceed 
the legitimacy gap to the point where there is conflict that could erode or 
take away altogether the support from society.  From the organisations 
perspective, managers who can address the needs of society efficiently, 
and hence reduce the legitimacy gap, are highly desirable (Deegan & 
Unerman, 2006/2008:273). Deegan (2000) argues that although 
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legitimacy theory provides a base to explain the reasons behind the 
voluntary adoption of certain organisational practices, some questions 
remain unresolved.  
 
First, for Deegan (2002), legitimacy theory does not explain whether 
legitimacy strategies work. In the field of sustainability assurance, this 
issue is addressed in a recent study conducted by Kuruppu and Milne 
(2010:15), who evaluated whether the presence or absence of an 
assurance statement in a corporate sustainability report affects attitudes 
and beliefs toward the credibility of reported information, and its capacity 
to deliver organisational legitimacy and reputation. Kuruppu and Milne 
(2010) study involved an experimental design with a group of final year 
undergraduate students taking advanced financial accounting and 
auditing courses, to examine the influence of information sources on the 
decision to accept an employment offer, and on beliefs about the 
legitimacy of a business when confronted with evidence of significant 
environmental damage.  
 
Kuruppu and Milne (2010:15) found that sustainability assurance does 
not influence the legitimacy of an organization. This analysis raises 
questions concerning the credibility benefits claimed for assurance 
statements by companies and regulatory organisations (FEE, 2002), even 
in cases where the assurance statements do add value (2010:13). 
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However, Kuruppu and Milne (2010:15) claim that caution is needed to 
not overstate these findings, and point to the following limitations of the 
research: (1) only a single experiment was conducted; (2) the information 
provided to participants was limited; (3) there was insufficient time for 
participants to process the information; (4) decisions made by 
participants are hypothetical; (5) the participants were drawn from a 
group of students in business and accounting disciplines, hence the results 
may represent a particular group not generalizable to others (Kuruppu 
and Milne, 2010:15).  
 
It is clear that the results of this experimental design concerning the 
influence of the presence of a sustainability assurance statement on the 
credibility of information reported and the capacity to deliver 
organisational legitimacy and reputation are rather controversial 
(Kuruppu & Milne, 2010). The findings suggest that more research is 
needed in order that the relationship between sustainability assurance 
and its capacity to deliver legitimacy can be more clearly understood. 
Hence, the present study addresses this issue by examining in detail the 
views of companies and stakeholders concerning the type of value created 
through the commission of sustainability assurance services (see also 
Kuruppu & Milne, 2010).  
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Second, for Deegan (2002:295), legitimacy theory provides poor 
resolution in that it talks about society as a whole; therefore, it fails to 
examine specific civil society groups, their power and their influence on 
other groups and on organisations. Deegan (2002:295) explains that 
stakeholder theory addresses this issue by accepting that different 
groups have different views about how organisations should conduct their 
operations, and have different abilities to affect an organisation. 
Therefore, on the grounds that one of the main aspects of the present 
research is the investigation of the inclusion of stakeholders views in the 
sustainability assurance practice, this study also uses stakeholder theory 
to understand companies motivations behind that inclusion, and the 
perspectives of diverse stakeholder groups towards sustainability 
assurance exercises.  
 
3.5.2 Stakeholder theory 
The term stakeholder refers to any group or individual that can affect or 
be affected by the organisations objectives and activities, for example 
investors, employees, customers, suppliers, government and community 
(Freeman, 1984). Stakeholder theory, the body of study examining these 
organisation-stakeholder relations, has informed finance, accounting, 
management, and marketing business disciplines (Freeman, Harrison, 
Wicks, Parmar, and De Colle, 2010). In the case of the accounting 
discipline, and specifically social accounting, theorists classify stakeholder 
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theory into two main subdivisions, the managerial and the ethical 
branches (Deegan & Unerman, 2006/2008).  
 
The managerial branch of stakeholder theory offers a managerial 
perspective on how business works at its best and how it could work 
(Freeman et al., 2010:8). The managerial perspective focuses on the ethics 
of organisations working in a capitalist society, and on how to manage 
successfully the stakeholders of the organisation (Freeman et al., 2010). 
This perspective is organisational-centred, descriptive, prescriptive and 
instrumental (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). The managerial branch of 
stakeholder theory concerns the organisations relationships with 
different stakeholder groups, the nature of those relationships, the 
outcomes for the organisations and their stakeholders, and the process of 
strategic stakeholder management (Caroll & Buchholtz, 2006). The 
Clarkson principles (Caroll & Buchholtz, 2006:89) summarize key strands 
of the theory, as follow: 
x Organisations should acknowledge and evaluate the concerns of all 
legitimate stakeholders, and address their issues in the decision 
making process; 
x Organisations should listen to and communicate with (legitimate) 
stakeholders about their concerns, and the risk assumed because of 
their engagement with the corporation; 
x Organisations should adopt processes sensitive to the (legitimate) 
stakeholder concerns; 
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x Organisations should recognize the interdependency with 
(legitimate) stakeholders, and attempt to distribute fairly the 
benefits and burdens of the organisations activities among them; 
x Organisations should work cooperatively with other entities to 
ensure that risk and harm arising from the organisations activities 
are minimized, controlled and compensated; 
x Organisations should avoid activities that might jeopardize the 
human rights of relevant stakeholders. 
 
Hence, the theory focuses mainly on the expectations of primary rather 
than secondary stakeholders34, that is, stakeholders who are fundamental 
for the existence and survival of the organisation (Clarkson, 1995). 
Proponents of this theory identify relevant stakeholders based on the 
attributes of legitimacy, power and urgency (Mitchell, Agle and Wood, 
1997)35
 
.   According to Deegan and Unerman (2006/2008) this branch of 
stakeholder theory can be tested by empirical observations. 
The view portrayed by the managerial branch of stakeholder theory is 
challenged by researchers working within the normative branch. These 
researchers argue that the managerial perspective of stakeholder theory is 
only concerned with how the organisation manages its powerful 
                                                        
34 Secondary stakeholders are those who are not engaged in transactions with the 
organisation, and are not essential for its survival (Clarkson, 1995). 
35 Mitchell et al. (1997) classifies stakeholders as:  (1) Dormant stakeholder; (2) 
Discretionary stakeholder; (3) Demanding stakeholder; (4) Dominant stakeholder; (5) 
Dangerous stakeholder; (6) Dependent stakeholder; (7) Definitive stakeholder.  
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stakeholders (Gray, Owen and Adams, 1996), with the aim of building or 
maintaining its legitimacy (Gray, Dey, Owen, Evans, Zadek, 1997). That is, 
it considers specifically different stakeholder groups within society and 
how they should best be managed if the organisation is to survive 
(Deegan & Unerman, 2006/2008:289). The main argument of these 
researchers is that all the stakeholders, primary and secondary, should be 
considered by management as they have certain minimum rights that 
must not be violated, and issues of stakeholder power (legitimacy and 
urgency) are not important (Deegan & Unerman, 2006/2008:287).  
 
From the normative perspective of stakeholder theory, an important 
consideration is that the impact of organisations objectives and activities 
on the lives of stakeholders (and here the environment, non-human 
species, and future generations36
                                                        
36 Starik (1995) argues that these stakeholders should be considered in the definition of 
stakeholders. 
 should be included) should be what 
determines the organisations responsibilities to that stakeholder rather 
than the existence of that stakeholders economic power over the 
organisation (Deegan & Unerman, 2006/2008:286). This normative view 
claims that all stakeholders have intrinsic rights. For example, in the case 
of the environment, there exists the right to expect that organisations 
would adopt precautionary measures when there is no scientific evidence 
of the consequences for the environment of an organisations action 
(precautionary principle). In the case of other stakeholders, there exists 
the right to live in a clean environment, with safe working conditions and 
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fair salaries (Deegan & Unerman, 2006/2008), and to be informed about 
how an organisation impacts the stakeholders, even if they choose not to 
use the information (see ODwyer, 2005). 
   
In essence, the normative perspective of stakeholder theory is based on 
accountability understood as the duty to take responsibility to undertake 
certain actions, and to account for those actions (Gray et al., 1996).  
Deegan and Unerman (2006/2008) note that from this perspective it is 
the need to be accountable that should drive the actions of organisations, 
rather than the need to respond to primary stakeholders to ensure the 
survival of the organisation. In the view of researchers working within the 
normative branch of stakeholder theory, the explicit manifestations of the 
criteria to hold organisations to account are stated in the statute law (e.g. 
Companies Acts) and standards established by statutory bodies (e.g. 
Environmental Protection Agency) (Gray et al., 1997:334), whilst other 
mechanisms, such as voluntary codes of practice, illustrate the implicit 
manifestations of these criteria. According to Deegan and Unerman 
(2006/2008:288), the normative branch of stakeholder theory is 
concerned with how organisations should act, which is not the same as 
how organisations actually act. Therefore, these perspectives cannot be 
validated by empirical observation.  
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3.6 CONCLUSION 
The review of literature conducted in this chapter can be summarized in 
two key points: 
(1) The discussion of the literature illustrates Powers main theses on the 
scale and importance of audit in society. 
(2) The discussion of the literature points to limitations in existing 
empirical research examining the sustainability assurance phenomenon.  
 
First, Powers theses explain the causes underlying the rise of audit, its 
importance and its potential added value in society. The rise of audit is the 
result of several factors, chiefly the expectation gap and the indeterminacy 
of the audit function, which have allowed auditing to spread across several 
contexts (Power, 1997/1999). A number of changes in UK society have 
been influential here, including the development of new public 
management, a shift towards regulatory styles of governance, demands for 
accountability, and the rise of quality assurance (Power, 1997/1999). The 
accountancy profession has also been influential in the rise of auditing in 
the UK (Power, 2000).  
 
Power raises serious critiques on the problems and consequences of audit 
practices. One of the main problems is related to the focus on examining 
organisations management control systems and risk management 
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systems, rather than actual performance (Power, 2000, 2007b). A second 
problem is that audit practices fail to promote public dialogue and 
transparency, and hence accountability (Power, 1994b). The 
consequences of making audits work are decoupling and colonization, 
which in turn undermine the achievement of control and effectiveness 
(Power, 1997/1999).  Power advocates for new forms of social control 
which encourage face-to-face accountability rather than empty rituals of 
verification (Power, 1994b).  
 
One limitation of Powers theoretical work is that it mainly considers the 
perspective of the auditor (Ball et al., 2000), and regulatory bodies. There 
is a need to provide the organisational and stakeholder perspectives; 
therefore, this research uses stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory as 
additional analytical lenses to examine the motivations behind the rise of 
auditing services, problems and potential added value in society.  
 
Second, the recent phenomenon of sustainability assurance provides a 
useful base to explore Powers theses. In examining the sustainability 
assurance phenomenon, researchers have noted most of the concerns 
raised by Power, that is, the professional and managerial capture of the 
sustainability assurance practice (Maltby, 1995; Ball et al., 2000; ODwyer 
& Owen, 2005; Jones & Solomon, 2010; Edgley et al., 2010), the different 
assurance approaches among different assurance providers (Maltby, 
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1995; Ball et al., 2000; ODwyer & Owen, 2005; Edgley et al., 2010), the 
problem of managerial control (Ball et al., 2000; ODwyer & Owen, 2005; 
Jones & Solomon, 2010) , and the failure to provide a basis for a 
deliberative accountability process (ODwyer & Owen, 2005). Researchers 
have also explored the way in which the audit process is constructed, how 
it secures legitimacy (ODwyer et al., 2011) and the differences between 
the normative and operational sides of the practice (Al-Hamadeen, 2007).  
However, most of the research conducted suffers from the fact that 
conclusions are based on inferences from verification or assurance 
statements. In this research study, Powers theses concerning the meaning 
of auditing, its purpose, benefits in society, and problems, are examined 
from the point of view of organisations and stakeholders.  Further, this 
research contributes to the examination of one of Powers key theses, that 
is, the potential of auditing to empower stakeholders to achieve 
accountability. This research study analyzes the role of stakeholders in 
sustainability assurance practices, the practicalities of their inclusion in 
those practices, and the potential to encourage face-to-face accountability 
from the perspectives of organisations and stakeholders. 
 
The theoretical tenet discussed in this chapter and used in this research to 
analyze empirical results in the form of perceptions held by companies 
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and stakeholders, and to reach conceptual conclusions, is represented in 
the conceptual framework (Figure 3.1) 37
  
:  
                                                        
37 Robson (2002:63) defines the term conceptual framework as the theory used in a 
research study expressed in diagrammatic form. 
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Figure 3-1 Conceptual framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The analysis of the views of companies and stakeholders is addressed in 
chapters six and seven. 
 
 
  
Meaning of Audit 
Purpose of Audit 
Power’s theory 
Stakeholder theory 
Legitimacy theory 
*Stakeholder-centred accountability 
* Downward versus upward 
accountability 
* Representation of voices of stakeholders 
in assurance 
*Role of stakeholders/strategy of 
stakeholders 
*Problems: no room for enabling 
substantive change/audit does not 
empower stakeholders 
 
 
 
Accountability 
Issue of expectation gap 
Efficiency/Quality 
*Development of management systems 
*Role of internal auditors 
*Production of higher quality reports 
*Economic added-value of assurance 
*Problems: managerial control; 
impression management 
Governance and 
Transparency 
*Organisational performance 
*Realize accountability *Secure 
legitimacy 
*Transparency 
*Problems: displacement of trust; 
managerial control 
 
*Accountability to all stakeholders 
*Accountability to relevant stakeholders 
*Characteristics of stakeholder 
management 
*Build legitimacy 
*Build reputation/credibility 
*Characteristics of building legitimacy 
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4 CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH DESIGN AND 
RESEARCH METHODS 
 
This chapter has three aims: 
(1) To describe and discuss the ontological and epistemological 
underpinnings of the research; 
(2) To describe the mixed-methods research design; 
(3) To discuss issues of reliability and validity.  
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This research is grounded on the body of work known as the social 
accounting project (Gray, 2002). It adopts a critical perspective to 
examine the practice of sustainability assurance in the United Kingdom, 
using a mixed-methods research design. This chapter acts as a research 
gearbox, linking the preceding conceptual chapters to the empirical 
chapters that explain research findings.  This chapter comprises seven 
sections: the first explains the research setting; the second illustrates 
ontological and epistemological factors underpinning the research, and 
the research approach; the third describes the research design 
considerations; the fourth explains the research design adopted; the fifth 
describes the limitations of the research design; the sixth section 
illustrates the ethical considerations for this study. Finally, the chapter 
draws conclusions based on these discussions.  
  
104 
 
4.2 THE RESEARCH SETTING 
The majority of research studies investigating the phenomenon of 
sustainability assurance have focused on geographical regions such as 
Europe, or have made comparative studies between countries and regions, 
such as the United Kingdom and Europe. Recently, academic studies have 
examined assurance exercises worldwide.  In 2005, when this research 
was begun, few studies had focused on investigating the sustainability 
assurance phenomenon exclusively in the United Kingdom. Moreover, 
Deegan et al. (2006) argue that there is a lack of uniformity in 
sustainability assurance practice across different countries.  Therefore, 
this research responds to the need to understand the sustainability 
assurance phenomenon specifically in the United Kingdom context.    
 
Of the research that has been conducted in the United Kingdom, most 
studies have examined the sustainability assurance phenomenon 
exclusively as portrayed in assurance statements, without seeking the 
views of main participants in the exercise. Recently, studies by Jones and 
Solomon (2010) and Edgley et al. (2010) have investigated assurance 
practices in the United Kingdom through the views of companies and 
assurance providers; however, despite the importance of stakeholders in 
the sustainability assurance process, far too little attention has been paid 
to their views. This study fills the gap by incorporating the views of 
stakeholders on the purpose of assurance, problems of the practice, and 
role in achieving stakeholder-centred accountability. 
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Jones and Solomon (2010) examined the views of companies concerning 
the drivers for commissioning sustainability assurance services, and the 
nature of the assurance process. However, a number of issues related to 
the motivation behind the commission of this type of assurance service 
remain unresolved. Further, Jones and Solomon (2010:30)                                                                      
call for more research investigating and reporting the views of companies 
representatives, as sustainability assurance is a practice undergoing rapid 
development. Therefore, there is a need to examine emerging issues in the 
sustainability assurance practice in the United Kingdom. This research 
responds to the call for detailed study on the sustainability assurance 
phenomenon in the United Kingdom, both as portrayed in the statements, 
and through the views of companies and stakeholders.   
 
4.3 RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY AND RESEARCH APPROACH38
Within the different schools of thought in accounting (see Chua, 1986; 
Dillard, 1991; Laughlin, 1995; Gray, 2002), this research aligns itself with 
the social accounting project (Gray, 2002). Gray (2002:692) defines the 
social accounting project as the work responding to calls for new forms of 
accounting (Medawar, 1976) based on the principles of democracy and 
accountability, with the purpose, as Bronner (Gray, 2002:700) argued, of 
 
                                                        
38 In this section the term paradigm refers to how we view the world and, thus, go 
about conducting research (Creswell & Plano-Clark, 2007:21); the term methodology 
refers to the philosophical framework and the fundamental assumptions of research; it 
responds to the question: What is the process of research? (Creswell & Plano-Clark, 
2007:21). 
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challenging capitalism on its own ground. The social accounting project 
is underpinned by a pragmatic view of the world (Gray, 2002:688); that is, 
the project conveys different avenues of research, research methods and 
political ideologies (Gray, 2002:688)39. Gray (2002) argues that this 
project shares elements of the critical accounting project40
 
.  
Both the social accounting and the critical accounting projects argue for a 
form of research which places emphasis on understanding the role of 
accounting in society, and its influence on reinforcing the position of elites, 
rather than engaging in disputes as to whether particular research 
methods should be used (Deegan & Unerman, 2006/2008:428).   
Proponents of both projects believe that through research they can 
challenge and generate change (Deegan & Unerman, 2006/2008:430). For 
supporters of both projects, it is important to investigate and expose the 
environmental and social consequences of conventional accounting 
practices (Gray, 2002:692). However, the two schools of thought differ in 
how they see the role of accounting in society, and the scale of change 
desired.  
 
                                                        
39 Gray (2002:292) explains that researchers working in social accounting evidence 
several ideologies, from those who reject current social structures  Marxists, feminists, 
for example -  through those who accept current social structures (which is the common 
position in most of the discussion).   
40  However, Deegan and Unerman (2006/2008) view the social accounting project as a 
body of thought within the umbrella term critical accounting project. Deegan and 
Unerman (2006/2008:449) explain that generally speaking, the majority of critical 
accounting research is grounded in classical political economy theory; however, there 
are other critical accounting researchers whose critiques of the role of accounting [in 
society] are not based on Marxist philosophy(2006/2008:449).  
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For proponents of the critical accounting project, the role of accounting 
practices is to legitimate particular social structures, hence reinforcing 
power and wealth inequalities in society (Deegan & Unerman, 
2006/2008:428). Therefore, through radical critiques, their research aims 
at exploring the role of current accounting practices in supporting these 
inequalities (Deegan & Unerman, 2006/2008:430-432). Conversely, 
advocators of the social accounting project argue for the introduction of 
new forms of accounting to overcome social inequalities. Hence, their 
research provides critiques of existing accounting practices, with the aim 
of developing practices of different types, for example of voluntary or 
regulatory nature, protest driven, or which empower civil society groups 
(Gray, 2002:700).  
 
Advocates of the critical accounting project believe that structural change 
should be achieved more broadly in society, a perspective grounded on 
the classical political economy theory (Deegan & Unerman, 
2006/2008:429). Their research seeks for radical change in a capitalistic 
society (Brown & Fraser, 2006:110). Hence, they believe they can 
significantly alter the status quo (see Brown &Fraser, 2006). Conversely, 
the majority of proponents of the social accounting project accept that 
society is structured as a given, a view underpinned by the bourgeois 
form of political economy theory (Deegan & Unerman, 2006/2008:433), 
and that change should be achieved considering current possibilities 
(Gray, 2002:692). Hence, they believe that incremental, rather than 
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radical, change could be achieved. Indeed, one of the key differences is 
that whilst researchers working within the critical accounting project do 
not provide solutions to the particular issues they raise, the advocators of 
the social accounting project seek for engagement [of researchers in 
social and environmental accounting research] and the changing of the 
[accounting] practice (Gray, 2002:698). 
 
This research responds to calls for this engagement by examining the 
practice of sustainability assurance in the United Kingdom. In this study 
sustainability assurance is understood as an instrument that is capable of 
bringing organisations to answer to their stakeholders, a crucial 
constituency to hold [organisations] to account for actions impacting 
their lives (ODwyer, 2005:31). Sustainability assurance is conceived as 
an instrument whereby the voices of stakeholders could be heard, with 
the intention to negotiate change in organisations (Gray et al., 1997).  
Consistent with the school of thought followed by this research, the study 
adopts a strategic attitude to change, which questions certain aspects of 
the status quo whilst maintaining other aspects of it (Laughlin, 1995:68-
70)41
                                                        
41 Therefore, in certain circumstances critique and ultimate change are important but 
not in other situations (Laughlin, 1995:82).   Laughlin (1995:68) associates the level of 
emphasis given to critique of the status quo with the terms high, medium, and low. 
However, he clarifies that these terms are not precise, definable or measurable.  
. That is, this study examines the status quo of the assurance practice, 
in order to explore the possibility of bringing change into certain aspects 
of it, and to promote the common good. 
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Researchers forming part of the social accounting project have healthy 
disregard for attachment to particular research methods (Gray, 
2002:697).  Therefore, whilst adopting a critical perspective, this research 
also aligns itself with the pragmatic paradigm, in which both objective and 
subjective knowledge is valued (see Creswell & Plano-Clark, 2007:26)42
 
.  
Ontologically, this research recognizes the existence and importance of a 
singular reality - the trend and patterns in selected features 
(characteristics which were identified from the body of literature 
described in chapter two) as they are portrayed in the assurance 
statements; and multiple realities - the multiple views of companies and 
stakeholders representatives (Creswell & Plano-Clark, 2011:41). 
Consistent with the ontological assumption made, the study takes a 
practical attitude to the construction of knowledge.  That is, the 
determinant for the development of knowledge in this study is the set of 
research objectives (Creswell & Plano-Clark, 2007); the researcher 
collects data according to what works to address those objectives 
(Creswell & Plano-Clark, 2011:42). 
In this study, the researcher sees the development of knowledge as a 
continuum where, as Tashakkori and Teddlie (Saunders, Lewis & 
Thornhill, 2007:110) explain, at some points the knower and the known 
                                                        
42 Creswell and Plano-Clark (2007:26-27) state that researchers embracing pragmatism 
argue that (1) the forced-choice dichotomy between postpositivism and constructivism 
should be abandoned; (2) the use, discussion and debates concerning metaphysical 
concepts such as truth and reality should also be abandoned. 
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must be interactive, while at others, one may easily stand apart from what 
one is studying. In this study, the researcher first objectively collected 
data on a coding form from assurance statements, and then visited 
company and stakeholder participants at their sites to gather data. Hence, 
the research includes both biased and unbiased perspectives (Creswell & 
Plano-Clark, 2007). During the first phase of the research, bias was 
eliminated through the use of quality control procedures (see discussion 
later in this chapter in section 4.4.1.3). During the second phase, 
procedures were introduced to deal with bias (see discussion later in this 
chapter, pages 4.4.2.3).  
 
The imperative to accomplish the research objectives guides the 
methodological choices (see Creswell & Plano-Clark, 2007:26-27; Johnson 
& Onwuegbuzie, 2004). In order to address the research objectives, the 
process of research began by seeking trends, patterns and emerging issues 
in features of the practice of sustainability assurance as represented in the 
assurance statements; then, it investigated multiple views from 
participants on these emerging issues in the practice of sustainability 
assurance. Stakeholder inclusivity is a key aspect of the examination. Such 
an approach calls for the collection of both quantitative and qualitative 
data, and requires that they be used together (Creswell & Plano-Clark, 
2007).  
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In this research, the set of quantitative data was examined through the set 
of conceptual strands developed in chapter two. The set of qualitative data 
was interpreted adopting a critical perspective on current practices in 
sustainability assurance. The conceptual framework used to interpret and 
critique the qualitative data comprises key strands of the theoretical work 
of Michael Power on contextualizing the role of audit in society, 
particularly in the United Kingdom context, together with stakeholder and 
legitimacy theories (see chapter three, sections 3.3 and 3.4). This 
conceptual framework was chosen on the grounds that it reflects the 
belief that through sustainability assurance it is possible to achieve change 
in society. In essence, Powers (1994b) critiques on actual auditing 
practices led him to claim the need for a form of audit which provides a 
base for substantive change, whereby the voices of stakeholders can be 
heard and stakeholder-centred accountability can be achieved. 
Conversely, both stakeholder and legitimacy theories explain changes in 
organisational behaviour.  
 
This research, therefore, aligns itself with the inductive research 
approach. The inductive research approach was chosen on the grounds 
that there is little existing literature on examining the assurance 
phenomenon specifically in the UK context which could provide well 
defined hypotheses to be tested (Saunders et al., 2007:119).  
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Results and conclusions from the analysis of the quantitative data set of 
this research are difficult to generalize to any settings other than close 
approximations to the settings of this study (Robson, 2002:107). Similarly, 
because of the small number of companies participating in this study, 
together with the fact that companies selected were markedly different 
from the majority of FTSE100 companies (they follow best practices in 
sustainability assurance), results and conclusions from the analysis of 
qualitative data are not generalizable to the entire population of FTSE100 
companies (Saunders et al., 2007:151). Furthermore, it is acknowledged 
that the perspectives of participants in this research might not reflect the 
position of their respective organisations. Therefore, it is not feasible to 
make generalizations about the entire population. Comparison with other 
research findings and conclusions should be made with caution. 
 
4.4 RESEARCH DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS 
The process of this research began by identifying trends and emerging 
issues worthy of investigation in the practice of sustainability assurance in 
the UK. Albeit that this research is based on an inductive research 
approach, researchers need some directionality for the overall research 
design process (Robson, 2002:81). Figure 4.1 displays the array of 
features of data that it was necessary to investigate during this first phase 
of the research. These key features of the assurance practice were 
identified and analyzed according to the set of conceptual strands 
developed in chapter two: 
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x Commission of sustainability assurance services: This feature 
captures the developments in the commission of sustainability 
assurance services.  
 
x Provision of sustainability assurance services: This characteristic 
captures the nature of the assurance provision by examining the 
type of assurance provider providing the assurance service. Studies 
conducted by KPMG (2005, 2008), CorporateRegister.com (2008). 
Deegan et al. (2006) and Al-Hamadeen (2007) identify the main 
types of assurance providers. Based on their results, this study 
identified and examined the following type of assurance providers: 
accountancy firms, specialized consultancy firms, certification 
bodies, panels of evaluation in the form of stakeholder panels or 
expert panels. 
 
x Sustainability assurance standards: This feature captures the 
approach and rigour of the assurance process by examining the use 
of assurance standards. Studies conducted by KPMG (2005, 2008), 
CorporateRegister.com (2008). Deegan et al. (2006) and Al-
Hamadeen (2007) identified different types of assurance 
standards. Based on their results, this research identified and 
examined three types of assurance standard: ISAE3000, AA1000, 
and other type of standards. 
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x Level of assurance: This characteristic captures the rigour of the 
assurance process by examining whether limited or reasonable 
levels were used to conduct the assurance exercise. In this 
research, the terms limited and reasonable levels refer to the 
definition provided by the ISAE3000 assurance standard43
 
. 
However, the research also considered cases where other labels 
were used to describe the level of assurance.  
x Assurance procedures: This feature captures the rigour of the 
assurance process by examining the procedures used to conduct 
the exercise. Deegan et al. (2006) identified fourteen assurance 
procedures used in assurance practice. Based on their results, ten 
types of assurance procedures were identified and examined in this 
research: Use of analytical procedures; 
Confirmation/corroboration of specific data with external parties; 
Consistency with underlying systems/data/report; Conducting 
interviews or discussions with management and employees; 
Inspection/checking of supporting documentation; Reviewing 
accounting policies/disclosure principles/measurement 
methods/performance/risk/materiality; Site visits;    
Testing/reviewing reliability/accuracy of internal control systems; 
Reliance on internal audit; Inclusion of stakeholder views. 
  
                                                        
43 These terms are defined in chapter 1 and chapter 5. 
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Figure 4-1 Operational field work research map – phase one 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Identifying emerging trends and issues in the practice of sustainability assurance in the UK 
Based on the work of KPMG (2005, 2008); 
CorporateRegister.com (2008) 
Data characteristic:  
*Existence of an assurance statement within the corporate 
sustainability report  
*Type of assurance statement: provided by: a formal 
assurance provider; stakeholder panel; other: internal audit 
function 
Features in the practice of sustainability assurance: 
Commission of sustainability assurance services: 
 
(1) Sustainability assurance provision: 
Data characteristic:  
*Assurance approach: accountancy; consultancy; social 
audit 
*Type of assurance provider: accountancy firm; specialized 
consultancy firm; certification body; stakeholder panel; 
panel of experts 
Based on the work of KPMG (2005, 2008); 
CorporateRegister.com (2008); Al-Hamadeen (2007); 
Deegan et al. (2006)  
(2) Sustainability assurance standards: 
Data characteristic:  
*Assurance standard: ISAE3000; AA1000; other 
 
Based on the work of KPMG (2005, 2008); 
CorporateRegister.com (2008); Al-Hamadeen (2007); 
Deegan et al. (2006)  
(3) Level of assurance: 
Data characteristic:  
*Level: limited; reasonable; other 
 
Based on the work of KPMG (2005, 2008); 
CorporateRegister.com (2008); Al-Hamadeen (2007)  
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x Inclusion of stakeholder views: This characteristic captures the 
extent to which the views of stakeholders were included in the 
assurance process. The preliminary analysis carried out by Park 
(2004) identified different forms of inclusion of stakeholder views 
in the assurance process across leading worldwide companies. 
Moreover, Edgley et al. (2010) identified actual forms of indirect 
and direct stakeholder inclusion in the assurance process in the UK. 
Based on their results, this study identified and examined six types 
of methods of stakeholder inclusion in the practice: Review of 
media; Via secondary data; Via observations, attending stakeholder 
sessions; Via questionnaires, surveys; Via meetings with 
Based on the work of Deegan et al. (2006) 
(4) Assurance procedures: 
Data characteristic:  
* Type of assurance procedures: Type 1- Use of analytical 
procedures; Type  2- Confirmation/corroboration of specific data with 
external parties; Type 3 – Consistency with underlying systems/data/report; 
Type 4 –Conducting interviews/discussion with management and 
employees; Type 5- Inspection/checking/supporting underlying 
documentation; Type 6 –Reviewing accounting policies/disclosure 
principles/measurement methods/performance/risk/materiality; Type 7-Site 
visits; Type 8- Testing/reviewing reliability/accuracy of internal control 
systems; Type 9- Reliance on internal audit; Type 10 – Inclusion of 
stakeholder views 
(5) Inclusion of stakeholder views: 
Data characteristic:  
*Type of stakeholder engagement: Type 1 -Review of media;  
Type 2-Via secondary data; Type 3- Via observations, attending stakeholder 
sessions; Type 4 -Via questionnaires, surveys; Type 5- Via meetings with 
stakeholders and interviews; Type 6 -Via stakeholder panel/panel of experts 
Based on the work of KPMG (2005, 2008); Edgley et al. 
(2010) and Park (2004) 
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stakeholders and interviews; Via stakeholder panel/panel of 
experts. 
 
The main outcome of the examination of these characteristics was a set of 
emerging issues which were subsequently investigated during phase two 
of the research with companies and stakeholder groups. Figure 4.2 
displays the array of emerging issues identified in phase one and which 
needed to be investigated during phase two. The findings of this second 
phase were understood using the conceptual framework developed in 
chapter three.  The conceptualization of the qualitative results of this 
study is based mainly on the work of Power, who theorizes on the role of 
auditing in society, and it also adopts a framework of system-oriented 
theories, viz, stakeholder and legitimacy theories. First, Power 
(1997/1999) theorizes about the purpose of audit in society, and provides 
critiques on the problems of actual audit practices. Thus, this study 
provides an overview on the purpose of sustainability assurance, and key 
issues faced by the practice. Second, Power (1994b) argues for an audit 
practice within which the voices of citizens are heard, in order to achieve 
accountability. Consequently, this study provides an understanding of the 
role of stakeholders in the sustainability assurance practice.  Further, the 
framework of system-oriented theories assists the conceptualization of 
the driving force behind organisations adoption of sustainability 
assurance practices. Stakeholder theory is particularly helpful in  
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Figure 4-2 Operational field work research map – phase two 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conceptual strands for analysis of research results: stakeholder-
centred accountability; the issue of expectation gap (based on the 
work of Power, see chapter 3); Power’s criticisms on actual auditing 
practices; key strands of  stakeholder theory 
 
 
Explaining emerging issues in the practice of sustainability assurance in the UK 
Conceptual strands for analysis of research results:  efficiency and quality; governance; 
stakeholder -centred accountability (based on the work of Power, see chapter 3); Power’s 
criticisms on actual auditing practices; key strands of legitimacy and stakeholder theories 
Reason for commission of sustainability assurance services 
 
Companies’ 
representatives 
Benefits of sustainability assurance services 
 
Factors underpinning the sustainability assurance approach; 
view on sustainability assurance standards 
 
Restriction on the level of the assurance exercise 
 
Role of internal audit function 
 
Necessary degree of stakeholder inclusion 
 
Positive or negative views towards the exercise 
 
Future of sustainability assurance 
 
Purpose of sustainability assurance  
 
Stakeholders’ 
Groups 
representatives 
Positive or negative views towards the exercise 
 
Views on assurance standards 
 
Views on stakeholder inclusion 
 
Future of sustainability assurance 
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conceptualizing the demands made of sustainability assurance by specific 
stakeholder groups. 
 
Therefore, this research is of descriptive and explanatory nature. That is, 
this study presents a clear picture of the sustainability assurance 
phenomenon in the UK, but also provides an explanation of the emerging 
issues of the practice. Because of the need to establish trends in the 
features of sustainability assurance practices, this study is also 
longitudinal. A period of seven years, between 2001 and 2007, was 
selected in order to observe these trends clearly. This time period was 
chosen based on a preliminary analysis of the results, which evidenced a 
clear trend in the data starting from the year 200144
 
. It should be noted 
here that the sample period in this research covers the introduction of a 
number of authoritative standards guiding the sustainability reporting 
process, such as GRI (2002, 2006), and assurance engagements such as 
FEE (2002, 2004), ISAE3000 (2004) and AA1000AS (1999, 2003, 2005). 
Studying the trends from the year 2001 allowed the researcher to observe 
the influence of those standards on assurance practices in the same way as 
previous researchers had done (see Ball et al. 2000).   
                                                        
44 In this research, raw data were collected starting from the year 1997.  However, 
between 1997 and 2000 the number of assurance statements collected was minimal. 
Hence, between 1997 and 2000 no clear trend was identified in the data. Therefore, the 
final analysis was conducted starting from the year 2001, when the data begin to show a 
clear pattern. 
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Evidence for the examination of features and emerging issues in the UK 
during phase one of this research was found in the assurance statements 
attached to reports containing companies sustainability information. In 
order to visualize clearly trends and issues, it was necessary to transform 
the qualitative information contained in the statements into quantitative 
data, and then to analyze that data using quantitative analysis procedures.   
Evidence for the explanation of these emerging issues was collected 
during phase two of this study from representatives of UK companies. The 
necessary data, of qualitative nature, was held by people working within 
the companies on issues concerning sustainability assurance. Evidence 
was also collected from representatives of organisations representing 
various civil society groups. The necessary data, again of qualitative 
nature, was held by people working in those organisations on matters 
related to sustainability and organisations.  Both types of qualitative data 
had to be analyzed using qualitative analysis procedures. The research 
needed to adopt data collection processes capable of gathering the 
necessary features during phase one, and then explain them during phase 
two.  Hence, it was necessary to adopt a research design whereby both 
quantitative and qualitative data collection techniques and analysis 
procedures are used (Saunders et al. 2007:145). Therefore, this research 
follows a mixed-methods research design.  
 
Mixed-methods research is based on the idea that the use of quantitative 
and qualitative [methods] in combination provides better understandings 
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of research problems than either [method] alone (Creswell & Plano-Clark, 
2007:5). Creswell and Plano-Clark (2007) argue that in cases where 
quantitative results provide limited explanation of the phenomenon under 
investigation, it is advisable to adopt a mixed-method research design. 
This provides better opportunities to answer the research questions and 
to enable triangulation45
 
. This approach is consistent with the research 
philosophy adopted in this study, since researchers embracing the 
pragmatic paradigm might use either quantitative or qualitative research 
methods, or both methods in a single study. 
4.5 RESEARCH DESIGN46
In this study, the follow-up explanatory model research design was 
adopted in response to the need to know what these trends and emerging 
issues in sustainability assurance mean for the companies, and for 
stakeholder groups. In essence, the follow-up explanatory model research 
design is a two-phase mixed methods design whereby qualitative data 
help to explain or build upon initial quantitative results (Creswell & Plano-
Clark, 2007:71). It is clear that analysis of sustainability assurance 
statements alone is insufficient to provide this information accurately 
since examining assurance statements alone is unhelpful in revealing 
exactly what sustainability assurance practice entails and who it is 
 
                                                        
45 Saunders et al., (2007:614) define triangulation as the use of two or more 
independent sources of data or data collection methods within one study in order to help 
ensure that the data are telling you what you think they are telling you. 
46 In this section, the term research design refers to the plan of action that links the 
philosophical assumptions to specific methods (Creswell & Plano-Clark, 2007:4). 
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designed to benefit (Deegan et al., 2006). Therefore, the selection of this 
research design responds to the need to incorporate the views of 
individuals affected or who have a voice in the sustainability assurance 
world in sustainability assurance research.  
 
Figure 4.3 illustrates the research design adopted for this study. It shows 
that the research process consisted of a two-phase mixed-methods follow-
up explanatory sequential design, from quantitative phase (phase one) to 
qualitative phase (phase two), (QUAN to   QUAL). The research began with 
general research questions (see chapter 2, section 2.6) drawn from the 
literature review process, which were used to generate the research 
objective for the quantitative phase of the research (see chapter 5, section 
5), and provided the framework to develop specific objectives for the 
qualitative phase (see chapter 5, section 5.7). The main outcome of the 
quantitative phase was the research objectives for the qualitative phase.  
 
Hence, the research objective for the quantitative phase (phase one) of 
this study was to: 
x Analyze trends and to identify emerging issues as represented in 
the text of sustainability assurance statements of companies in the 
UK between 2001 and 2007.   
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Figure 4-3 Research Design: Explanatory design (QUAN to QUAL) – follow-up explanatory model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PHASE ONE PHASE TWO 
QUAN 
Data 
Collection 
QUAN 
Data  
Analysis 
QUAN 
Results 
 
Content analysis 
 
Sample:  
FTSE100 
companies 
(n= 244assurance 
statements) 
 
Descriptive 
statistical analysis 
 
Discuss main 
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and emerging 
issues 
 
Methods: Methods:  
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Products: 
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relationship 
plots 
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results with 
conceptual 
framework 
developed in 
chapter 2 
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Identify 
emerging 
issues to 
explore 
further 
 
Products: Products: 
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objectives and 
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Data 
Collection 
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Data  
Analysis 
Overall 
findings and 
interpretation 
 
Companies 
*Semi-structured 
interviews 
 
Stakeholders 
*Semi-structured 
interviews 
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O’Dwyer (2004) 
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emerging 
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findings 
Methods: Methods:  
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and 
transcripts 
Products: 
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findings: 
Stories for each 
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Discussion of 
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conceptual 
framework 
developed in 
chapter 3 
 
Products: Products: 
Source: Adapted from Creswell and Plano-Clark (2007: 51) 
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During the second, qualitative, phase of this research, the aims were to:  
x Investigate companies reasons for commissioning sustainability 
assurance, and the factors underpinning the choice of assurance 
approaches, assurance standards, role of internal audit function, 
and restrictions in level of assurance; 
x Elicit the views of companies representatives about the 
appropriate level of stakeholder inclusion in the assurance process, 
together with their suggestions for further developing assurance 
processes; 
x Examine stakeholder views on sustainability assurance process, 
together with their suggestions for further developing assurance 
processes in order to promote a greater degree of stakeholder 
accountability. 
 
The next section will discuss the process of data collection and analysis 
used during both phases of this research. 
 
4.5.1 Phase one of the research: Quantitative47
The first phase of this research responds to the research objective: To 
analyze trends and to identify emerging issues as represented in the text 
of sustainability assurance statements of companies in the UK between 
 
                                                        
47 In this section the term method refers to techniques of data collection and analysis 
(Creswell & Plano-Clark, 2007:4). 
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2001 and 2007. In order to address this objective, it was necessary to use 
a specific technique to collect and transform data into a quantitative form. 
Therefore, the research method used was content analysis, as applied by 
previous researchers (see Al-Hamadeen, 2007; but also see Deegan et al., 
2006). Hence, this phase adopted a quantitative approach; that is, it 
consisted of collecting qualitative data, transforming this data to 
quantitative form, and analyzing this quantitative form data using 
descriptive statistics (Collis & Hussey, 2003).   
 
4.5.1.1 Data collection method: Content analysis 
To identify trends and emerging issues in the practice of sustainability 
assurance in companies in the UK, the most appropriate method was a 
textual analysis of sustainability assurance statements issued between 
2001 and 2007. Silverman (1993) defines textual analysis as the 
examination of text and documents. From among the research methods 
that could be used to understand the meaning in a text (Weber, 1990; 
Robson, 2002; Neuendorf, 2002; Krippendorff, 2004), this research uses 
content analysis. Krippendorff (2004) explains that this method is 
classified into two categories, viz, quantitative and qualitative. 
Quantitative content analysis was chosen on the grounds that it is one of 
the more practical ways to  systematically convert information on selected 
features of the practice of sustainability assurance to numerical 
(categorical) variables for quantitative data analysis and to [work] with 
the frequency of occurrence of [these features] (George, 2009:145). 
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Albeit that Weber (1990) argues that there is no simple right way to 
conduct content analysis, it was decided that the best procedures to adopt 
for this phase of the investigation were the following sub-processes48
 
: 
(1)Identifying sources of data:  This procedure focused on the selection of 
UK companies, and selection of reports and assurance statements; 
 
(2)Designing the coding form: The design of the coding form considered 
the data characteristics described in section 4.3, viz coding framework. 
The procedure also focused on testing the reliability of the coding form; 
 
(3)Desk-based work: This consisted of coding the information contained 
in the assurance statements, and designing a database in Excel for the 
purpose of descriptive statistical analysis. 
 
4.5.1.1.1 Identifying sources of data 
Companies examined  
This research examines companies listed in the FTSE100 Index.  This 
index comprises the 100 most highly capitalized companies in the United 
                                                        
48 Based on the work of Silverman (2006:159). 
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Kingdom listed on the London stock exchange, representing 81% of the 
UK market49. Albeit that the FTSE100 Index is not representative of the 
United Kingdom companies as a whole (see Gray, Kouhy & Lavers, 1995), 
it was selected on the grounds that50
 
, first, larger organisations are more 
likely to commission a type of assurance service (see Kolk & Perego, 
2010). Hence, there was empirical evidence that more than 50% of 
FTSE100 companies reporting on sustainability issues commissioned 
sustainability assurance services (KPMG, 2005, 2008).  Second, this index 
provides more comparability with previous studies investigating the 
phenomenon of sustainability assurance, which also used a FTSE100 
sample of companies (see Al-Hamadeen, 2007; Jones & Solomon, 2010). 
Therefore, the one hundred companies listed on the FTSE100 Index on 
31st March 2005 were examined. The breakdown of these one hundred 
companies by industrial sector is shown in Table 4.1. As can be seen from 
the table, the sample of companies represents a wide range of industrial 
sectors; hence, it is unlikely that there will be a sector bias in the result.  
Table 4-1FTSE100 companies covered by the research, by industrial sector classification  
Industrial sector Classification representation in total list 
(%) 
Aerospace and defence 3.0 
Banks 8.0 
Beverages 4.1 
Chemicals 3.0 
Construction and building materials 3.0 
Electricity 3.0 
Food and drug retailers 3.0 
                                                        
49 http://www.ftse.com/Indices/UK_Indices/index.jsp 
50 This section draws on the work of Gray et al. (1995:87-88).  
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Industrial sector Classification representation in total list 
(%) 
Foods producers and processors 4.0 
General retailers 6.0 
Health, pharmaceuticals, and 
biotechnology 
5.0 
Leisure and hotels 6.0 
Life assurance 6.0 
Media and entertainment 9.0 
Mining 4.9 
Oil and gas 3.0 
Personal care and household products 1.0 
Real estate 4.0 
Software and computer services 1.0 
Speciality and other finance 4.0 
Support services 4.9 
Telecommunication services 4.0 
Tobacco 3.0 
Transport 3.0 
Utilities 4.0 
Total 100 
 
Assurance statements 
The information needed to achieve the objective of the first phase of the 
research is contained in sustainability assurance statements. This 
research follows previous research by analyzing sustainability assurance 
statements attached to reports (see Ball et al., 2000; Kamp-Roelands, 
2002; ODwyer & Owen, 2005; Al-Hamadeen, 2007). Specifically, the study 
examines assurance statements attached to reports published by FTSE100 
companies through sustainability sections on their websites over a period 
of seven years. First, reports issued by the FTSE100 companies from 2001 
to 2007 under the headings environmental, health and safety, 
environmental, social/environmental, corporate social responsibility 
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and corporate sustainability were collected. Reports under other 
denominations, or not archived on the website, were not counted. In four 
cases there were mergers and acquisitions of companies in the sample. 
Reports released by these new companies were not recorded. In total, a 
sample of 401 reports was collected. Next, assurance statements were 
identified and collected from these reports. In this research an assurance 
statement was any statement in the report with a clear method of 
evaluation and issued by a formal external assurance provider. However, 
because of the need to explore different assurance approaches in the 
FTSE100 companies, statements issued by panels of evaluation or by the 
internal audit group were included51. In total, 244 assurance statements 
were identified and collected. The process of gathering assurance 
statements was carried out between January 2006 and September 2008. A 
final check was conducted in December 2008, to verify the number of 
reports and assurance statements contained in the sample database52
 
.  
4.5.1.1.2 Designing a coding form  
The process of designing the coding form consisted of the following sub-
processes53
                                                        
51 The sample of assurance statements excluded benchmarking statements (such as those 
provided by the London benchmarking group-LBG), and commentaries provided by 
opinion leaders. 
: 
52 The high cost of access to a database such as CorporateRegister.com limited this step of 
the research. 
53  The procedure draws on the work of  Neuendorf  (2002:111-163). 
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(1) The first draft of the coding form was designed considering the 
features needed to describe the trends, and analyze emerging issues of the 
assurance practice (see section 4.3). Krippendorff (2004:173-178) 
suggests that the development of these features should be an interactive 
process; hence, the initial list of features was revised and adjusted after 
being evaluated by the research supervisor in his status of expert in the 
field. Following this procedure, the following final list of 20 features was 
produced:  
 
x Presence of assurance statement  
x Assurance provider type: accountancy firm, specialized 
consultants, certification bodies; other 
x Assurance standard type: ISAE3000;AA1000; other 
x Level of assurance type: reasonable, limited, other 
x Assurance procedure type 1: Use of analytical procedures    
x Assurance procedure type 2: Confirmation/corroboration of 
specific data with external parties  
x Assurance procedure type 3: Consistency with underlying 
systems/data/report 
x Assurance procedure type 4: Conducting interviews/discussion 
with management and employees 
x Assurance procedure type 5: Inspection/checking of supporting 
underlying documentation 
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x Assurance procedure type 6: Reviewing accounting 
policies/disclosure principles/measurement 
methods/performance/risk/materiality 
x Assurance procedure type 7: Site visits 
x Assurance procedure type 8: Testing/reviewing 
reliability/accuracy of internal control systems 
x Assurance procedure type 9: Rely on internal audit 
x Assurance procedure type 10: Inclusion of stakeholder views 
x Inclusion of stakeholder views method type 1: Review of media 
x Inclusion of stakeholder views method type 2: Via secondary data 
x Inclusion of stakeholder views method type 3: Via observations, 
attending stakeholder sessions 
x Inclusion of stakeholder views method type 4: Via questionnaires, 
surveys 
x Inclusion of stakeholder views method type 5: Via meetings with 
stakeholders and interviews 
x Inclusion of stakeholder views method type 6: Via stakeholder 
panel/views of experts. 
 
Albeit that the list of features generated is ample, it is not all-inclusive. 
However, it provides a good base for the examination of trends in the 
sustainability assurance practice. 
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(2)Preliminary drafts of the coding form were tested to assure reliability. 
A pilot reliability test was conducted on a sample of 33 assurance 
statements (15% of total sample). This process is explained in more detail 
in section 4.4.1.3;  
 
(3)Efforts were made to establish content validity. This process is 
explained in more detail in section 4.4.1.3; 
After confirming the reliability and validity of the coding form, the final 
version of the coding form was approved by the researchers supervisor. 
 
4.5.1.1.3 Desk-based work 
Data were collected by means of the 62-item coding form (see version of 
the coding form in appendix 1). The majority of the items collected by the 
coding form were categorical variables; that is, yes/no variables (Agresti, 
2007)54
                                                        
54 Categorical data are data whose values cannot be measured numerically but can be 
either classified into sets (categories) or placed in rank order (Saunders et al., 
2007:593). 
. Other items asked for factual information such as name of 
company or name of assurance provider. Following the procedures of 
ODwyer and Owen (2005), the researcher re-checked the array of data 
collected on several occasions. A final check of the data compiled was 
conducted in December 2008. After this, the categorical variables were 
translated into a spreadsheet in Excel, using numerical codes (0,1). A 
missing data code was used to indicate reasons for data missed. The 
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spreadsheet was checked and re-checked several times to verify that the 
data had been entered correctly. Following this, a preliminary analysis 
was carried out to check for errors in the database; in this manner, the 
database was corrected. After carrying out this process several times, the 
final analysis was conducted.  
 
4.5.1.2 Data analysis method:  Descriptive statistical analysis 
A descriptive statistics analysis, using diagrams, enables the researcher to 
describe (and compare) variables numerically (Saunders et al. 2007). 
Therefore, in this research the categorical data were subject to a 
descriptive statistics analysis using Data Analysis and Statistical Software 
(Stata). The reason for using Stata was that it is command-line oriented 
(Kohler & Kreuter, 2005); this feature allows more efficient organisation 
and editing of datasets than does the Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences (SPSS). From among the existing forms for presentation of 
categorical data (Saunders et al., 2007), this research chose two. That is, 
the statistical analysis consisted of: (1) Comparison of proportions of 
occurrences of categories for two or more variables in a percentage 
component bar chart, and (2) Showing patterns in variables using cross-
tabulation in the form of categorical tabplots (see Cox, 2004). These forms 
were selected on the grounds that they facilitate to visualize trends, make 
comparison between variables, and to find relationships between 
variables (Saunders et al., 2007:430). The analysis of this data identified 
trends, patterns and emerging issues in the practice of sustainability 
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assurance in the FTSE100 companies. In this manner, the research 
objective of the quantitative phase of the research was achieved.  
 
4.5.1.3 Quality control procedures 
There are two main types of validity that need to be established in a 
research project, viz content validity and results validity (see Saunders et 
al., 2007). Whilst content validity refers to the extent to which the content 
analysis method measures what it intends to measure, results validity 
concerns the extent to which results are really about that they profess to 
be about (Saunders et al., 2007:614).  Krippendorff (2004:313-338) 
describes a variety of procedures that are used to establish the content 
and results validity in content analysis. For the purpose of establishing 
content validity, and because of time constraints, this research used a 
semantic validity procedure to ensure that the features selected for 
investigation (see section 4.3) accurately describe meanings in the context 
of this research (Krippendorff, 2004); that is, that the features could be 
easily identifiable by experts in the field of sustainability assurance as 
characteristic of the practice. Hence, the features were drawn from an 
extensive review of the literature on sustainability assurance, with 
particular focus on the United Kingdom case, and were then approved by 
the supervisor of this research in his role of expert in the field. Thus, the 
features seemed reasonable (see Robson, 2002). Moreover, results validity 
was established by the predictive validity procedure (Krippendorff, 2004). 
In other words, based on the review of the literature on sustainability 
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assurance possible answers were envisaged with regard to the trends of 
the features selected for investigation (see section 4.3). Hence, 
observations in the dataset validate the predictions made.   
 
Conversely, reliability refers to the extent to which the data collection 
method will yield consistent findings (Saunders et al., 2007:609).  
Neuendorf (2002:141) states that when human coders are used in 
content analysis, this translates to intercoder reliability or level of 
agreement among two or more coders. Neuendorf (2002:146) notes that 
in content analysis, reliability should be assessed at two points, pilot and 
final. In this study, a pilot test was conducted on a random sample of 15% 
of the total sample of the assurance statements, in order to verify the 
performance of the coding form55
 
. The data collected were reviewed by 
the research supervisor who, in his role as expert in the field of 
sustainability assurance, confirmed the results. Next, during the data 
gathering processing a final reliability test was conducted by two different 
coders (the researcher and a PhD student who received training on the 
subject) in order to verify the performance/consistency of the researcher 
in collecting the data.  A random sample of 15% of the total number of 
statements was selected to conduct this final reliability test. 
                                                        
55 A guideline between 10% and 20% is the rule (Neuendorf, 2002:158). 
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Because there is no one universally accepted coefficient of intercoder 
reliability, three coefficients were used in this study: percent of 
agreement, Scotts pi and Cohens kappa56. For the calculation of the 
coefficients, the statistical software Statistical Analysis and Simulation 
Software (Simstat) was used. The reason for using Simstat was that it can 
calculate percentage agreement, Scott's pi and Cohen's kappa, whereas 
SPSS can only calculate Cohen's kappa (Lombard, Snyder-Duch & 
Campanella, 2010).  In total, 23 items of the coding form were tested. The 
pilot test reported the following results (see results of the analysis in 
Appendix 2): (1) 9 items in the coding form with 100% agreement; (2) 6 
items with coefficients equal to 1; (3) 8 items between 1 and 0.9; (4) 5 
items between 0.9 and 0.8; (5) 1 item with less than 0.757. The final test 
reported the following results: (1) 11 items in the coding form with 100% 
agreement; (2) 8 items with coefficients equal to 1; (3) 7 items between 1 
and 0.9; (4) 2 items between 0.9 and 0.8; (5) 2 items between 0.8 and 0.7; 
(5) 1 item with less than 0.758
                                                        
56 These coefficients are the most popular in social and behavioural science (Neuendorf, 
2002).  They are concerned with the assessment of whether coders agree as to the 
precise values assigned to a given variable (149). Because percentage of agreement 
coefficient does not take into account the element of chance, Scotts pi and Cohens kappa 
are also used.  Scotts pi ranges between 0.00 (agreement at chance level) and 1 (perfect 
agreement); values less than 0.00 indicate that agreement is less than chance. Cohens 
kappa ranges from 0.00 (agreement at chance level) to 1.00 (perfect agreement); values 
less than 0.00 indicate that agreement is less than chance (Neuendorf, 2002:150).  
. Neuendorf (2002:143) notes that 
coefficients > 0.9 would be acceptable for all; coefficients > 0.8 would be 
acceptable in most situations, and below 0.7 there exists a disagreement. 
The two items in the coding form below 0.7 were revisited to better 
understand their meaning, and correct the issue in the final coding. Then, 
57 Simstat did not report results for 3 items. 
58 Simstat did not report results for 3 items. 
 137 
 
a final re-check was conducted for all the variables of the coding form with 
the whole sample of statements; however, no reliability test was 
conducted.  
 
4.5.1.4 Limitations of content analysis method 
Research methods have advantages and disadvantages (Collis & Hussey, 
2003; Silverman, 2006; Weber, 1990). Robson (2002:358) argues that one 
of the major advantages of the content analysis method lies in its 
execution on data which is in permanent form; this allows reliability 
checks. However, a major disadvantage is the bias from working on 
documents which have been written for some purpose other than for the 
research (Robson, 2002:358). Hence, with this research method there is 
no possibility of interacting beyond reading and analyzing the text. 
Robson (2002) suggests the need for other data sources to address this 
problem. Therefore, in this study this limitation was minimized through 
the use of another research method, semi-structured interviews, as 
discussed below.      
 
4.5.2 Phase two of the research: Qualitative  
During phase one of this research, trends and emerging issues in the 
practice of sustainability assurance in the FTSE100 companies were 
identified. During phase two, these issues were explained and understood 
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through the views of representatives of FTSE100 companies and of 
stakeholder groups.  Hence, the following objectives were established for 
the second phase of the research:  
x To investigate companies reasons for commissioning sustainability 
assurance, and the factors underpinning the choice of assurance 
approaches, assurance standards, role of internal audit function, 
and restrictions in level of assurance; 
x To elicit the views of companies about the appropriate level of 
stakeholder inclusion in the assurance process, together with their 
suggestions for further developing assurance processes; 
x To examine stakeholder views on the sustainability assurance 
process, together with their suggestions for further developing 
assurance processes in order to promote a greater degree of 
stakeholder accountability. 
 
To address these objectives, it was necessary to use a specific technique to 
collect the views of companies and stakeholder groups on emerging issues 
of the sustainability assurance in the United Kingdom. The research 
method used was semi-structured interviews, as applied by previous 
researchers (see Jones & Solomon, 2010; Edgley et al., 2010; ODwyer et 
al., 2011). Therefore, this phase of the research adopted a qualitative 
approach; in other words, this phase consisted of eliciting research 
participants views on emerging issues of the sustainability assurance in 
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the United Kingdom, and using their words as data to obtain a deep 
understanding of the phenomenon (see Collis & Hussey, 2003).   
 
4.5.2.1 Data collection method: Semi-structured interviews 
This study chose the interview method over the questionnaire-based 
survey and observation methods for three reasons. First, the 
questionnaire-based survey method work[s] best with standardized 
questions where it is possible to be confident that the questions mean the 
same thing to different respondents (Robson, 2002:234). Hence, this 
method was inappropriate, particularly when dealing with participants 
from stakeholder groups. It was anticipated that with this group, there 
would be a need to explain and interpret some questions concerning 
technicalities of the assurance process, such as issues concerning 
assurance standards and the stakeholder inclusion in different stages of 
the assurance process. Second, there are practical difficulties in carrying 
out participant observation, chief among them the high cost, and the 
uncertainty of access to companies and stakeholder group organisations. 
Finally, it was more likely that participants would agree to be interviewed 
rather than complete a questionnaire survey (see Saunders et al., 2007).  
 
The interview is a method of collecting research data in which 
participants are asked questions in order to find out what they do, think 
or feel (Collis & Hussey, 2003:167).  From among the different types of 
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interviews - structured, semi-structured, open-ended, or focus group type 
(Silverman, 2006), this research chose the semi-structured interview. It 
was considered that through this type of interview, a flexible approach 
could be adopted. That is, whilst emerging issues were discussed with all 
participants, there were cases in which new questions were addressed as 
different aspects of those issues were revealed. Moreover, the semi-
structured interview method allows for varying the order of inquiries 
between the interviews (Saunders et al., 2007).  
 
Saunders et al. (2007) explain that semi-structured interviews may be 
conducted on a one-to-one or group basis. Although conducting semi-
structured interviews by telephone is the more convenient approach (see 
Saunders et al., 2007), the majority of the interviews in this study were 
conducted one-to-one in a face-to-face situation. It was considered that in 
this way, the issue of the interviewer conducting the interviews in English 
could be managed59.  Hence, thirteen interviews were conducted in a face-
to-face situation, and five by telephone60
                                                        
59 The interviewers native language is Spanish. 
. Moreover, face-to-face 
interviews offer the possibility of following up interesting responses 
(Robson, 2002). Conversely, group interviews and video teleconferencing 
were not considered for practical reasons, chiefly the difficulty of 
organizing such interviews. Equally, electronic semi-structured interviews 
using email or chat rooms would have been inappropriate as it would not 
60 Telephone interviews were conducted in cases where there were difficulties in 
travelling to the place where the interview was conducted.  
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have been possible to establish personal contact and build trust to explore 
sensitive matters concerning social and environmental issues. 
 
4.5.2.1.1 Selection of respondents 
The companies participating in this study were selected according to their 
status as interesting or best practice exemplars (Gray et al., 1995). In 
other words, the companies selected had a history of participation in the 
ACCA sustainability reporting awards scheme (for years 2005, 2006, and 
2007).  The sample of companies was also designed to cover: (1) the main 
approaches in the assurance provision adopted, such as big four, 
specialized consultant, certification body and panel of evaluation; (2) 
companies that had changed their assurance provider, or type of 
provision, during the previous five years, and (3) one company that 
decided not to re-commission assurance that it had previously 
discontinued.   
 
Representatives of these companies were contacted via email, with a 
formal letter explaining the nature of the project. In qualitative research, 
the researcher selects individuals who can provide the information 
needed; that is, researchers intentionally select participants who have 
experience with the central phenomenon or the key concept being 
explored (Creswell & Plano-Clark, 2007:112). Therefore, participants 
were corporate responsibility managers who held primary responsibility 
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for commissioning sustainability assurance. In the case of one company, 
two senior managers participated in the research; however, because the 
views they expressed were broadly the same, no distinction was made 
between them when considering the views of that company. Robson 
(2002:176) argues that if the researcher selects the interviewees, this 
introduces a bias in the research. However, as was the case with previous 
researchers, this bias was considered balanced by the interviewees 
knowledge in sustainability assurance (Jones & Solomon, 2010:22).  In 
total ten corporate responsibility managers were interviewed. These 
respondents were selected across industrial sectors to reduce sector bias 
in the result. The full list of corporate interviewees appears in Table 4.2. 
 
Table 4-2 Company interviewees 
Interviewee Industrial 
Sector 
Sustainability 
assurance provision 
(2007) 
Assurance history  
(2002 -2007) 
C1: Head of 
sustainable 
development 
Mining Big 4 Big 4 (change in 
provider 2007) 
C2: Social 
performance 
manager 
Oil and gas Big 4 Big 4 (change in 
provider 2005) 
C3: International 
sustainability 
manager 
Tobacco Big 4 Certification body 
and Big 4 (change in 
2006) 
C4: (i) Manager for 
country sustainability 
reporting ; (ii) Head 
of corporate 
reporting  
Oil and gas Big 4 Big 4 (same provider 
2002-2007) 
C5: (former) 
Sustainability 
manager 
Telecommunication 
services 
Certification body 
and stakeholder 
external panel 
Certification body 
(same provider 2001-
2007) 
C6: VP corporate 
responsibility 
Health, 
pharmaceuticals, and 
biotechnology 
Certification body Consultant and 
certification body  
(change in 2006) 
C7: Public affairs 
manager 
General retail Big 4, consultant and 
stakeholder external 
panel 
Big 4, consultant and 
stakeholder panel  
(change in 2007) 
C8: Group senior 
adviser, sustainable 
development 
Oil and gas Stakeholder external 
panel 
Big 4 (2002-04); 
external stakeholder 
panel from 2005 
C9: Senior Banks No assurance Consultant (2002-4); 
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Interviewee Industrial 
Sector 
Sustainability 
assurance provision 
(2007) 
Assurance history  
(2002 -2007) 
sustainability 
manager 
(change in provider 
in 2004) 
C10: European 
sustainability director 
Telecommunication 
services 
Big 4 Big 4 (same provider 
2003-2007); 
stakeholders views 
(2005-2006) 
 
Additionally, a maximal variation sampling approach was used to select 
stakeholder groups participating in this study. In this approach, groups 
chosen hold different perspectives on the central phenomenon (Creswell 
& Plano-Clark, 2007:112). The idea is to choose a diversity of participants 
who can provide different views on the phenomenon under study, hence, 
providing a good qualitative study (Creswell & Plano-Clark, 2007:112). On 
this basis, three categories of stakeholder groups were selected.  
 
First, the group from the investment community was sought, in view of the 
fact that social and environmental issues are becoming increasingly 
integrated into institutional investment decision making (see Solomon & 
Solomon, 2006), and because of the potential influence of this group in the 
development of sustainability reporting and assurance practice (see Zadek 
et al., 2004). Again, individuals from this stakeholder group were 
contacted by email, with a formal explanation of the research project. 
During the process of interview, respondents were asked to recommend 
people who were interested in the subject matter. In this manner, three 
individuals representing the investment stakeholder group were selected 
and agreed to participate in the research.   
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Second, nongovernmental organisations (INGOs) working on development 
issues at international level were approached.  INGOs have tended to be at 
the fore in corporate stakeholder engagement initiatives: some, such as 
Christian Aid and Oxfam, have produced critiques of corporate social and 
environmental impacts; whilst others, such as War on Want and Friends of 
the Earth, have produced alternative corporate sustainability reports. 
Here, the strategy for identifying interview participants was to ask the 
first interviewee to recommend individuals with appropriate experience 
in corporate sustainability assurance and reporting. In most cases, one 
interviewee provided the name of the next interviewee. In another 
instance, the researcher contacted an individual at an international event 
held in Brussels in 200861
 
. In this way, four participants representing the 
INGO sector in the areas of development, environment, human rights, and 
social/poverty development were identified and agreed to participate in 
the research. 
Third, the researcher sought a contribution from the trade union 
stakeholder group. Zadek et al. (2004) argue that employees are a major 
audience for sustainability assurance as they might be interested in the 
continuous improvement of company performance.  Interestingly, it was 
here that there was greatest difficulty in securing interviewees, with the 
                                                        
61 Conference: Smart regulation: Legislative opportunities for the EU to improve 
corporate accountability hosted by the European Parliament in 2008. 
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major United Kingdom trade union organisations all declining 
participation, largely arguing lack of expertise and/or interest in the 
subject matter. However, the researcher contacted a prominent official 
with an international trade union organisation, whom she met at an 
international event in Brussels in 200662
 
, who agreed to an interview.  
All the participants representing the stakeholder groups were either 
actively involved in sustainability reporting and assurance activity and/or 
had strong views concerning its current usefulness and future 
possibilities. In total, eight participants agreed to be interviewed. The full 
list of stakeholder interviewees appears in Table 4.3. 
Table 4-3 Stakeholder groups interviewees 
S1 Investor (specialist asset management) 
S2 Investor (pension scheme advisor) 
S3 Investor ( SRI analyst) 
S4 Environmental INGO 
S5 Social/Poverty INGO 
S6 Sustainable development INGO 
S7 Environmental/Human rights INGO 
S8 (International) Trade union official 
 
In terms of numbers, rather than selecting a large number of people or 
sites, the qualitative researcher identifies a small number that will provide 
in-depth information about each person or site. It is normal that a small 
number is used, such as 4 to 10 (Creswell & Plano-Clark, 2007:12). 
Therefore, it was decided to choose a small number of participants from 
                                                        
62 Conference: Recent trends in Sustainability Reporting in Europe hosted by the 
European Commission in 2006. 
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the companies and stakeholder groups to provide detailed views on the 
phenomenon under study.   
 
4.5.2.1.2 Interview themes and procedures 
In this research, interview themes to examine the views of representatives 
of companies and stakeholder groups on emerging issues in sustainability 
assurance were derived from the analysis of trends and issues in 
sustainability assurance in the FTSE100 companies (see chapter five, 
section 5.7). Themes for the interviews were as follow: 
 
(1)Interview themes with representatives of companies: 
x Company division with main role in the sustainability assurance 
exercise 
x Reasons for commissioning sustainability assurance services 
x Benefits of the assurance services 
x Factors underpinning assurance approach; view on sustainability 
assurance standards 
x Restrictions on level of assurance 
x Role of internal audit function  
x Necessary degree of stakeholder inclusion 
x Positive or negative views on the assurance exercise 
x Future of sustainability assurance. 
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(2)Interview themes with representatives of stakeholder groups: 
x Purpose of sustainability assurance 
x Positive or negative views towards the exercise 
x Views on assurance standards 
x Future of sustainability assurance. 
 
From these themes, two interview guides were developed, one for the 
representatives of companies and another for representatives of 
stakeholder groups (see list of questions in Appendix 3). Additional 
questions were asked according to the context, and depending on the 
issues discussed. Moreover, specific questions were asked to clarify 
responses given to the general questions.  
 
Interviews with participants from the companies and stakeholder groups 
were held from January 2008 to August 2008. The majority of face-to-face 
interviews were conducted in various cities in the United Kingdom, and 
one was conducted in Brussels, Belgium. The interview protocol consisted 
of a brief presentation of the researchers background together with the 
interview objectives, followed by general and follow-up questions. 
Interviews lasted between 30 minutes and 2 hours. 
With the agreement of the interviewees, all the interviews were recorded 
and subsequently transcribed for the purpose of analysis.  Several 
participants were concerned with what would be reported, and how 
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(Robson, 2002). Therefore, a guarantee of anonymity was given to the 
interviewees, in that neither their own name nor the name of their 
organisation would be identified in the final research report.  This 
situation led to difficulties of referencing in the writing up process. In one 
case, there was a need to reference a previous research article that 
specifies the name of a company participating in this study. To guarantee 
anonymity, the name of the company was removed from the title of the 
article in the list of references of this thesis. 
 
Conducting interviews in English was a challenging experience for the 
researcher, especially when dealing with difficult interviewees. For 
example, one interviewee provided straightforward, short answers to the 
questions, without the possibility to explore the topic further, while 
another started interviewing the researcher, in an almost intimidating 
way. In the latter case, the researcher had to build trust with the 
interviewee, and was finally able to conduct an interview which yielded 
interesting insights. Overall however, the experience of interviewing was a 
positive one.   
 
4.5.2.2 Data analysis method: Data display and analysis 
Because this study is based on an inductive research approach, it follows 
an inductively-based analytical approach to analyze the qualitative data 
(Saunders et al., 2007: 492). Lack of experience in conducting a qualitative 
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data analysis meant that the researcher was an apprentice (Robson, 
2002:457), and needed assistance in this area. Hence, from among the 
group of inductively-based analytical methods, it was advised that the 
researcher use the data display and analysis method (Saunders et al., 
2007: 493). This method has been developed in more detail and used by a 
previous researcher in the field (ODwyer, 2004). Hence, this research 
mainly follows ODwyers (2004: 391-407) procedures, which consisted of 
the following three sub-processes:  
 
(1)Data reduction 
Prior to commencing the data reduction, every transcript was read several 
times until the text was fully understood. Then, the researcher read each 
transcript while simultaneously listening to the recording, and made notes 
on specific issues.  Following this, categories related to the research 
objectives of phase two of the research were identified in the text. 
Additionally, the interview themes were used as a guide.  After these 
categories were identified, open codes were derived from the dataset. The 
process of composing the open codes took a considerable amount of time, 
especially with the dataset from the stakeholder groups participants, 
since they provided very heterogeneous views. Then, each codified dataset 
was recorded in a Word file and cross referenced with the marked page in 
each transcript. Finally, further readings of the transcripts were made in 
order to make a summary of each interview, and in the case of the 
stakeholder groups dataset, the review considered the type of stakeholder 
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group represented. After this, a period of six months was taken to reflect 
on the findings, following which the transcripts and summaries were read 
again.  
 
(2)Data display 
In order to organize the codified dataset, a matrix was used to assemble 
the dataset into a diagrammatic form. This matrix allowed comparison 
among different viewpoints and different items of information, and the 
identification of patterns and contradictions in the dataset. To build the 
matrix, the matrix function in the software NViVo (a type of computer 
assisted qualitative data analysis software [CAQDAS])63
 
  was used (see 
Saunders et al., 2007:509).  
(3)Drawing conclusions 
This stage of the analysis took a considerable amount of time, almost 
eighteen months. To draw empirical conclusions, the dataset was analyzed 
by asking the following questions: What are the points of interest 
emerging? What are the differences in the views of different stakeholder 
groups, and companies? Are there any connections among different 
categories? Are there any connections among the different views of 
participants? (see Saunders et al., 2007). Then, a story was developed 
                                                        
63 For practical reasons the matrix function of this software was used to assist with the 
construction of the matrix that ODwyer (2004) recommends.     
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around a theme, focusing on expressing the diversity and contradictions of 
the views of the participants. Here, the researcher made generous use of 
direct quotes from the interview transcripts to provide an extensive 
description and interpretation of sustainability assurance in the United 
Kingdom. For the researcher, this was the most difficult part of the dataset 
analysis and required further assistance from her supervisors. Following 
this, and for the purpose of drawing conceptual conclusions, the dataset 
was analyzed by asking the following question: How does the empirical 
material relate to the conceptual framework (see chapter three, section 
3.5)? (see Saunders et al., 2007). Finally, an explanation was developed 
around key strands of the conceptual framework.  
 
4.5.2.3 Quality control procedures 
In this research, the lack of a standard set of questions leads to concerns 
regarding reliability (Saunders et al., 2007:318). However, reliability has 
limited meaning in qualitative research since the circumstances to be 
explored are complex and dynamic (Creswell & Plano-Clark, 2007:135). 
In this study, the researcher underwent a thorough process of reflexivity 
(Robson, 2002:172); that is, the researcher took full account of particular 
personal beliefs and ideologies which could have an impact on the 
research process. Through the reflexivity process, she identified areas of 
potential researcher bias, and dealt with them. In this manner, the validity 
or credibility of the results was established.  
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In qualitative approaches the concern for the researcher is to deal with 
threats to the validity of results (Robson, 2002).  There are three possible 
threats to the validity of qualitative approaches, viz, reactivity, respondent 
biases, and researcher biases (Robson, 2002:172). In this research, a 
member checking procedure was used (Creswell & Plano-Clark, 2007) to 
deal with these three threats. The empirical findings were returned to the 
respondents, who were asked whether the findings were an accurate 
reflection of their experiences (2007:135).  Whilst most of the 
respondents agreed on the empirical findings, one participant from one 
stakeholder group asked to rectify one result. Further, triangulation in the 
form of observer triangulation was used (Robson, 2002:174). That is, the 
supervisor of this research was present during the majority of the 
interviews, and he conducted the empirical analysis of the data. Hence, 
both the supervisor and the researcher arrived at similar results. Finally, 
preliminary findings were subject to external review from researchers in 
the field of sustainability assurance.  
 
4.5.2.4 Limitations of semi-structured interviews method 
The advantage of the semi-structured interview method is that it allows 
the researcher to explore a wide range of categories at a deeper level than 
the questionnaire-based survey method. However, the major limitation 
comes from interviewer bias. In this research, the potential for 
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misinterpretation of the interviewees responses because of cultural 
differences between the interviewees and the researcher was minimized 
by follow-up statements from the interviewees when necessary, and by 
recording the interviews then having them transcribed by native-English-
speaking professional transcribers.  
 
4.6 LIMITATIONS OF MIXED-METHODS RESEARCH  
Albeit that the follow-up explanatory model research design is 
straightforward, researchers choosing this approach face specific 
challenges. Creswell and Plano Clark (2007:149) argue that potential 
issues in this type of mixed-methods research design are: (1) Not 
choosing participants for the follow-up who help explain significant 
results; (2) Not designing an instrument with sound psychometric (i.e., 
validity and reliability) properties; (3) Choosing weak quantitative results 
to follow up on qualitatively. In order to minimize these threats, the 
following procedures were applied: (1) Participants for the quantitative 
and the qualitative phases were chosen from the same sample of FSTE100 
companies; (2) Rigorous procedures for developing and validating the 
coding form were followed; (3) Significant results were chosen to follow 
up on; (4) Procedures to address both threads to validity and reliability 
were carried out when applicable. 
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4.7 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
A researcher needs to consider a number of different ethical issues and 
find out what rules there may be for conducting research at an early stage 
of the research (Collis & Hussey, 2003:37). Since there are no established 
ethical principles for business research, this study used the University of 
Nottingham code of conduct for research64
 
. First, professional 
development training in quantitative and qualitative research methods 
was undertaken. Second, paper records, and two databases with the 
quantitative and qualitative data, were kept to demonstrate that there was 
no falsification of results. Third, confidentiality of the research 
participants was ensured, since no names were disclosed. Finally, the 
research participants took part on a voluntary basis. 
4.8 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has described the research philosophy, research design and 
research methods choices made in this research. It has examined in detail 
the ontological assumptions, research design considerations, choice of 
research methods, and quality control measures adopted in the study. It 
has made clear that the study is based on an inductive research approach. 
This study is of descriptive, explanatory and longitudinal type. The 
chapter has described the mixed-methods research design - follow-up 
explanatory model - of two phases, from quantitative to qualitative. The 
                                                        
64 Version of the code for year 2007 
(http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/ris/policy/code_of_conduct.pdf) 
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results arising from the first, quantitative, phase are presented in chapter 
five. In chapters six and seven results from the second, qualitative, phase 
of the research are reported. This chapter provides a link between the 
preceding conceptual chapters, and the empirical chapters that follow.  
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5 CHAPTER FIVE: TRENDS AND ISSUES IN 
SUSTAINABILITY ASSURANCE PRACTICE: THE 
FTSE10065
 
 
This chapter has three aims: 
(1) To examine sustainability assurance practices adopted by the FTSE100 
companies using the content analysis method; 
(2) To describe the trends, and emerging issues, in sustainability 
assurance exercises between 2001 and 2007; 
(3) To highlight further research required to be conducted during the 
second, qualitative, phase of this research. 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Evidence from chapter two indicates that there are country differences in 
the growth of the commission of sustainability assurance services, and 
variations in the main features of the sustainability assurance practices. In 
order to address the research objective to analyze trends and to identify 
emerging issues as represented in the text of sustainability assurance 
statements of companies in the UK between 2001 and 2007, this chapter 
examines the patterns of significant features of the sustainability 
assurance practices over that period in the FTSE100 companies. The 
                                                        
65 This chapter draws upon the work of Owen et al. (2009:14-16), who present an 
overview of the trends and issues in sustainability assurance practices in the FTSE100.  
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analysis highlights a number of emerging issues in the practice of 
sustainability assurance, which will be explored in chapters six and seven. 
This chapter comprises seven sections. The first section analyzes the trend 
in the commission of sustainability assurance services; the second 
examines the trend in the choice of assurance provider and approach; the 
third section illustrates the tendency regarding sustainability assurance 
standards; the fourth describes the trend concerning the level of 
assurance; the fifth describes the trend in the type of assurance 
procedures employed, while the sixth section examines the trend in the 
inclusion of the opinion of stakeholders within assurance exercises. 
Finally, section seven draws conclusions from the discussions in this 
chapter. 
 
5.2 COMMISSION OF SUSTAINABILITY ASSURANCE SERVICES 
As mentioned in chapter two, the commission of sustainability assurance 
services is a voluntary company decision. Therefore, the business case for 
sustainability assurance is a determinant of the adoption of these services.  
The FEE (2002:16) argues that there are potential internal and external 
benefits from implementing this type of assurance. Internally, the 
assurance process contributes to the development of management 
systems of control and reporting systems, which in turn improve the 
process of decision making and the capacity to achieve business 
objectives.  Externally, the assurance process promotes improvement of 
community perceptions of companies activities, as the credibility of the 
 158 
 
sustainability report is enhanced. According to the FEE (2002:16), 
companies also receive benefits from the expertise and experience of 
assurance providers. Further, the adoption of assurance process reduces 
the likelihood of regulatory investigations and penalties in connection 
with social and environmental concerns (FEE, 2002).  
 
This section explores the extent of the commission of sustainability 
assurance services in the FTSE100 companies. Given the claims that 
external and internal benefits arise from the provision of sustainability 
assurance services, it could be expected that there would be a significant 
annual increment in the percentage of FTSE100 companies hiring this 
type of assurance service. However, the results in this study show a 
different tendency.  
 
Figure 5.1 outlines the trends in the proportion of FTSE100 companies 
that issued reports and the proportion of companies that commissioned 
sustainability assurance services between 2001 and 2007. The figure 
shows that the proportion of reporting practices was higher than the 
proportion of assurance practices. It is clear that most of the reporting 
practices of the FTSE100 companies were under some type of 
sustainability assurance exercise. As can be seen from the chart, the 
proportion of companies adopting reporting practices steadily increased 
during the period of study; however, from 2001 to 2004, this increase was 
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significant compared to the rise between 2004 and 2007. Conversely, 
although the proportion of companies commissioning assurance services 
increased significantly from 2001 to 2004, it appears that this proportion 
remained almost stable between 2004 and 2007. Moreover, the difference 
between the proportion of companies adopting reporting practices and 
the proportion of companies commissioning sustainability assurance 
services fluctuated between 2001 and 2007; that is, in the years 2002, 
2004 and 2006, the gap was lower than in the years 2003, 2005 and 2007.  
 
Three scenarios might explain these trends in commissioning assurance 
services: (1) It might be that companies engage in assurance exercises 
only once they have robust reporting systems, and therefore those 
companies that initiated reporting exercises in 2004 or later are not yet 
declaring assurance; (2) Sustainability assurance might be reaching a peak 
or even declining as a result of companies budgetary constraints in the 
unfavourable economic climate; (3) If companies are unconvinced as to 
the benefits arising from the sustainability assurance service, they might 
develop an intermittent assurance process, alternating between 
adopting and not adopting assurance exercises.  
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Figure 5-1 Reporting and the commission of sustainability assurance  
 
 
Source: Owen et al.  (2009:14)  
 
The results of this research differ from some published studies in the 
percentage figure of FTSE100 companies commissioning assurance 
services. Whilst KPMG Surveys (2005, 2008) report that between 2002 
and 2008 the commission of sustainability assurance services in the 
FTSE100 companies remained almost stable at around 53-55%, the 
present study found that the percentage figure is stable at around 44-46%. 
This discrepancy can be explained by the differences in the samples of 
corporate sustainability reports taken for the two analyses. However, the 
research findings in this study are in agreement with the KPMG (2005, 
2008) results in that there was a lag in the commission of sustainability 
pe
rc
en
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assurance services in the FTSE100 companies. As a result of this lag, the 
UK was displaced from its 2002 position as the country with the second 
highest percentage in Europe of top national companies commissioning 
sustainability assurance services, to fourth place in 2008, after France, 
Spain and Italy, where 73%, 70% and 60% respectively of the top national 
companies commissioned this type of assurance services (KPMG, 2005, 
2008).  
 
It is clear that sustainability assurance services are popular among the 
FTSE100; however, the lag in the adoption of this type of assurance 
services, together with the general reluctance among corporate 
responsibility managers of the FTSE100 to endorse external assurance, as 
reported by Jones and Solomon (2010), evidences the need for in-depth 
investigation of corporate motives and favoured approaches towards 
sustainability assurance. Consistent with the view of KPMG (2008), 
further research should be done to identify the reasons driving the 
commission of sustainability assurance exercises in the UK. 
 
5.3 SUSTAINABILITY ASSURANCE PROVISION 
The FEE (2002) defines four types of assurance approaches: accountancy, 
consultancy, social audit, and other approaches.  According to the FEE 
(2002:18), differences among these approaches arise for historical 
reasons and are evident in the nature of the assurance provider. The 
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accountancy and the consultancy approaches lead to the production of an 
assurance statement (report) by the assuror for the company. The 
accountancy approach consists of an independent examination by an 
accountancy firm of the information contained in the company reports 
(FEE, 2002:18).  The consultancy approach came into being as part of the 
consultancy services that companies were seeking to strengthen various 
management processes (FEE, 2002:20). Conversely, the social audit 
approach began as an external critical investigation of the companys 
activities by an independent social auditor who would produce a report 
mainly for external constituencies without any report from the company 
(FEE, 2002:19).  
 
The accountancy approach, the FEE (2002) explains, is a structured 
approach using risk analysis methods and appropriate procedures to 
gather evidence in order to produce an assurance statement66. The 
consultancy approach provides recommendations to the companies to 
improve performance in the areas of sustainability or to increase the 
reliability and disclosure of sustainability information (FEE, 2002)67
                                                        
66 Academic researchers have raised concerns regarding the accountancy approach in 
sustainability assurance. ODwyer and Owen (2005:225) assert that, in reality, 
accountants tend to adopt a cautious approach. They claim that accountants engage in 
little real time assurance and reduce this type of assurance to checking data only, in 
stark contrast to the risk-based financial approach in financial auditing, which focuses on 
auditing adding value.  
. Al-
Hamadeen (2007) suggests that within the consultancy approach, there is 
67 This view is supported by ODwyer and Owen (2005:225-226), who claim that the 
consultancy approach is more evaluative, focusing on issues of completeness and 
fairness, providing commentary on reporting systems and weakness in performance.  
According to these researchers, this approach is more strategic and adds value to 
external constituencies. 
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a clear distinction between specialized assurance consultants and 
certification bodies.  Hamadeen (2007) emphasizes that certification 
bodies provide information concerning the assurance standards, scope of 
the exercise and the criteria used to evaluate the quality of the report.  The 
social audit approach relies on obtaining evidence from outside the 
company, mainly from stakeholders and third parties, to produce a public 
report (FEE, 2002:19)68. However, the need to assure sustainability 
information led to assurance providers incorporating operating 
procedures of social auditors in their assurance approaches. The FEE 
(2002:20) illustrates other approaches which consist of judgements made 
either by a rating agency type of organisation, or by independent experts 
or celebrities in the field69
 
.  
According to Deegan et al. (2006), there is neither regulation nor 
consensus as to who is the most appropriate entity to conduct a 
sustainability assurance exercise. Therefore, it is expected that a diversity 
of assurance approaches will be found in the FTSE100 companies. In this 
section, the assurance approaches adopted by the FTSE100 companies are 
explored via an analysis of the type of assurance provider conducting the 
assurance exercise. Three main categories of assurance provider were 
identified in this sample of study: traditional assurance firms 
(accountants), specialized assurance firms (consultants) and certification 
bodies. Figure 5.2 presents the trend in the proportion of assurance 
                                                        
68 Examination of this approach was intentionally excluded from this research. 
69 Examination of this approach was intentionally excluded from this research. 
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services conducted by accountants, specialized assurance firms, and 
certification bodies between 2001 and 2007. As is apparent from the 
figure, initially traditional assurance providers (accountancy firms) were 
the companies first choice to provide assurance services. Specialized 
assurance consultants emerged as assurance providers when 
sustainability reporting began to take off from 2001 onwards, and were 
dominant in the sustainability assurance market between 2001 and 2007; 
however, between 2005 and 2007 there was a noticeable increase in the 
proportion of companies using accountancy firms. Hence, the difference 
between the proportion of assurance services conducted by specialized 
assurance firms and the proportion conducted by accountancy firms 
decreased considerably between 2005 and 2007. It appears that 
accountancy firms began to take a more proactive position in the 
sustainability assurance market in the UK. It would be of considerable 
interest to observe whether this trend continues, since it might have an 
impact on the assurance approach adopted in the future. Conversely, as 
can be seen from the chart, certification bodies were used to a much lesser 
degree than specialized assurance consultants and accountancy firms. 
 
The present findings seem to be consistent with other research which has 
found that, between 2000 and 2004, the consultancy approach was the 
most used approach in sustainability assurance in the FTSE100 (Al-
Hamadeen, 2007).  What is surprising in this finding is that whilst UK 
companies still prefer the consultancy approach, the global trend tends to 
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favour the accountancy approach (KPMG, 2005, 2008). The finding in this 
study raises questions concerning the preference for a certain type of 
assurance approach. Consistent with the views of Deegan et al. (2006) and 
Al-Hamadeen (2007), further investigation is needed to clarify the 
 
Figure 5-2 The trend in assurance provision   
                 
 
Source: Owen et al.  (2009:14)  
 
factors behind the selection of the consultancy and the certification body70
                                                        
70 This approach is examined as it is considered part of the consultancy approach. 
 
approaches in the UK. However, the findings in this research also reveal 
that accountants have begun (and will probably continue) to take a larger 
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slice of the sustainability assurance market in the UK. Hence, further 
research should be done to investigate the reasons behind this recent 
preference for the accountancy approach. 
 
Turning now to examine additional results on the assurance approaches 
used by the FTSE100 companies, the findings in this research suggest that 
the approaches used by assurance providers have started to incorporate 
the operating procedures used by social auditors (FEE, 2002); that is, the 
assurance providers are entering into dialogue with stakeholders. The 
degree of inclusion of the opinion of stakeholders in sustainability 
assurance exercises will be examined in detail later in this chapter in 
section 5.6.  Results in this research indicate that few companies were 
using either a stakeholder panel or panel of experts or independent 
credible experts in conjunction with a formal assurance approach 
(conducted either by an accountancy firm or by a specialized assurance 
firm or certification body). These results are consistent with those of other 
studies and suggest that there is an incipient emerging trend of using 
procedures of social audit in the assurance approach (see KPMG, 2005, 
2008; Edgley et al., 2010). The most striking result to emerge from the 
data is that two of the FTSE100 companies71
                                                        
71 The companies were from the defence and oil industrial sectors. 
 were replacing the 
traditional assurance approach with a form of panel of evaluation. Hence, 
further work is required to establish the reasons behind both the adoption 
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of the panel of evaluation, and the use of different assurance approaches 
in a single assurance exercise.    
 
5.4 USE OF ASSURANCE STANDARDS  
As sustainability assurance is currently voluntary in the UK, there are no 
mandatory ethical, procedural or reporting standards to guide the 
assurance exercise. Nevertheless, according to Deegan et al. (2006), the 
assurance provider is the authoritative entity for selecting the most 
appropriate assurance standard. The selection of the standard is based on 
the type of assurance engagement and the scope of the exercise, and the 
expectations of the organisation and stakeholders (Deegan et al., 2006).  
However, in the case of accountancy firms, the assurance approach is 
based on the standards and guidance provided by the IAASB (FEE, 2002). 
Hence, it is expected that they use the ISAE3000 standard, which apply to 
all assurance engagements other than audits and reviews of historical 
information, and are effective for assurance engagements where the 
statement is dated on or after 1 January 2005 (IAASB, 2004). Conversely, 
specialized assurance consultants tend to use the AA1000 assurance 
standard (ODwyer & Owen, 2005), which was developed by the leading 
(non-accounting) international institute, AccountAbility, and is based on a 
process of stakeholder accountability.  
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This section examines the trends in the use of assurance standards to 
conduct the assurance exercise. Figure 5.3 compares the proportions of 
assurance practices conducted with and  without the use of a standard 
between 2001 and 2007. From this figure, it is evident that the proportion 
of the exercises using assurance standards steadily increased from 2003 
to 2007. As can be seen from the chart, the difference between the 
proportion of exercises using standards and the proportion not using 
standards is growing. Hence, it is apparent that over time, assurance 
standards are gaining wider acceptance among, and being referenced by, 
assurance providers in the United Kingdom. Previous research has shown 
that the rule among UK companies was not to report the use of an 
assurance standard (Deegan et al., 2006; Al-Hamadeen, 2007). The 
findings in this research suggest that there has been progress towards the 
adoption of a more rigorous approach to the assurance process. 
 
In this research, three main types of assurance standard were identified as 
the AA1000AS, the ISA/ISAE3000, and other standards. Figure 5.4 
compares what proportion of exercises used the AA1000AS, the 
ISA/ISAE3000, a combination of AA1000AS and ISA/ISAE3000, and other 
standards between 2001 and 2007. From the figure, we can see that the 
AA1000 standards were introduced in 2001 and were widely used in the 
assurance exercises. The popular use of the AA1000AS in this sample of 
FTSE100 companies corroborates earlier findings from Al-Hamadeen 
(2007). The ISA/ISAE3000 standards were less popular in assurance 
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exercises; however, there has been an increment in the proportion of the 
use of the ISAE3000 standard since 2005. 
 
Figure 5-3 Use of assurance standards 
 
    
 
Source: Owen et al.  (2009:15)  
 
This trend might be a consequence of the growth in accountancy-based 
assurance between 2005 and 2007. As can be seen from the chart, there 
has been a significant increment in the proportion of assurance exercises 
conducted with both AA1000 and ISAE3000 standards simultaneously 
between 2005 and 2007. This indicates that assurance providers have 
begun to mix different approaches, as represented in the nature of the 
assurance standard used, in the practice. Hence, it is probable that in the 
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future, the assurance service provided by different assurance providers 
will have similar features. It is also clear that a lower proportion of 
assurance providers were using another type of standard, mainly from the 
International Organisation for Standardisation, the (ISO) series.  
 
Figure 5-4  The type of standard used 
   
  
Source: Owen et al.  (2009:15)  
 
If we now turn to examine the use of assurance standards according to the 
type of assurance provider, a clear tendency can be observed. Figure 5.5 
outlines the proportions of assurance standards used by different 
assurance providers in sustainability assurance exercises between 2001 
and 2007. From the figure, we can see that accountants tend to make 
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greater use of the ISAE3000 standard, but also use AA1000AS. Similarly, 
specialized assurance consultants tend to make greater use of AA1000AS, 
but in the majority of cases they do not refer at all to the use of standards. 
These findings corroborate the findings of a great deal of the previous 
work in this field (see ODwyer & Owen, 2005). Given that specialized 
assurance consultants dominate the assurance market in the UK, and that 
one third of the accountancy firms, together with a high proportion of 
certification bodies, use AA1000AS, the results confirm the predominance 
of these standards. As can be seen from the chart, for the certification 
bodies, the AA1000AS  standard is the first choice. Interestingly, the figure 
shows that accountants are more reluctant than other assurance 
providers72
  
 to engage in sustainability assurance exercises without 
adopting a rigorous approach via the use of standards. This finding is in 
agreement with the study by Mock et al. (2007:73), which showed that 
accountancy firms are more likely to disclose the assurance framework 
used to conduct the exercise. As can be seen from the figure, accountants 
tend to use a combination of ISAE3000 and AA1000 standards to a greater 
extent than do specialized assurance consultants and certification bodies. 
Intriguingly, this figure shows that a small proportion of specialized 
assurance consultants and of certification bodies are also using the 
ISAE3000 assurance standard. 
                                                        
72 Here specialized assurance consultants and certification bodies are considered 
together. 
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Figure 5-5 Use of standards by assurance providers 
 
 
 
This finding confirms that there is an emerging trend of using both 
assurance standards in the assurance exercise (CorporateRegister.com, 
2008). 
 
It is clear that the assurance practice in the UK has taken a different 
course than has practice at the global level, where the preference is for the 
accountancy and ISAE3000 approaches (see KPMG, 2008). The favoured 
position of the AA1000 assurance standard in the sustainability assurance 
market in the UK is worthy of examination. Hence, further work is 
Assurance Providers 
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required to investigate the opinion on this assurance standard approach. 
What is interesting in the results of this research is that accountancy firms 
have started to integrate a stakeholder-centred approach (by using the 
AA1000AS) into their own assurance services. A possible implication of 
this finding is that accountants will be providing assurance with more 
added value for external stakeholder groups. Therefore, future research in 
the field should build on the work of ODwyer and Owen (2005) and Al-
Hamadeen (2007) to clearly establish the influence of the core principles 
of the AA1000AS on the accountancy assurance approach.   
 
5.5 THE LEVEL OF ASSURANCE 
The concept of level of assurance is used mainly in the context of the 
accountancy approach, where assurance engagements are categorized as 
reasonable or limited. According to Soltani (2007:16), the level of 
assurance conveys the degree of confidence that the users of the 
assurance statement may place in the credibility of the subject matter. 
However, the FEE (2002:36) explains that an audit cannot guarantee the 
complete absence of material misstatements in audited subject matter. 
That is, there is always a risk that audits fail. In the case of sustainability 
assurance, the assurance provider may have to consider the risk of 
system failure not only in relation to the disclosure of data but also in 
relation to the evidence necessary to allow assurance to be given directly 
on the operation of the system (FEE, 2002: 36). The risk of audit failure is 
measured and controlled by auditing firms.  
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The ISAE3000 standard provides a clear definition of the objectives of 
limited and reasonable levels of assurance:  
The objective of a reasonable assurance engagement is a reduction 
in assurance engagement risk to an acceptably low level in the 
circumstances of the engagement as the basis for a positive form of 
expression of the practitioners conclusion.   
The objective of a limited assurance engagement is a reduction in 
assurance risk to a level that is acceptable in the circumstances of the 
assurance engagement, but where that risk is greater than for a 
reasonable assurance engagement, as the basis for a negative form of 
expression of the practitioners conclusion (paragraph eleven) 
(IAASB, 2004: 1045).73
 
   
According to Deegan et al. (2006:332), the level of assurance has 
important implications for the practice of sustainability assurance in 
terms of the definition of the scope, the procedures employed, and the 
investment in money and in time. That is, it is expected that reasonable 
levels of assurance, also known as audit-level engagements, involve 
considerable levels of testing and assurance (Deegan et al., 2006:363). 
Deegan et al. (2006) explain that it is accepted that a positive form of 
opinion should be used for a reasonable assurance engagement, and that a 
negative form is used for a limited assurance engagement.  
 
                                                        
73 The IAASB (2004:1060) explains that a positive form of opinion is in the form of:  In 
our opinion internal control is effective, in all material respects, based on XYZ criteria. 
Conversely, a conclusion in the negative form is expressed in the form: Based on our 
work described in this report, nothing has come to our attention that causes us to believe 
that internal control is not effective, in all material respects, based on XYZ criteria. 
(IAASB, 2004:1060)   
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This section examines the level of assurance provided in sustainability 
assurance exercises. Figure 5.6 compares the proportions of assurance 
exercises carried out with limited and reasonable levels, with the 
proportion that gave no disclosure information on the level of assurance 
between 2001 and 2007. As shown in the figure, the results in this 
research indicate that limited and reasonable engagements were used. 
However, it can be clearly seen from the chart that the proportion of 
assurance exercises that did not disclose information on the level of 
assurance was much higher than the proportion that did provide this 
information. Hence, the trend was not to disclose information on the level 
of the assurance exercises. This result is consistent with those of other 
studies (see Al-Hamadeen, 2007), and could be the consequence of 
companies hiring mainly specialized assurance consultants and 
certification bodies to conduct the assurance exercise. However, Figure 
5.6 also reveals that the proportion of assurance exercises reporting on 
the level of assurance increased significantly between 2004 and 2007. It is 
highly probable that this growing trend will be observable in the future, 
given the introduction of a new requirement in the latest version of 
AA1000AS to disclose the level of assurance provided (AccountAbility, 
2008 a, b).  
 
Nevertheless, in contrast to earlier findings (see Al-Hamadeen, 2007), 
from the data in Figure 5.6 it is apparent that the proportion of exercises 
conducted with reasonable levels of assurance was much lower than the 
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proportion conducted with limited levels. Hence, reasonable levels of 
assurance were noticeable largely by their absence. This tendency is also 
reported at global level (KPMG, 2008). Indeed, the difference between the 
proportion of exercises conducted with limited levels and the proportion 
conducted with reasonable levels increased considerably between 2004 
and 2007. A possible explanation might be the difficulty in providing 
higher levels of assurance on the area of sustainability. Some researchers 
even argue that it will never be possible to guarantee highly reliable 
verifications, mainly because the examination of the information 
contained in sustainability reports is a complex task (Manetti & Becatti, 
2009). Interestingly, the findings in this research also show that in the 
case of three FTSE100 companies, assurance providers reported two 
different levels of assurance (limited and reasonable) simultaneously in a 
single assurance engagement. In one case, whilst a reasonable level of 
assurance was used to provide assurance on key environmental indicators 
reported, no level was reported for social information. This finding further 
supports the conclusion by the FEE (2002:37) that it may not be possible 
to achieve high levels of assurance on certain potential disclosures 
because of their nature, the lack of suitable criteria, and restrictions on the 
evidence reasonably likely to be available.   
 
 
 
 177 
 
Figure 5-6   The level of assurance  
 
 
Source: Owen et al.  (2009:15)  
 
The latest version of AA1000AS defines two levels of assurance labels in 
addition to those used by the accountancy profession, namely high level 
and moderate level (AccountAbility, 2008 a, b). According to the AA1000 
standard, a high level of assurance is achieved where the evidence taken is 
sufficient for the risk of the conclusion to be very low but not zero 
(AccountAbility, 2008b:11). By contrast, a moderate level of assurance is 
reached when enough evidence is provided to reduce the risk of the 
conclusion being in error, but not to the point at which the risk is very low 
(AccountAbility, 2008b:11)74
                                                        
74 Soltani (2007:18) argues that moderate levels of assurance are used in the case of a 
review engagement, referring to the circumstances in which the information subject to 
.  This is an important issue for the future 
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practice of sustainability assurance, in that there is the possibility that the 
level of assurance could be upgraded from limited to moderate level.   
 
Turning now to examine additional results in this research on the level of 
assurance used by the FTSE100 companies, these seem to be consistent 
with the findings in other research that a group of assurance providers 
developed their own definitions of levels of assurance (see Al-Hamadeen, 
2007; Mock et al., 2007). The findings in this research reveal that in order 
to describe the level of assurance provided in the assurance engagement, 
one certification body and two accountancy firms used the terms 
reasonable and absolute levels75, whilst another certification body76
 
 
used the terms advanced, positive or basic.  This finding in this 
research raises the important questions of whether using different level of 
assurance labels might increase the expectation gap, and whether there 
will be a standardization of the terms and meanings of level of assurance 
in the future.  
                                                                                                                                                  
review is free of material misstatement which is expressed in the form of negative 
assurance. 
75 The ISAE3000 assurance standard notes that reasonable assurance is less than 
absolute assurance. It claims that reducing assurance engagement risk to zero is very 
rarely attainable or cost beneficial (IAASB, 2004:1054). Soltani (2007:17) also claims 
that absolute assurance is not generally achievable because of factors such as the nature 
of selective testing, the shortcomings of the company internal controls, the 
characteristics of the audit evidence, and the importance of the auditors perceptions in 
performing audits and formulating audit opinions. 
 
76 Further to these three levels, this certification body also noted in the assurance 
statement that our work was planned and carried out to provide reasonable, rather than 
absolute, assurance. This increases the confusion as to what real level of assurance was 
used to conduct the exercise.  
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The results of this study illustrating the level of assurance by assurance 
provider are in accord with earlier observations by ODwyer and Owen 
(2005) that accountancy firms disclose levels of assurance applied in the 
exercises more often than do other assurance providers. This might be a 
consequence of accountancy firms using mainly the ISAE3000 standard. 
Figure 5.7 outlines the proportion of disclosure of the level of assurance 
by assurance provider in sustainability assurance exercises between 2001 
and 2007. From the figure we can see that specialized assurance 
consultants and certification bodies very seldom report on the levels of 
assurance. However, when using the ISAE3000 standard, accountancy 
firms and specialized assurance consultants tend to report limited levels 
of assurance, whilst certification bodies tend to report reasonable levels. 
These findings further support the assertion by Mock et al. (2007) that 
accountancy firms are less likely to give positive (or reasonable) 
assurance. 
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Figure 5-7 Level of assurance by assurance providers 
 
 
 
 
The level of assurance is an important issue in the provision of the 
assurance service, since it determines whether the form of the opinion 
offered is negative or positive. From the perspective of assurance 
providers, it is clear that the decision to restrict the level of assurance 
provided depends on the nature of the information reported and on 
limitations on finding reasonable evidence to provide an opinion (Deegan 
et al., 2006). However, further research should be done from the 
perspective of the auditee to investigate the factors underpinning 
restrictions on the level of the assurance exercise.  
 
Assurance Providers 
 
Assurance Providers 
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5.6 PROCEDURES EMPLOYED IN SUSTAINABILITY ASSURANCE SERVICES 
GRI (2006:38) notes that one key factor which demonstrates the quality of 
external assurance of sustainability reports is that assurance providers 
implement it in a manner that is systematic, documented, evidence-
based, and characterized by defined procedures. According to Deegan et 
al. (2006), a systematic form of assurance procedure is important to 
provide assurance on the information contained in the sustainability 
report. However, they explain that the level of assurance chosen for the 
assurance engagement influences the nature, timing and extent of 
assurance procedures employed. That is, it is expected that assurance 
exercises conducted with limited levels of assurance accentuate the use 
of inquiries or/and analytical procedures rather than collecting large 
amounts of substantiating evidence (Deegan et al., 2006:353).  
 
There is a lack of consensus concerning the procedures for conducting 
assurance on sustainability reports (Deegan et al., 2006). However, 
sustainability assurance standards provide a guide on the type of 
procedures that should be used to conduct the exercise. For example, the 
ISAE3000 standard specifies that assurance procedures must combine 
substantive tests, analytical procedures and control tests (Manetti & 
Becatti, 2009).  According to the FEE (2002:25), substantive tests are 
procedures aimed at obtaining evidence of misstatements or omissions in 
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the sustainability report, and they may involve substantiating individual 
items making up a disclosure and checking that calculations and 
summarisations have been done accurately (26). Analytical procedures 
consist of a critical analysis of past series of data, enquiring into gaps 
between planned and achieved values and into indexes and business 
trends (Manetti & Becatti, 2009:291). Control tests are procedures such 
as inquiries and observations to verify the efficiency of the internal 
management control systems (Manetti & Becatti, 2009). Conversely, the 
AA1000 assurance standard mentions traditional financial and 
environmental audit procedures in addition to procedures that include the 
view of stakeholders (AccountAbility, 1999, 2003, 2005).   
 
This section examines the procedures used in sustainability assurance 
exercises. Figure 5.8 compares the proportions of different types of 
assurance procedures employed in sustainability assurance services 
between 2001 and 2007. The findings corroborate the suggestion by 
Deegan et al. (2006) that there is great variation in procedures applied. As 
shown in the figure, the findings in this study confirm that a high 
proportion of the assurance procedures concern substantive tests (see 
Manetti & Becatti, 2009). The figure shows that substantive test 
procedures in the form of interviews with management and employees, 
reviewing consistency with underlying systems/data/reports, inspection 
of documentation, and site visits, were used to a much greater extent than 
were analytical procedures. These results are consistent with Al-
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Hamadeen (2007). The figure also shows that procedures for testing of 
control and reviewing reliability/accuracy of internal control systems 
were used less than procedures concerning substantive test, which 
confirms that most of the assurance exercises were conducted with 
limited levels of assurance.  As can be seen from the figure, the annual 
growth in the proportion of use of assurance procedures for evaluation of 
reporting criteria, risk, materiality, and/or organisational performance is 
minimal77. This result is consistent with Al-Hamadeen (2007), who found 
that a low percentage of the assurance findings referred to weaknesses in 
the sustainability performance of the FTSE100 companies78
 
.    
It is also clear that a small proportion of assurance procedures rely on the 
internal audit function. In fact, an additional finding in this research was 
that five companies of the FTSE100 opted to use the internal audit 
function to provide an assurance statement on the information reported 
by the company. The use of the internal audit function in the practice of 
sustainability assurance has implications for the practice, as was 
discussed in chapter three, section 3.3.4. Hence, further work is required 
to establish the nature of the role of the internal audit division in the 
provision of sustainability assurance. 
                                                        
77 Here, the procedures considered for this analysis clearly indicated the evaluation of 
organisational performance.  
78 ODwyer and Owens (2005:221) findings show that in six cases assurors went further 
in providing views on the acceptability of the reporting organisations performance.  
ODwyer and Owen (2005:224) argue that a greater degree of focus on the organisation 
performance (as opposed to simply management systems) was discernible in their 
sample of analysis when comparing their results with Ball et al. (2000). Conversely, in 
this research the results show that from 2001 to 2007 the majority of the procedures still 
focus on reviewing the consistency with underlying systems/data/reports. 
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Figure 5-8  The procedures in assurance exercises    
 
 
 
 
 
From the above figure it is apparent that from 2001 to 2007 there was a 
slightly increase, of approximately 9%, in the proportion of the 
procedures employed which asked the views of stakeholders.  It is 
somewhat surprising that although the AA1000AS is the most referenced 
assurance standard in the FTSE100 companies, only a very small 
proportion of the procedures refer to targeting the collection of 
stakeholder opinions, a key procedure recommended by this standard. It 
appears that there is a disconnect between what assurance providers say 
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they do - following the AA100AS - and the procedures they employ to 
conduct the exercise. This also accords with earlier studies, which show 
limited participation of stakeholders in the assurance practices (see also 
ODwyer & Owen, 2005; Al-Hamadeen, 2007). This finding suggests that 
there has not been any significant improvement or real change. It seems 
possible that the absence of stakeholder participation is mainly a 
consequence of the large degree of managerial control over the assurance 
process (see ODwyer & Owen, 2005; Edgley et al., 2010). Therefore, 
further research should be done to investigate the views of companies on 
the inclusion of stakeholders opinions in the assurance process. The issue 
of how the opinion of stakeholders is being incorporated into the 
sustainability assurance process is examined in the next section.  
 
5.7 INCLUSION OF STAKEHOLDER VIEWS WITHIN ASSURANCE EXERCISES  
The need to provide assurance on social and environmental disclosures 
leads assurance providers to enter into dialogue with stakeholders (FEE, 
2002:19). The inclusion of stakeholders in assurance is managed in 
different ways by the assurance standards. For example, the AA1000 
assurance standard emphasizes that organisations adopting this standard 
commit themselves to the practice of inclusivity (AccountAbility, 1999, 
2003, 2008 a, b)  ; that is, organisational activities (and here assurance is 
included) must consider and respond to the aspirations and needs of all 
stakeholder groups (including the environment and future generations).  
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According to the AA1000AS, the opinion of stakeholders may be 
incorporated in assurance through an engagement process by means of 
surveys of stakeholder opinions, interviews, review of commentary from 
experts, or via stakeholder panels (to advise the organisations or the lead 
auditor) (AccountAbility, 1999, 2003, 2008 a, b). Conversely, the 
ISAE3000 assurance standard does not pay specific attention to the 
inclusion of stakeholders views (IAASB, 2004). Instead, it notes that 
assurance providers should use the opinion of experts from different 
disciplines to conduct examinations in areas where they lack competency 
(Manetti & Becatti, 2009). Manetti and Becatti (2009) argue that this 
procedure of consulting experts such as environmental technicians, 
representatives of NGOs, or rating agencies, is reminiscent of the social 
audit approach79
 
.  
This section examines the procedures used to include the opinion of 
stakeholders within sustainability assurance exercises between 2001 and 
2007. Figure 5.9 compares the proportion of assurance exercises that 
included the collection of stakeholders views, either directly or indirectly, 
with the proportion that excluded this procedure. As can be seen from the 
chart, the proportion of assurance practices that excluded the opinion of 
stakeholders was much higher than the proportion that included these 
views. However, the figure shows that the difference between the 
                                                        
79 However, Iansen-Rogers and Oelschlaegel (2005:27) argue that the ISAE3000 also 
refers to the need to engage with parties independent from the auditee to obtain 
evidence that the information provided is sufficient, accurate and relevant (Appendix 17). 
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proportion of procedures that included the views of stakeholders and the 
proportion that did not decreased significantly between 2001 and 2007. 
These findings corroborate the suggestion by Edgley et al. (2010) that 
there is an emerging tendency to include the views of stakeholders in the 
assurance exercise, albeit in an indirect form. This study confirms that the 
tendency is to use procedures such as review of opinions stated in the 
media, review of minutes of stakeholder dialogues, or observation of 
stakeholder and company meetings (see Edgley et al., 2010). However, it 
is apparent from the figure that the preferred procedure for the inclusion 
of the opinion of stakeholders is the examination of minutes of 
stakeholder dialogues. As can be seen from the chart, the proportion of 
procedures directly collecting the views of stakeholders increased slightly 
between 2002 and 2007. However, it is clear from the figure that direct 
stakeholder participation, through interviews or stakeholder panels, or 
views of experts, barely figures within the assurance process.  
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Figure 5-9  Procedures of inclusion of stakeholder opinions in sustainability assurance 
 
 
 
Contrary to expectations, this study did not find significant evidence that 
the use of the assurance standard AA1000 is leading to direct stakeholder 
inclusion in sustainability assurance. The present findings are significant 
in that they do not support Edgley et al.s (2010:553) suggestion that 
stakeholder inclusivity is no longer rare or exceptional.  This is because 
the practice of inclusivity in sustainability assurance requires procedures 
that facilitate direct contact between companies and their stakeholders, 
which in reality does not often occur. Figure 5.9 shows that between 2002 
and 2007 the trend in the proportion of procedures directly including the 
views of stakeholders within sustainability assurance exercises grew at a 
very slow rate, of approximately ±2% per year, which suggests that it 
remains very limited. This trend coincides with tendencies reported by 
CorporateRegister.com (2008), which showed that only 12% of the 
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assurance exercises in its sample of analysis included procedures asking 
the views of external stakeholders. Therefore, further research should be 
done to investigate the reasons for the reluctance to include the views of 
stakeholders directly within the assurance process, and for companies 
favouring of certain approaches to stakeholder participation.   
 
The most striking result to emerge from the data is that assurance 
providers are increasingly opting for indirect mechanisms of stakeholder 
inclusivity. They do not consider it their responsibility to engage directly 
with stakeholders (Edgley et al., 2010:545). They argue that the main 
obstacles to the inclusion of stakeholder opinions in the assurance process 
are the high cost of the engagement for the companies, and ignorance or 
lack of interest on the part of stakeholders (Edgley et al., 2010). Further 
work is required to establish the causes of this lack of interest. Further 
research should also be done to examine the views of stakeholders on the 
sustainability assurance process.   
 
5.8 CONCLUSION 
The discussion in this chapter can be summarized into two points: 
(1)The analysis explored patterns of key features of sustainability 
assurance, and highlighted emerging issues in the practice of 
sustainability assurance which will be investigated with representatives of 
companies and of stakeholders. 
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(2)The results provide the basis to develop the objectives of the second, 
qualitative, phase of this research.  
 
 
First, results in this research show that sustainability assurance services 
are popular among the FTSE100 companies. However, the findings 
indicate that there was a lag in the adoption of this type of assurance 
services among these companies (see KPMG, 2005, 2008). Hence, further 
research is needed to clarify the reasons driving companies to commission 
sustainability assurance exercises. This research confirms that the 
favoured assurance approach among the FTSE100 companies is the 
consultancy approach (Al-Hamadeen, 2007), albeit that there is a new 
trend towards increased use of the accountancy approach. This research 
supports the idea that there is an incipient trend to use operating 
procedures of social audit in the assurance approach (see KPMG, 2005, 
2008; Edgley et al., 2010). Therefore, further investigation seems 
necessary on the reasons for companies preference for the accountancy, 
consultancy or certification body approaches, for the incorporation of 
social audit approach operating procedures, and for the use of different 
assurance approaches in a single assurance exercise.  
 
The findings in this research suggest that among the FTSE100 companies 
there has been progress towards the adoption of a more rigorous 
approach to the assurance process, via the use of assurance standards. 
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These results are consistent with those of other studies and suggest 
that the most popular assurance standard in the UK is the AA1000 (Al-
Hamadeen, 2007), albeit that there is a recent trend of using the 
AA1000AS in conjunction with the ISAE3000 standard. This research 
confirms that whilst accountants tend to make greater use of the ISAE 
3000 standards, specialized consultants tend to make greater use of 
AA1000AS ( ODwyer & Owen, 2005). The findings in this research further 
support the idea that accountants are more reluctant than other assurance 
providers to engage in sustainability assurance exercises without 
adopting a rigorous approach by the use of standards (Mock et al., 2007). 
Therefore, more research is needed to examine the opinion of companies 
on the AA1000AS and the ISAE3000 assurance standards.  
 
The results of this research show that there is a new trend of reporting on 
the level of assurance; however, reasonable levels of assurance are 
noticeable largely by their absence. This research confirms that 
accountancy firms disclose levels of assurance applied in the exercises 
more often than do other assurance providers (ODwyer & Owen, 2005). 
Therefore, further investigation of factors underpinning restrictions on 
the level of the assurance exercise seems necessary. The findings support 
previous research showing that most of the assurance procedures concern 
substantive tests (Manetti & Becatti, 2009). Findings in this study show 
that a small proportion of assurance procedures rely on the internal audit 
function. Therefore, further work is needed to examine the role of the 
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internal audit division in the provision of sustainability assurance from 
the perspective of companies.  
 
This research corroborates the suggestion by Edgley et al. (2010) that 
there is a new tendency to include the views of stakeholders in 
sustainability assurance practices, albeit in an indirect form. Contrary to 
expectations, this study did not find significant evidence that the use of 
standard AA1000 is leading to direct stakeholder participation in 
sustainability assurance. The present findings are significant in that they 
do not support the suggestion by Edgley et al. (2010:553) that stakeholder 
inclusivity is no longer rare or exceptional. The reason for this is that true 
stakeholder inclusivity requires direct contact between companies and 
their stakeholders, which barely figures in sustainability assurance 
practices. Hence, further research examining the opinion of companies on 
the inclusion of stakeholders opinions within the assurance process 
seems necessary.  
 
In addition, it would be interesting to explore the views of companies on 
how the budget for the assurance exercise is arrived at, and their level of 
satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) with current assurance practices, and the 
future of sustainability assurance. Further investigation of the views of 
stakeholder groups on the sustainability assurance process, particularly 
on the level of involvement desired or experienced in assurance exercises, 
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their suggestions for institutional and corporate governance reforms that 
might enhance the credibility of the assurance exercise from a stakeholder 
perspective, and their expectations for the future of assurance, seems 
needed. 
 
Second, the objectives of the second, qualitative, phase of this research 
are: (1) To investigate companies reasons for commissioning 
sustainability assurance, and the factors underpinning the choice of 
assurance approaches, assurance standards, role of internal audit 
function, and restrictions in level of assurance; (2) To elicit the views of 
companies about the appropriate level of stakeholder inclusion in the 
assurance process, together with their suggestions for further developing 
assurance processes; (3) To examine stakeholder views on sustainability 
assurance process, together with their suggestions for further developing 
assurance processes in order to promote a greater degree of stakeholder 
accountability. 
 
In chapters six and seven, the views of representatives of FTSE100 
companies and of stakeholders are examined. 
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6 CHAPTER SIX: CORPORATE MANAGERS' 
PERSPECTIVES ON SUSTAINABILITY ASSURANCE 
 
This chapter has two aims: 
(1) To describe the views of selected representatives of ten FTSE100 
companies on emerging issues in sustainability assurance in the United 
Kingdom; 
(2) To discuss and interpret the interview results across several key 
issues using the lens of Michael Powers theory, and legitimacy and 
stakeholder theories. 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explains recent developments in sustainability assurance 
practices in the United Kingdom from the perspective of companies. It 
reports on the results of the semi-structured interviews with 
representatives of ten FTSE100 companies on emerging issues in 
sustainability assurance.  The emerging issues discussed were identified 
by analyzing in detail trends in the practice of sustainability assurance in 
the FTSE100 companies (see chapter 5). The chapter includes a discussion 
and interpretation of the interview results across several key issues 
through the lens of Michael Powers theory and legitimacy and 
stakeholder theories as conceptualized in chapter 3.  
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This chapter is structured as follows: First, it presents empirical results in 
the form of (1) an examination of the reasons why companies commission 
assurance; (2) interviewees views on choice of assurance providers and  
perceived differences in assurance approaches ; (3) interviewees views 
on sustainability assurance standards; (4) interviewees perspectives on 
the reasons for constraining assurance exercises; (5) interviewees views 
on the role of the internal audit function in sustainability assurance; (6) 
interviewees perspectives on stakeholder inclusion in assurance 
exercises; (7) their views on the future prospects for sustainability 
assurance, and (8) a summary of findings.  Second, it provides a discussion 
and analysis of the empirical results by examining the following aspects: 
(1) sustainability assurance and the ideals of efficiency and quality; (2) 
sustainability assurance and the ideal of governance and transparency; (3) 
sustainability assurance and the ideal of stakeholder-centred 
accountability; (4) the future of sustainability assurance. Finally, it draws 
conclusions from these discussions. 
 
6.2 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
This section draws upon the work of Owen et al. (2009:17-23), who 
present an overview of the perspectives of representatives of FTSE100 
companies on emerging issues in sustainability assurance exercises in the 
United Kingdom.  
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6.2.1 Why commission sustainability assurance? 
There are similarities between the views expressed by corporate 
managers in this study and those described by Jones and Solomon (2010). 
In this research, the justification given by the corporate managers in 
favour of commissioning sustainability assurance services is based on the 
perception that there is an added value flowing from these exercises.  
 
From an internal perspective, the commission of sustainability assurance 
services realizes benefits for the companies. As one interviewee [C4] 
noted, sustainability assurance is there to satisfy an internal need in the 
company. Another interviewee [C6] gave a particular perspective, noting 
that: I think that there are areas where the very act of having assurance makes people 
internally take the whole process more seriously. Internal benefits, it was 
suggested, generally arise in two ways. First, as assurance providers 
themselves have noted (Edgley et al., 2010), recommendations offered by 
providers lead to improvements to information systems and management 
process, with the management report arising from the assurance process 
being particularly valued in this context.  
 
Second, the present findings seem to be consistent with Jones and 
Solomon (2010), who found that a further benefit of sustainability 
assurance lies in the production of better reports, as assurance providers 
have claimed (Edgley et al., 2010). However, in this research, although 
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interviewees emphasized that assurance providers do not decide the 
content of the report, it appears that the reporting exercise is a product of 
a partnership between management and the assurance provider. This 
alliance is very demanding, as some interviewees stated:  
And theyll say we really think youve got to make the following changes, and Ill 
look at it and say I think youre right actually, weve over-rated this, or, Ive been 
told this by someone; if youre telling me that thats not the case then we need to 
change it, I need to get back to that person, and thats very useful, or well if thats 
best practice well do that.  And in other areas they say we dont like what youve 
done here, to which I might say okay, but this is the approach were taking, this is 
how were going to do it. [C2] 
Weve been challenged much more on materiality and how weve identified what 
goes in the report, much more on whether or not the right information is going in 
there, so its much more about the process and its much more of a partnership 
throughout the reporting cycle than we had in the past. [C3] 
Im telling you, they push us very hard.  Youll see in our reporting that weve 
widened it from just purely the social and environmental issues, to health and 
safety, employee issues, training, etc.  You know, they said youre not including 
health and safety, youre not including other things and we take note; we take 
their advice and we work hard to always push ourselves that little bit harder. [C7] 
 
An additional perspective was offered by one interviewee [C8] whose 
company used a panel of experts approach. For him, one of the major 
benefits emanating from this assurance approach was the improvement in 
their company performance. Similarly, another interviewee [C5] stated 
that assurance providers draw attention to performance matters that can 
be improved.  
 
External benefits to the companies, in the view of most interviewees in 
this research, focus on building trust with the stakeholders and, as Jones 
and Solomon (2010) found, enhancing credibility and corporate 
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reputation. However, these interviewees were more convinced that 
sustainability assurance enhances the credibility of reports than were 
corporate managers interviewed by Jones and Solomon (2010). It has also 
been argued by assurance providers that sustainability assurance assists 
companies seeking to improve their image with external constituencies 
(Edgley et al., 2010). This point of view was particularly perceptible in two 
interviewees [C3, C8] whose companies faced serious credibility issues. 
For example, interviewee [C3] emphasized that: 
For us, its the way any business is, I dont think its responsible to publish 
information that you dont know is correct.  But secondly, for us its very much, you 
might not trust [name of the company] as a business, but you can trust the process.  
So we have very rigorous processes around the way that we report, the way the 
stakeholder dialogue is carried out, everythings assured, so that you might not 
trust us, but you can trust our process, which is very, very important to us. 
 
Similarly, interviewee [C8] noted that the credibility of the business 
increased significantly with the use of the panel of experts approach. 
 
An additional view was provided by interviewee [C6], who stated that 
sustainability assurance helps to manage pressures from key activist 
groups: 
The reason we went from just doing environment, which has been done for a while, 
to doing the access to medicine section as well [was because] I was a little bit 
concerned that over the years we would come under more and more pressure to do 
assurance, such that wed suddenly have to embark on assurance of our whole 
report, and we wouldnt have a clue how to do it.  And we chose that section of the 
report because its probably the biggest responsibility issue for us in terms of 
activism and pressure, and its the area that we do the most proactive 
communications in.  So its the area where were most at risk if we get something 
wrong. So I felt if we were going to do assurance that was the most useful area to 
do it on.  
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Another interviewee emphasized that it was crucial to put into the public 
domain quality information on behalf of the directors and the board.  She 
went on to note that: 
It is an important part of our work and we feel we benefit from doing that. We feel 
that as a business, reputation-wise, it is good to have that assurance. I think that 
for any report that goes out now that isnt assured, actually there will always be 
questions as tohow credible it is.  [C7] 
 
For these interviewees, it was clear that sustainability assurance provides 
external benefits to the companies. However, a couple of interviewees [C4, 
C6] who were to some extent supportive of sustainability assurance 
expressed some reservations.  For example, interviewee [C4] spoke about 
doubts among the companys senior executives as to the added value of 
this exercise, and argued that assurance providers (particularly 
accountancy firms) could do more to demonstrate the value of their work. 
 
Conversely, interviewee [C6] stated that:   
My sense is that most of the pressure on assurance actually comes from the 
assurance providers.  And theyre very good at generating it in a way that it 
appears that the world wants it, but actually its them who want the business I 
think.  We havent been subject to a lot of pressure from, for example, the Socially 
Responsible Investment community.  
 
From this comment, it appeared that the real beneficiaries are the 
community of professional assurance providers. This concurs with Jones 
and Solomons (2010:29) claim that there was a negative perception 
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generally on the part of companies, which believe that assurance 
providers benefit excessively from companies needs for verification, in 
all areas. 
 
For this interviewee, the assurance process operates essentially as an 
insurance policy.  She went on to note that:  
I suppose now we cant stop it because that would look very odd.  But I dont want 
to do even more of it.  So were in a bit of a funny place with it really. [C6] 
 
In a similar vein, interviewee [C9], whose company had abandoned the 
assurance process a few years ago, provided a sceptical view. This 
interviewee stated emphatically that sustainability assurance did not add 
any value to her company. For her, the lack of assurance was not an 
impediment to engaging in meaningful dialogue with stakeholders: 
I think we need to get some confidence in what we are doing.  I find that people are 
latching onto things without really thinking about it - is it really the right thing for 
you, in your organisation?  I think its important to different stakeholders, its 
important to weigh it up against materiality and the resources we have.  Where 
can you have the most impact?  My lack of assurance for my document has not yet 
been a barrier to having very good quality conversations with people and very 
important stakeholders. [C9] 
 
Indeed, for this interviewee, the lack of assurance was not an issue. It 
appeared that in this case, the company strategy focused on delivering 
value to stakeholders by other means rather than on commissioning 
assurance services. The view of this interviewee was that companies may 
engage in sustainability assurance either because they inherited it without 
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seriously considering its added value for the business, or because they 
want to follow a fashionable trend. Nevertheless, this interviewee 
intimated that she was considering formalizing the stakeholder 
engagement within her organisation, in the form of a stakeholder panel of 
evaluation.  
 
6.2.2 Choice of assurance providers and approaches 
According to the view of one interviewee, it appears that assurance 
providers need to prove the value of their work to the companies: 
We asked two key questions: how can you add more value to our business through 
the assurance process, and how can you provide more reassurance to our 
stakeholders as a result of the process? [C3] 
 
In fact, this interviewee noted similarities in the assurance procedures of 
accountancy firms and certification bodies:  
Most people came back with relatively similar [procedures]. We didnt get any of 
the smaller boutiques to tender, it was all big four accountancies or certification 
firms that came to us, but they all had very similar procedures in mind.  [C3] 
 
If accountancy firms and certification bodies have similar procedures, the 
advantages of each must lie in other factors, such as the cost of the 
assurance provision. Nevertheless, one interviewee remarked that the 
provider offering the most competitive price would not always be the best 
option: 
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We had one which was more than a standard certification body, which was chosen 
as an unusual one.  And their price was so cheap we thought theyd misunderstood 
the brief and so we knocked them out.  So we were left with three of the big four in 
the little pool. [C1]    
 
For this interviewee, it was the issue of independence, combined with 
other factors such as the capacity for global coverage and high level of 
resources (in terms of skills, knowledge, and finance) which determine the 
selection of an assurance provider, rather than their assurance model. She 
also pointed out that another factor was whether or not they use a global 
assurance standard: 
 We also wanted to make sure that the [assurance] standard applies equally across 
Africa, South America, Australia, etc.  And we still felt that the need for rigour was 
there.  So we stayed with a big four firm.80
 
[C1]  
Conversely, other interviewees perceived differences among assurance 
providers approaches that were fundamental to the choice of provider.  
For example, interviewee [C6] said that she chose a certification body over 
an accountancy firm after considering the quality of their assurance 
statement, together with their capacity to provide assurance in key areas. 
She claimed that:  
 We felt wed spend an enormous amount of time teaching them [an accountancy 
firm] about [areas to be addressed during the assurance exercise] and we wouldnt 
get as good value as we could do from one of the other providers. [C6] 
 
                                                        
80 This assurance provider used the ISAE3000 standard and the GRI standard. 
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She said that another advantage of certification bodies lies in the flexibility 
of the assurance engagement: 
But our view was that it was not bespoke enough for us, it was fitting us into a pre-
defined plan that they [two accountancy firms] had, and there wasnt the flexibility 
that we wanted. [C6] 
 
Nevertheless, the majority of the interviewees in this sample employed 
the services of an accountancy firm as assurance provider. One 
interviewee, [C2], said that accountancy firms have the advantage of 
higher professional standing over other types of assurance providers. He 
went on to note that:  
But more importantly than that, it ensures a rigour in our processes Im an ex 
chartered accountant so I understand how reporting needs to work  and that  you 
cant make unsubstantiated statements in these things.  These guys help me with 
that. [C2] 
 
In a similar vein, another interviewee, [C1], argued that the use of an 
accountancy firm, given the traditions they have in conducting financial 
assurance, provides credibility to the managers.  For interviewee [C4], the 
use of an accountancy firm guaranteed synergy with the financial 
assurance: 
Ernst and Young are also our financial assurance providers, so it made more sense 
to just have the same people that know the organisation extremely well, [because] 
they could also draw from some of the findings from the financial team and the 
audit team, and do a much more in-depth look into the organisation.   
 
Two interviewees claimed that the advantage of the accountancy firms 
assurance approach lies in their assessment of internal information 
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systems [C7], and in the provision of hardcore verification of 
information given in the external report [C10]. However, in both these 
cases, an additional form of direct stakeholder input was provided in 
order to add a more strategic and critical dimension to the assurance 
process. Indeed, notwithstanding a clear consensus on the part of those 
interviewees hiring accountancy firms that their assurance process adds 
value to reporting, and to the business in general, certain problematic 
areas were acknowledged. 
 
For example, for interviewees [C10] and [C3], one concern was that there 
is a belief among stakeholders that accountancy firms lack the integrity, or 
the experience, to conduct assurance work. For interviewee [C3] a more 
fundamental issue was that a statement produced by an accountancy firm 
could be automatically un-reassuring. Intriguingly, despite the awareness 
of this drawback, her company went from hiring a certification body to 
hiring an accountancy firm that was able to provide a more accessible and 
meaningful statement to the reader. Another reason for change, she said, 
was that the new assurance provider brought new insights to the 
assurance process. However, this interviewee suggested the possibility of 
setting up a stakeholder panel to complement the formal assurance 
provision by offering strategic commentary on key issues faced by the 
company, or on the sustainability report itself.  
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Nevertheless, another interviewee [C1], whose company has used an 
accountancy firm for many years, expressed some frustration with the 
nature of the assurance statement itself:  
I think most of us have found some measure of value from the big four type 
approach.  Many get very frustrated with it, because the assurance statements are 
written in such a way that ... they are protecting themselves first, there are all these 
double negatives and that kind of thing.  
 
Similar reservations over accountancy firm assurance statements were 
expressed by interviewee [C8]. For him, statements from accountancy 
firms were unintelligible, unhelpful, or both. He was sceptical as to the 
recent moves on the part of accountancy firms, such as described by 
interviewee [C3] above, to provide more detailed information on the 
scope of the assignment and procedures employed: 
I think that is a step in the right direction.  Its a bit strange frankly, because youll 
then tell people all the things you did without actually drawing any single 
conclusion from that activity: And so we went off into the deepest, darkest areas of 
the company, we did all this really exciting stuff but we cant tell you what we 
found. And in a way, thats almost worse.  
 
A more fundamental question as to what accountancy firms have to offer 
was raised by an interviewee who argued that the assurance approach 
they provided was particularly useful only during certain stages of what 
she called the maturity cycle in assurance: 
I think they [the accountancy firms] are incredibly useful at early stages of the 
maturity cycle. Whether that value continues as you move up the cycle will be 
worth seeing. [C1] 
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Indeed, interviewee [C8] argued that when his assurance process was 
sufficiently mature, the assurance providers - two accountancy firms - 
could no longer provide what he needed.  
 
According to him, they were not ready to adopt a more stakeholder 
centred assurance approach based on the AA1000AS principles, as they 
lacked the skills, or people with knowledge, and were restricted by 
professional requirements and liability issues: 
There is an element in all of this of if I have the hammer everything looks like a 
nail.  In other words, if youve got a longstanding 100-year-plus professional model 
of how you check data to do assurance, or count beans inevitably when you come 
to do something new, that 100-year model is going to affect and in some respects 
limit what it is youre able to do in that new world.  Obviously it helps, it provides 
the rigour and the quality and a whole bunch of things that are beneficial, but you 
quickly hit up against some pretty fundamental limitations of using that particular 
hammer on something thats actually not a nail but a screw. [C8]  
 
For him, once the company is confident with its own internal assurance 
systems, it is time to move on to the next level. Then, he had decided to dispense 
with the services of these accountancy firms in favour of employing a 
panel of experts. 
 
Intriguingly, despite the perceived limitations of the accountancy 
approach, as was also noted in chapter two, the use of accountancy firms 
to conduct the assurance provision in the largest companies is becoming 
increasingly prevalent (see chapter five).  
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If we now turn to examine the views on specialized consultants, 
interviewee [C9] pointed out that among the specialized consultants, some 
tend to form a group with diverse expert professionals who can give 
inputs in different areas, whilst others are small boutiques which focus on 
specific areas of knowledge. It appears that as a result of this skill, 
specialized consultancy firms perform well in reviewing how appropriate 
the data is, as another interviewee [C7] stated. This interviewee [C7] 
explained that her company used a specialized consultancy firm together 
with an accountancy firm, as complementary approaches. A further point, 
noted by interviewee [C3], was that the assurance fees for the services 
provided by small boutiques are considerably less than those of the other 
assurance providers. 
 
Jones and Solomon (2010) found that, from the perspective of corporate 
managers, sustainability assurance should be performed by financial 
auditors. This was the case even for those interviewees using specialized 
consultants as assurance providers. However, for the interviewees in this 
research study, this was certainly not the case. For these interviewees, the 
choice of assurance provider lies in how effectively they can prove an 
aggregate value for their services. 
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6.2.3 Sustainability assurance standards 
Among five interviewees who said that their companies were using the 
ISAE3000 standard, two, [C2] and [C3], emphasized that it was the 
assurance provider - an accountancy firm - who suggested its 
implementation. This influence on the adoption of the ISAE3000 standard 
was expected, considering that accountancy firms are mandated to follow 
that standard as part of their professional responsibilities if they conduct 
assurance (Jones & Solomon, 2010: 21). Interviewees perceived 
limitations in the assurance approach promoted by the ISAE3000 
standard.  For example, one interviewee argued that this standard focuses 
only on data assurance: 
We certainly found AA1000AS a more useful framework than the framework our 
accountants came to us with [ISAE3000 standard], because again, its moving from 
is the data right? to is this the right data? and I think thats a very healthy 
development.  [C8] 
 
Seven interviewees indicated that their companies were using the AA1000 
assurance standard. The main reasons for adopting this assurance 
standard were that it had been proposed by the assurance provider [C7, 
C6], it is the most recognized standard that facilitates conversations 
between individuals from the corporate social responsibility group and 
senior managers [C4], and it provides external certification [C5].   
 
Supporting views for the AA1000AS principles were also expressed, albeit 
that the benefits were described as providing a consistent and measurable 
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standard [C5], as being a really good tool for an assurance provider to use [C4], 
and as making the reports better documents and more relevant for stakeholders 
[C10], rather than it being a means of involving stakeholders more directly 
in the assurance process.  
 
Intriguingly, for interviewee [C1], whose company opted to use the 
ISAE3000 standard, the use of AA1000AS was a redundancy as her 
company was conducting extensive stakeholder engagements at different 
levels of the organisation.  
 
However, regardless of the type of assurance standard used, there was 
general agreement on the desirability of achieving more stakeholder 
inclusion, albeit that there were fundamental discrepancies among views 
on how to achieve this. For example, whilst two interviewees suggested 
that the stakeholder engagements should take place at other levels of the 
organisation [C1], or under the reporting framework only [C9], other 
interviewees were supportive of stakeholder engagement during the 
assurance exercise. Although the idea of implementing stakeholder panels 
as part of the assurance process attracted the support of the majority of 
the interviewees, they also expressed reservations on the practicalities of 
such implementations.  Less support (from only two interviewees [C3, 
C4]) was expressed for the idea advocated by interviewee [C10] of giving a 
voice to experts in key issues reported in the sustainability report.  The 
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issue of stakeholder inclusion will be discussed in more detail later in this 
chapter in section 6.1.6. 
 
6.2.4 Constraints on the assurance exercise 
There was a consensus that assurance must provide value for money. One 
interviewee expressed this idea in the following terms:  
Well, weve changed the approach this year and its already costing us significantly 
more money than it did in the past, but we think were getting better service for 
that, so we can justify it.  [C3]  
 
Cost is the overriding factor to be considered when agreeing the scope and 
level of any assurance engagement. The cost of assurance must come from 
the overall corporate social responsibility division budget, and in some 
cases this budget is not very large. Interviewees complained that the 
commission of sustainability assurance services affects the budget for 
other important areas:  
We only have this much pie: do we put 50% of it towards assurance or do we put 
10% towards it, so that we can put 90% towards actually doing things?  And thats 
not to say that assurance isnt doing things, but it does come out of that overall pot. 
[C5] 
If we assured everything down to the level we would like to I think the cost would 
be astronomical, and not necessarily reflective of the value we would get from it. 
[C3] 
Its a catch-22 again, so of course we have the assurance, everythings negative, and 
then if we want something positive it would mean that our fees would be increased 
by, I dont know, maybe 1,000% or 2,000%?  So you say, well, am I going to ask my 
line management to give me 2,000% more of my budget in order to get a positive, 
given that we already have so much assurance going around in the company?  
That is an issue with the standard, and Ernst and Young always back themselves up 
by saying Well, thats what ISAE3000 allows us to do and so forth. [C4] 
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One interviewee went further, to suggest that the commission of this type 
of assurance services diminish company returns, and expressed a fear that 
the whole process was getting out of control:  
Im not sceptical about the value of assurance but I think it has in some sense gone 
far too far and it now needs to be grounded in reality, because there are plenty of 
companies that are spending much, much more on assurance than we spend on our 
entire reporting process. [C6] 
 
For this interviewee, [C6], it was clear that companies would increasingly 
move to restricting the scope of the assurance by adopting a more 
selective, bite-sized chunk approach - as favoured by her organisation - 
on sensitive issues, for which there is a perceived need to establish a 
greater degree of trust among strategic stakeholders.   
 
Although this was a minority point of view, for the majority of the 
interviewees it was nevertheless clear that cost is a factor influencing the 
level of the assurance engagement. This restriction was particularly 
evident when the ISAE3000 standard was used.  Limited levels over 
reasonable levels were the rule, as one interviewee indicated: 
But whilst you have got that [ISAE3000] you are never going to get beyond limited 
assurance because of the cost factor. It is as simple as that. [C4] 
 
Albeit that two interviewees said they did not have financial restrictions 
on the assurance provision, they noted that higher levels of assurance are 
not justified in all cases. One stated: 
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Weve considered looking at a higher level of review over greenhouse gas 
emissions.  But theyd need to visit maybe 40% of our assets in order to do that, 
which may be worth doing, but we dont see the value that we would get from that 
for covering all of our assets.  Im not sure it would be value for money. [C2] 
 
Interestingly, a different perspective was provided by one interviewee, 
[C10], who argued that by implementing strong internal reporting 
processes, the level of assurance could be upgraded gradually without 
incurring excessive cost: 
I dont think budget is such a key thing, because our understanding is that if you 
have good processes of good working, so the auditors can jump in at the beginning 
of the process, they dont have to do a lot of checks because the processes are good 
anyway, so they can see what you are doing ... and rather than them checking 
everything they perform procedures based on that process.  So if youre organized 
and you have a good materiality process and a good drafting process and a good 
process to show transparency across the life of the document until its publication, 
you can get reasonable assurance at a very low cost, which is what we do.  
 
Even the assurance provision conducted by panels of experts was viewed 
by two interviewees [C1, C8] as a costly exercise. One stated: 
If you factor in several hours of the CEO, exposure to the heads of all the major 
businesses, etc, its not an inconsiderable cost, its just a slightly more hidden cost in 
the sense that theyre not paying out major amounts of money. [C1] 
 
Jones and Solomon (2010) found that according to corporate managers, 
one impediment to the adoption of - or continuing with - assurance was 
the increased cost in terms of time and money. Notwithstanding their 
concern with the cost of assurance, a clear majority of the interviewees 
participating in this study regarded the exercise as being worthwhile from 
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a company perspective and were apparently committed, at least in the 
short term, to commissioning some form of external assurance provision.  
 
6.2.5 Does the internal audit division have a role? 
The majority of the interviewees clearly perceived a role for the internal 
audit division. Most envisaged that the internal audit function could work 
in cooperation with the external assurance provider, rather than replace 
them. Two interviewees [C5, C1] said that this process was taking place 
already in their companies, whilst others noted that it was very much 
work in progress.  As one interviewee stated:  
In an ideal world, [name of company] [would have] very strong processes of 
internal control in place and then Ernst and Young [would] come and test those 
processes and draw a conclusion from that. It is something that we are working on, 
it is more for the medium term and we are not there yet. [C4] 
 
Another interviewee said that assurance providers advocate for the 
engagement of the internal audit function in sustainability assurance: 
 
One of the criticisms that weve had, both from the assurance providers and from 
some of our own staff, is that we should be using an internal assurance process 
primarily, that the external assurors should come in as a sort of oversight around 
internal assurance.  [C1] 
 
For these interviewees, it was clear that the internal audit function can 
play a key role in developing and testing processes and information 
systems, and therefore assist the work of the assurance providers. 
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However, another interviewee argued that such a move implies the 
commitment of financial resources: Weve discussed it and they just havent got the 
resources to commit to what we need.  [C3] 
 
A couple of interviewees [C2, C10] did not perceive a role for the internal 
audit division. Certainly, they could not envisage that the internal audit 
group might potentially take the role of the assurance provider:  
We dont use internal audit to check the report, we use our legal team to do that, 
we have a corporate responsibility and legal team here, and they go through it and 
do a similar substantiation exercise to [name of a big four firm] to go through each 
statement and say can we verify that statement?[C2] 
 
If we want to audit some specific issues we use internal audit, but the assurance 
process is coordinated by corporate responsibility.  The assurors meet all the issue 
owners at global level, and then we select a range of markets in order to perform 
audits in the market. [C10] 
 
A different perspective was provided by the interviewee [C8] whose 
company had replaced the assurance provided by accountancy firms with 
a panel of experts, and by the interviewee [C9] whose company had 
decided not to commission external assurance. The high degree of 
confidence in the work of the internal audit function might perhaps have 
influenced the replacement or abandonment of the external assurance. 
One interviewee noted: 
 
Dont forget, at the point when we changed it was our ninth report; wed had eight 
years to work with the accountants and to work internally to tighten up our 
internal audit processes and iron out a lot of the issues that everybody has when 
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they start.  Wed been through that loop for eight years and now it was time for us 
to move on to the next level.  [C8] 
 
Jones and Solomon (2010:26) found that from the perspective of some 
corporate managers, the role of internal audit is adequate, making 
sustainability assurance unnecessary. However, this point of view was 
explicitly shared by only one of the interviewees in this research study. 
Clearly, a well implemented and developed internal audit function could 
facilitate the work of external assurance providers.  It also appeared that 
this would limit the verification work required of the external assurance 
providers.  
 
6.2.6 The stakeholder dimension 
Are stakeholders interested? 
A majority of the interviewees felt that stakeholders are not interested in 
the information conveyed in the assurance statements. They were of the 
opinion that stakeholders do not read the assurance statements, and are 
satisfied with the simple presence of them in the report. Two interviewees 
stated: 
 Ive never been asked by anybody very much about the assurance statement.  I 
think if we didnt have it in, people would say oh, you dont have assurance, but I 
dont think they read them ... I dont think they pay huge amounts of attention to 
them. [C1] 
No, weve got it and thats very good and I think we would be criticized if we didnt 
do it.  But its one of those things thats just housekeeping for us; they expect us to 
have it and we do it.  [C3] 
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For these interviewees [C1, C3], it appeared that an assurance statement 
in a corporate sustainability report adds value to that report for the 
stakeholders. This benefit was also perceived by another interviewee [C4], 
who said that her investors perceived benefits from the exercise. 
However, this interviewee also suggested that the question of whether or 
not the assurance statement adds value to the report is one worthy of 
being tested with stakeholders.  
 
A sceptical view was provided by two interviewees, who argued: 
From the external point of view it should give the stakeholders the reassurance 
that we are talking about the right issues, but sometimes there is some cynicism 
from the stakeholders, perhaps some cynicism about the value of assurance the 
assurance process does not reassure them, doesnt provide value for the 
stakeholders. Some of them think that, just having this page from Deloitte does not 
mean anything.  [C10] 
Yes, if youre paying [the big four firm] a lot of money, theyre going to say, you 
know, youre all big bad business together. [C3] 
 
The perceptions expressed by these interviewees give the impression of a 
sustainability assurance exercise from which stakeholders are in large 
part disconnected. This view concurs with claims by the assurance 
providers that there is either ignorance or lack of interest on the part of 
stakeholders concerning sustainability assurance matters (Edgley et al., 
2010:551). 
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Is there a role for the stakeholders in sustainability assurance? 
Interviewees were asked to provide their views about how to increase the 
relevance of sustainability assurance to stakeholders. Two suggestions 
were made as to possible ways in which the views of stakeholders could 
be more integrated into the assurance process. First, interviewees were 
asked about the possibility of offering stakeholders a voice in the 
appointment of the assurance provider (see Adams & Evans, 2004), and 
second, they were asked about the feasibility of addressing assurance 
statements to stakeholders rather than to the company itself, as is usual 
current practice.  
 
Assurance providers have indicated that stakeholders are not involved in 
the choice of provider (Edgley et al., 2010:542). In this study, companies 
provided reasons for this. For example, four interviewees were dismissive 
about the idea of stakeholders selecting the assurance provider:  
I cant see how that would work.  How do you pick one or two stakeholders who 
would be representative to make that decision? [C4] 
No, no, the companies pay for it, so the companies should [make the decision]. [C5] 
I dont know how realistic it is to start involving stakeholders in the selection of 
your provider.  Because there are a whole load of other things to take into account, 
like how you get on with them, and can you let them loose in the organisation 
without them upsetting people, and how much is it going to cost?  Because the 
other thing is, the big four firms are very expensive, so I wouldnt particularly want 
to ... And what happens if you involve an external stakeholder in the selection and 
they want one question and you want another?[C6] 
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In contrast, another interviewee [C7] did not see any reason why 
stakeholders, and particularly stakeholder panels, could not have a voice 
in the selection of the assurance provider. However, she went on to 
propose a better role for the stakeholders: 
I dont see any reason why it cant be part of the discussion, particularly in the 
stakeholder panel, as to the credibility of the results of the auditors. [C7] 
 
When discussing the issue of the addressee constituency in the assurance 
statements, the predominant view was that the statements must be 
addressed to internal constituencies, as it is the company that 
commissions the assurance exercise.  
 
A couple of interviewees explained that in the cases where accountancy 
firms conducted the assurance provision, they would have problems with 
addressing their statements to external constituencies due to the formal 
contractual situation. One interviewee pointed out:  
 
I think this [situation] needs to evolve to a place where we are in the middle. A little 
bit here, a little bit for management and a little bit for stakeholders.  At the 
moment it just focuses on the management, and we are hoping that that delivers 
trust and credibility.  [C4] 
 
Another interviewee spoke about this issue in frank and dismissive terms: 
Oh this really winds me up. Who cares [to whom the statement is addressed]? At 
the moment its to the board, right; fine, the statements there.  We could change it 
to say to stakeholders, youre not going to change the assurance, its not going to 
change what it means.  I think this is something that somebody (laughs) has come 
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up with and, there are more important things that could really fundamentally 
change the way you do things, but the way it comes across is that all you need to do 
as a corporate reporter is change who its actually directed at.  Whereas our CSR 
Board, a subcommittee of the main board, have asked us to write a report to 
society.  That assurance statement is geared to assure those stakeholders, thats 
what the reports about.  [C3] 
 
Nevertheless, in general interviewees were aware of the contradiction in 
preparing the reports for the stakeholders, whilst addressing the 
assurance statements to the company itself.  One interviewee explained 
that even if she would like to address the statement to stakeholders, she 
would find internal resistance: 
 I think the problem for the senior executives is they only think of assurance as an 
internal process.  So really the assurance is for them and maybe the board and 
therefore the shareholders.  They dont think about assurance for a wider group of 
stakeholders, they dont see the wider aspects of it. [C4] 
 
The views of these interviewees evidences that there is little support for 
the promotion of more direct stakeholder participation by having 
assurance statements addressed to the stakeholders. It appears that there 
is little support for the normative position of researchers in the field (see 
Adams & Evans, 2004), who advocate for the involvement of stakeholders 
in the selection of the scope or the assurance provider.  
 
Involvement of stakeholders views  
The findings in chapter five of this study reveal that companies were using 
different degrees of stakeholder inclusion in their sustainability assurance 
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exercises, from not including the views of stakeholders at all, to 
integrating the views of stakeholders in the formal assurance exercise, to 
using a panel of evaluation in the form of a panel of experts or stakeholder 
panel.   
 
Two interviewees whose companies were not including the views of 
stakeholders directly in the assurance exercise expressed their opinions 
as to the reasons for that exclusion. One interviewee, [C2], argued that his 
assurance provider - an accountancy firm - had never suggested the direct 
inclusion of stakeholder views in the exercise. For him, such direct 
stakeholder inclusion was unnecessary.  The other interviewee [C1] 
argued that her company conducted a very sophisticated stakeholder 
engagement at different company levels, and therefore the direct inclusion 
of stakeholder views in the assurance exercise was not essential. However, 
she expressed support towards the idea of including stakeholders 
opinions in assurance in general.  
 
In the cases where stakeholder views were included to some extent in the 
assurance exercise, it appeared that there was a desire to see stakeholders 
more involved in the assurance process itself: 
I would like to see stakeholders involved a bit more I am very conscious that us 
having Ernst and Young or any big four as our assurance provider is automatically 
un-reassuring for some of our stakeholders. And I think that by having a level of 
stakeholder assurance in there we will be able to provide more assurance to the 
wider group. [C3] 
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For this interviewee [C3], the motivation was there, despite some 
resistance on the part of their assurance provider.  
 
The idea of implementing panels of evaluation in the form of stakeholder 
panels to complement the formal assurance process received the support 
of another two interviewees [C1, C7], albeit with slightly different focus. 
For interviewee [C1], the role of the stakeholder panel would be to: 
[supplement] what we do, but more on a front end.  I would treat that more as an upfront 
issue than an end of report issue. For the interviewee [C7] whose company 
implemented a stakeholder panel, the role of the panel was to provide an 
assurance statement.  
 
Another interviewee [C5], whose company had been using the stakeholder 
panel in addition to a formal assurance exercise conducted by a 
certification body, also spoke about the benefits of such an approach:  
What the assurance does is it does look at your systems, it looks at internal 
processes, which, yes, we could say we know them, but its always good to get an 
external perspective.  I always think that theres value for different people to look 
at it because theyll see it with different eyes  and they do highlight process and 
performance things that can be improved.  What our panel does, which our 
auditors couldnt, is to give us a forward looking statement on what our challenges 
are and what they would like to see us do in the future.  And it hasnt got the 
constraints that assurance has   its not done within a formal framework.  Theyre 
able to be more freethinking and more challenging in some ways, from an 
intellectual perspective and from a perspective of where sustainable development 
is moving towards.  So for me, both of those two things working together is what 
gives us our real value.  
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Nevertheless, some reservations were expressed by a couple of 
interviewees who were aware of the practical difficulties in the 
implementation and operation of stakeholder panels. For example, 
interviewee [C2] spoke about the international and heterogeneous nature 
of the companys activities, whilst another [C4] pointed out the 
impossibility of setting stakeholder representativeness at company level, 
which would have widespread credibility with stakeholders:  
 
Again, think about the monster that [name of company] is: 101,000 employees over 
100 countries around the world.  On which basis could we choose which 
stakeholders to choose to provide which assurance where?  I have gone through 
this debate year after year the same way that we have gone through the debate 
around, well should we have a panel?  But it is very difficult and thats why we 
leave it at a profits level, because at a product and a country level, where the audits 
are taking place people there know whats going to assure them at a better level.  
Whereas at a group level I would be really sceptical if someone told me this 
stakeholder is representative: representative of what to whom?  
 
This interviewee suggested that stakeholder panels of evaluation were an 
idea to satisfy the professional assurance industry and corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) experts.  She went on to stress that this idea could be 
considered useful at intellectual level, however:   
It doesnt provide a lot of value for stakeholders.  I sincerely believe that. It feels like 
stakeholder engagement for stakeholder engagements sake.  And thats not useful; 
it doesnt add value for stakeholders or the company. Therefore, its not going to be 
sustainable; that is the honest truth. [C4] 
 
For her, a better idea would be to adopt micro panels at project and local 
level, rather than setting panels at company level and for the reporting 
process.  
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For another interviewee, the idea of implementing stakeholder panels 
sounded, and looked, cumbersome [C6]. Indeed, the decision to adopt 
stakeholders panels of evaluation must be taken only after serious 
consideration; as one interviewee stated: 
I keep saying, You cant set up a panel and then ignore everything they say; you 
have to be willing to change and perhaps do things that youre initially not 
comfortable with.  Otherwise it will lose all credibility.  So Im really trying to make 
sure that the business is ready for it and knows whats involved because it could be 
a huge disaster if we set something up and then the business goes actually, Im not 
listening to you. Which I dont think they would do, but youve got to manage 
peoples expectations havent you?  [C3] 
 
A different perspective on the inclusion of stakeholder views in the 
assurance exercise was provided by interviewee [C10], who perceived a 
need to respond to the negative and suspicious stance adopted by some 
stakeholders towards the independence of the external assurance 
exercise:  
Stakeholders like NGOs or campaigners think that we are paying the assurors and 
mainly they are writing what we want them to write.  And this is something that 
we need to address.  
For this interviewee, the solution to this issue was to ask credible 
independent experts on specific environmental and social impacts to offer 
their critical commentary in the published report, in addition to the formal 
assurance exercise conducted by an accountancy firm: 
In the, lets say, hardcore assurance from Deloitte, the benefit is that the report is of 
a higher quality because the claims are double set, we are balanced, so there are 
not only positive issues.  So thats the main value of the external assurance, in terms 
of giving critical stakeholders a voice, to give an opinion on the issue on which they 
are experts.  This gives the reassurance that we are not hiding anything.  It gives a 
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voice to the stakeholders, so the rest of the stakeholders can see what is our 
version, and what is their version. [C10] 
 
This interviewee explained that this approach of using credible 
independent experts has an advantage over the stakeholder panel 
approach: 
We dont mix things here, and miss who is the real stakeholder. We just look at 
what are the most material issues and then we ask subject matter credible experts 
on those issues to provide comment. [C10] 
 
For the majority of the interviewees the major concern was how to 
increase the involvement of stakeholders, whilst keeping the formal 
assurance provision. Nonetheless, this was not the case for interviewee 
[C8], whose company had discontinued a deep-rooted formal data 
assurance provision conducted by two accountancy firms, and replaced it 
with a panel of experts. For him, this change was a natural development in 
the assurance provision, moving from a concern with the assurance of the 
accuracy of data reported, to:  
 
Having a broader conversation with experts in the field about what is actually the 
right data, the right topics, the right information, [and] are we handling it the right 
way?  
 
He went on to argue that there are benefits for both companies and 
stakeholders: 
So theyre pre-reading the report and working in focus groups and in that sense, 
theyre representative of a lot of readers were trying to reach.  It was incredibly 
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powerful to have them go through [the report] and get their reactions to this 
particular phrasing or this way of handling a particular section ahead of our 
readers.  And that level of nuance and that level of understanding of where our 
readers are coming from, we certainly didnt get from our accountants.  I dont 
know whether we would have been able to get that from a professional assurance 
provider. 
 
He noted that stakeholder reaction had been positive: 
Every year we do an extensive reader survey of what people think, and this is one 
area that we test quite closely.  And its clear that the credibility of our reporting 
and our reputation as a company has risen as a result of the shift.  
 
According to him, as was said earlier, the perceived benefits were not 
restricted to the report per se, as this type of assurance provision 
facilitates other, more important, processes: 
Pretty quickly you are also talking about performance and very quickly after that 
you are talking about ways to improve your performance and these people with 
their expertise can help you.  
 
It is somewhat surprising that companies, whose current sustainability 
assurance practices manifest a lack of direct stakeholder participation, 
expressed a desire to bring about more active involvement from 
stakeholders in sustainability assurance. Intriguingly, assurance providers 
(accountants and consultants) also believe that stakeholders should be 
involved in sustainability assurance (Edgley et al., 2010:542). The 
question is whether this desire will be realized in the future.  
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Significantly, views of companies respondents in this study show that 
there is very little consensus as to how this stakeholder involvement 
might be achieved. For this sample of interviewees, formalizing 
stakeholder involvement by operating some form of  panel of evaluation 
appears to present a more attractive option, but even here there is no 
agreement as to how best to proceed. Some of the corporate respondents 
drew attention to the practical difficulties inherent in bringing together a 
truly representative stakeholder panel. This view complements the 
opinion of assurance providers, who have claimed that one problem of 
engaging stakeholders in assurance relates to the dissimilarity of the 
stakeholder groups (Edgley et al., 2010). 
 
6.2.7 The future of sustainability assurance 
A previous study describes three possible future scenarios in 
sustainability assurance (Zadek et al., 2004:73-77): (1) grey scenario: 
assurance focusing on historical data accuracy; (2) gold scenario: 
legislation in place, with stakeholder engagement, examination of 
management systems and focus on organisational performance; (3) black 
scenario: a huge diversification of assurance approaches, an internal 
company tool lacking rigour. By contrast, in this research study, 
interviewees envisaged two main possible scenarios for the future of 
sustainability assurance.  
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In scenario one, which was not envisaged by Zadek et al. (2004), 
companies will either restrict the level and scope of assurance exercises, 
or abandon assurance. In scenario two, the tendency will be for more 
companies to engage in sustainability assurance exercises. The latter 
scenario shares a few of the characteristics of the grey, black and gold 
scenarios envisaged by Zadek et al. (2004); that is, interviewees said that 
there would be a focus on data verification, stakeholder engagement - 
albeit that interviewees did not talk about being in the framework of a 
regulatory environment - and a diversification of assurance models.   
 
6.2.7.1 Scenario one 
A couple of interviewees [C4, C6] predicted that companies will not 
engage in assurance, or will abandon assurance or, as interviewee [C4] 
said, will place restrictions on its scope:  I feel youre going to see a lot more of 
the big companies pushing back and reducing the scope of their assurance because of the 
excruciating costs.  Another interviewee lamented this possibility, and spoke 
about a possible solution: I think therell be a lot more boutique providers as well but 
I think that perhaps does keep costs down and more people will be able to enter into the 
[assurance process]. [C3]. Notwithstanding these points of view, as was stated 
earlier in this chapter, a majority of the interviewees in this research study 
were apparently committed to continuing to commission a form of 
external assurance provision. As interviewee [C3] argued: It will be 
irresponsible not to assure.  
 
 228 
 
6.2.7.2 Scenario two 
In this scenario, interviewees suggested that sustainability assurance 
would have the following features: 
 
More stakeholder inclusion  
A majority of the interviewees said that the tendency will be for greater 
stakeholder engagement (see also Zadek et al., 2006). One interviewee, 
[C3], said the engagement will be within the formal traditional of 
assurance provision. Conversely, interviewees [C7], [C4] and [C10] noted 
that it would be through experts panels of evaluation and stakeholder 
panels.  
 
Synergy between financial and sustainability assurance 
A couple of interviewees [C2, C4] said that the trend will be to find a closer 
alignment between financial and sustainability assurance:  
I think inevitably sustainability issues are becoming more and more mainstream.  
So I dont see why there would not be a synergy in the types of financial assurance 
and sustainability assurance coming through at some point as well.  [C4] 
Then, interviewee C2 envisaged that the assurance process will be more 
technical.   
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Diversification of assurance models 
Two interviewees spoke about a trend for companies to re-evaluate their 
existing assurance exercises, and to shift to new and different approaches 
(see also Zadek et al., 2006). One interviewee stated: 
Once youve learnt and really got things under your belt, then youll feel like you 
can experiment a bit.  So I think youre going to get companies doing different 
things. I think many will start [assurance], I think youre going to get different 
models like the statements coming along. I think theres going to be a period of 
divergence, and of challenge and pushback, people saying what value are we 
getting for it; weve been doing this for a number of years now, can we live without 
it?  Can we do something different? [C5] 
 
A continuing role for data verification 
Two interviewees [C3, C1] emphasized that there will always be a role for 
data verification. This role was linked to what two interviewees [C1, C8] 
termed maturity cycle in the assurance process, as mentioned earlier in 
this chapter. The idea of a sustainability assurance process in the early 
stages of maturity was also mentioned by several other interviewees, who 
expressed great uncertainty as to how the assurance process might evolve 
in the future. Two interviewees [C5, C8] noted that during the 
development of the assurance process, companies could explore very 
different approaches to what they had been doing.  
 
In this assurance cycle, interviewee [C1] said, the role for data verification 
will be more significant for companies that are starting reporting and 
assurance exercises. During the later stages of the assurance cycle, one 
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possibility might be that a well developed internal audit function takes on 
the role of data verification, as was explained by interviewee [C8], and that 
a panel of evaluation takes on the role of external assurance. However, 
interviewee [C1] argued that even in this case, external formal assurance 
is fundamental, in the sense that: 
If somebody is really trying to hide something, a stakeholder panel is going to have 
as much difficulty, if not more, than a group of auditors who, for most companies, 
carry a sense of authority, where [company management] would be nervous of 
trying to pull the wool  over the eyes of a KPMG or PWC or whatever.  
 
Concerns about assuring data were influential in leading most of the 
interviewees to reject the approach adopted by the interviewee [C8] 
whose company had replaced formal assurance with an experts panel of 
evaluation.  
 
In sum, the views of these representatives of companies indicate that 
there is great uncertainty as to how assurance practice will develop in 
future.  
 
6.2.8 Summary of findings 
First, it was clear that the driving force behind sustainability assurance is 
internal. Findings in this research suggest that sustainability assurance 
must provide value for money. The key benefits accruing from assurance 
exercises were generally considered to be improvements in information 
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and reporting systems (and reports), and in management process, and a 
re-assurance about the integrity and credibility of data released into the 
public domain (see Jones & Solomon, 2010; Edgley et al., 2010). Findings 
in this study confirm that an additional benefit is the enhancement of 
corporate reputation (see Jones & Solomon, 2010). The results also show 
that sustainability assurance is used as an instrument to build trust with 
the stakeholders. Another key benefit is improvement of performance. 
There was an impression that most of the pressure for commissioning 
sustainability assurance services comes from assurance providers. These 
findings are consistent with those of other studies and suggest that other 
real beneficiaries are the community of professional assurance providers 
(see Jones & Solomon, 2010).  
 
Findings in this study suggest that there are perceived differences 
between the AA1000 and the ISAE3000 assurance standards. For the 
interviewees in this research, the ISAE3000 standard focuses on data 
assurance. Respondents expressed support for the AA1000 assurance 
standard; however, they did not appreciate it as a means to directly 
involve stakeholders in the assurance process. 
  
Results in this research show that assurance providers are selected based 
on their capacity for global coverage, high level of resources, and cost-
effective price for the assurance service. Findings reveal that interviewees 
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perceived differences among different types of assurance providers and 
approaches, and selected their services based on the proven value of their 
work, in contrast to earlier findings suggesting that companies believe 
that sustainability assurance should be performed by financial auditors 
(see Jones & Solomon, 2010). In this research, interviewees believed that 
accountancy firms have advantages over other assurance providers in 
terms of professional standing and global reach, and data verification 
work. However, one weakness of the assurance provided by accountancy 
firms is the assurance statement. A few interviewees also believed that 
specialized consultancy firms and certification bodies have the advantage 
of deep knowledge in specific areas, and perform well in reviewing how 
appropriate the data is. 
 
The study reveals that a more substantial input from the internal audit 
function might assist the work of external verification; however, few 
interviewees seemed likely to follow the example of one interviewee and 
discontinue the assurance exercise entirely, or to support the view that 
the role of internal assurance is adequate, hence making external 
assurance unnecessary (see Jones & Solomon, 2010). Results in this 
research show that a greater use of internal audit might eventually 
provide a means of upgrading from limited assurance to reasonable 
assurance.   
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Findings also reveal that cost considerations are influencing the 
development of sustainability assurance practices. For this reason, it 
appeared that there was little possibility of change from limited towards 
reasonable assurance. However, there was no support for Jones and 
Solomons (2010) suggestion that cost was an impediment to the adoption 
of or continuing with assurance; indeed, a clear majority of the 
participants in this study were committed - at least in the short term - to 
commissioning some form of external assurance provision.   
 
Second, this research confirms that there is a disconnection between 
stakeholders and the assurance process (see Edgley et al., 2010). In this 
study, a majority of the interviewees acknowledged that stakeholders do 
not read assurance statements, and expressed a desire to bring about their 
active involvement. This latter view concurs with the opinion of assurance 
providers that stakeholders should be involved in sustainability assurance 
(see Edgley et al., 2010). However, findings in this study reveal very little 
consensus as to how to achieve a more stakeholder inclusive assurance 
process. For example, there was no support for the idea of stakeholders 
selecting and appointing the assurance provider, or for that of addressing 
the assurance statements to the stakeholders. The general view was that 
as the company commissions the assurance provision, it is only natural 
that the statement is addressed to the same constituency. Most of the 
interviewees supported the idea of formalizing stakeholder inclusion in 
the form of panels of evaluation; however, there was no consensus on how 
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to proceed here. A few interviewees argued that there are practical 
difficulties in implementing stakeholder panels, a view shared by 
assurance providers (see Edgley et al., 2010). Few interviewees argued in 
favour of using independent external experts, either as a panel or to 
provide comment within the report, rather than engaging direct 
stakeholder representation.  
 
Third, there is a great uncertainty as to how assurance practice will 
develop in future. Findings in this research suggest two possible scenarios. 
In one, sustainability assurance would continue to evolve, with diverse 
assurance approaches and more direct stakeholder inclusivity (see also 
Zadek et al., 2006). However, it appeared that interviewees envisaged 
these developments under a voluntary regime rather than under a 
regulatory environment. It also appeared that there is a role for data 
verification, and a synergy between financial and sustainability assurance. 
In the other scenario, sustainability assurance would wither and 
disappear. One interviewee suggested that assurance has gone too far 
now and needs to be grounded in reality. 
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6.3 DISCUSSION AND THEORETICAL INTERPRETATIONS 
In this section, Michael Powers theory together with key strands of 
stakeholder and legitimacy theories are used to analyze the practice of 
sustainability assurance in the United Kingdom. 
 
Michael Power (1994b:47) argues that at programmatic level, audit is 
understood as symbolizing ideals of efficiency and quality, governance, 
transparency and accountability. In terms of efficiency and quality, the 
audit process is linked to the production of better management systems of 
control and better reports, and to reporting systems and process, and the 
effectiveness of those systems81 (Power, 1994b; 1996). In terms of 
governance, the audit process is related to the improvement of 
organisational performance and activities, and to ensuring accountability 
of management to stakeholders (Power, 1997/1999). Power contends that 
the audit system imports and exports legitimacy (2003a). In terms of 
transparency, the audit process is facilitated, and accountability is 
enhanced, when companies create environments to allow the provision of 
information concerning existing conditions, decisions and actions82
                                                        
81 Powers argument is complemented by the work of Soltani (2007).   
 
(Power, 1994b). Power (1994b) claims that audits have the ability to 
enhance transparency of organisational actions. In terms of accountability, 
Power (1994b) advocates for a form of audit whereby diverse 
stakeholders can assert their claims as principals. He claims that audits 
82 Powers argument is complemented by the work of Soltani (2007).   
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are thought to shift power; from professionals to the public, from experts 
to stakeholders (Power, 1994b:23).   
 
However, Power (1997/1999) also provides serious critiques on the 
actual state of auditing practices. He raises concerns in that, in reality, 
audits serve the institutional need to deliver comfort in society, rather 
than providing critiques and a base for real change. Power (1994b; 
1997/1999) argues that audits are a new form of image management, and 
that the auditor usually trades cost and audit quality. Power (1994b; 
1997/1999) makes the criticism that audit arrangements discourage 
dialogue both inside and outside organisations, and that there is a 
preference for the downward accountability model in which 
accountability is discharged by demonstrating the existence of 
management systems of control rather than by demonstrating good 
performance in economic, social, and environmental practices on the 
ground. For this reason, Power (1997/1999:127) claims that audit has 
become a dead end in the chain of accountability 83
 
.   
The empirical data described in the previous section will be analyzed by 
examining these Powers arguments and criticisms.  That is, it  will be 
examined whether sustainability assurance practices in the UK are in 
accord with the normative view of Power concerning what audit means 
                                                        
83 Power bases this argument on the work of Day and Klein 1987 
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and its purpose in society, and whether they manifest the issues and 
concerns raised by him.   
 
The analysis also uses key strands of stakeholder and legitimacy theories. 
These theories are particularly useful when considering the normative 
arguments made by Power concerning governance, legitimacy, 
accountability and audits.  
 
First, both perspectives of stakeholder theory are used to analyze 
companies motivations behind the commissioning of sustainability 
assurance and the adoptions of certain assurance practices are examined 
(but see also Belal and Owen, 2007).  One argument subject to analysis is 
the managerial branch of stakeholder theory, which states that in order to 
guarantee the survival of the organisation, management need to adopt 
strategies to deal with their powerful stakeholders (Deegan & Unerman, 
2006/2008).  A second argument subject to analysis is the normative 
branch of stakeholder theory, which argues that organisations have the 
duty to respond to the needs of their stakeholders regardless of their 
power and influence (see also Medawar, 1976).   
 
Second,   key strands of legitimacy theory are used to analyze the use of 
sustainability assurance in legitimation strategies (but see also Belal and 
Owen, 2007). Lindblom (2010: 57-60) identifies four organisational 
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strategies to obtain or maintain legitimacy by the disclosure of 
information in sustainability reports. In this study,  the empirical data will 
be analyzed to determine whether or not the practice of sustainability 
assurance can be used by an organization to implement the following 
legitimation strategies (Lindblom, 2010: 57-60): (1) to educate and inform 
society about real changes in performance, hence, closing the legitimacy 
gap; (2) to change the perceptions of society concerning the performance 
of the organisation, without changing organizations actions; (3) to 
manipulate perceptions by changing the discussion from the issues of 
concern; (4) to change society expectations by showing that they are 
unreasonable.   
 
6.3.1 Sustainability assurance and the ideals of efficiency and 
quality 
In general, respondents argued that companies receive benefits through 
the commission of sustainability assurance services. This opinion is 
consistent with the perception of auditing as symbolizing the ideal of 
efficiency. That is, through the provision of this type of assurance, 
respondents gained comfort (Power, 1997/1999) that their management 
process and information systems operate efficiently. In the view of these 
respondents, even in cases where the service provided was of limited 
nature, this type of assurance provision influences the development of 
higher quality reporting systems. It has been argued that one of the 
measures adopted by auditors to reduce the gap caused by inadequate 
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organisational performance is their input to reporting systems to improve 
the quality of those systems (see Soltani, 2007: 32). It seems possible 
that in the case of sustainability assurance, providers resort to this 
measure in order to halt the expectation gap. An implication of this finding 
is the possibility that an evolution of reporting systems is needed in order 
to legitimize sustainability assurance practices with external 
constituencies (see Power, 2003a). 
 
Indeed, respondents argued that assurance providers also influence the 
quality of the reports. Some respondents revealed that the production of 
higher quality reports is the result of negotiations (Power, 1996) between 
the assurance provider and the companies within the assurance process. 
In this process of co-production of the report and the assurance (Power, 
1996:290), respondents claimed that assurance providers challenge and 
criticize the content of the reports, and encourage companies to address 
the issues and concerns raised. It seems that the provision of critiques on 
the reports might be an additional measure by the assurance providers to 
control the expectation gap in the practice of sustainability assurance. In 
the view of the respondents, it was clear that the inclusion of particular 
information in the report is agreed within the assurance process; 
nevertheless, these interviewees believed that it is companies that decide 
on the final content of the reports, hence controlling the information that 
is finally assured (but see Ball et al., 2000). It appears that managerial 
control is needed, as it is during this stage of building the assurance 
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environment that impression management84
 
 and management are tightly 
coupled through the assurance process (Power, 1996:303). One issue to 
emerge from these findings is that there appears to be a conflict between 
assurance providers need to legitimize their assurance practices with the 
external world though measures to ensure the quality of the information 
reported, its relevancy and completeness, and companies need to 
legitimize their practices with external constituencies through forms of 
impression management.  
We now turn to the issue of internal control processes. According to 
Soltani (2007:309), these processes are designed to achieve goals 
concerning the reliability of reporting and accountability, operational 
efficiency and compliance with laws, regulations and policies, among 
others. As Power (2007b:43) states, internal management control process 
provides a base to make organisations accountable, auditable and 
inspectable.  In this context it is expected that internal auditors, in their 
function of evaluating and assessing the quality of internal control 
performance over time (Soltani, 2007), could play a role in the provision 
of external sustainability assurance. The majority of respondents 
envisaged, like Power (1997/1999; 2007b), that the internal audit 
function could work in partnership with external assurance providers, and 
gave the impression that they intended to reach a balance between 
                                                        
84 Impression management is a broad phenomenon in which we try to influence the 
perceptions and behaviours of others by controlling the information they receive 
(Rosenfeld, Giacalone, & Riordan, 1995:7). 
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internal and external arrangements for assurance. It seems possible that a 
more substantial input from the internal audit function might serve to 
diminish the importance of, or even take over the role of, external 
sustainability assurance in the future (Power, 1997/1999). It is also 
probable that a more proactive role of the internal audit function could 
have an impact by reducing the assurance fees (Power, 2007a). However, 
at the time the research was conducted, few respondents seemed likely to 
follow the example of interviewee [C8], who had successfully substituted 
the provision of external assurance for internal auditing, whilst 
implementing a form of panel of evaluation to provide strategic 
commentary on critical issues.   
 
In the view of the majority of respondents, upgrading to reasonable levels 
of assurance was not possible, because of cost. This perception supports 
Powers (1997/1999) claim that sustainability assurance is a practice 
bounded by economic constraints. It appears that the commission of 
sustainability assurance services is considered under the cost-benefit 
analysis (Power, 1997/1999), as a majority of respondents argued that 
sustainability assurance must provide value for money. It does seem that 
assurance exercises conducted with limited levels of assurance provide an 
added value. However, the question is: value to whom? As in the case of 
environmental auditing (see Power, 1991), companies - rather than 
society - undertake the role of principals; therefore they assume the 
assurance cost until the point at which they perceive that they are gaining 
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major benefits. Albeit that the views of companies respondents gave the 
impression that there is a benefit for the users of the sustainability 
reports, one is likely to conclude that sustainability assurance is far from 
providing real benefits for society. In fact, in the view of one respondent, 
another real beneficiary is the community of professional assurance 
providers.  
 
6.3.2 Sustainability assurance and the ideal of governance  
In general terms, a majority of the respondents did not refer to 
sustainability assurance as a means whereby companies shape and 
enhance their performance (Power, 1994b:8), and therefore ensure 
accountability to stakeholders. These respondents did not view auditing 
as symbolizing the ideal of governance.  This finding concurs with our 
earlier observations, which showed that the assurance procedures which 
indicate clearly the evaluation of organisational performance were not 
main priorities in the practice of sustainability assurance in the FTSE100 
companies (see chapter five, section 5.5). Only one respondent, [C8], 
clearly stated that corporate performance is improved through the 
practice of sustainability assurance85
                                                        
85 Although interviewee C5 also considers that assurance providers draw attention to 
performance matters that can be improved; this issue in analyzed in the context of 
company [C8].  
. Intriguingly, the assurance exercise 
in his company was conducted by a panel of external experts. This 
respondent explained that within the conversations with the panel of 
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experts, the companys needs and point of view were understood, and 
strategies were provided to improve their performance.  
 
Indeed, this oil company [C8] claims that it is accountable to their 
stakeholders (see Lawrence, 2002).  In 2007, the work of the external 
panel of experts focused on reviewing and commenting on the company 
report, and on offering observations on the company performance. On the 
environmental side, the main issue commented by the panel was related 
to the impact of climate change on the business and on the future of the 
planet, and to how the company will develop renewable energy business 
to ensure sustainability of the business. Moreover, the panel report (for 
years 2005, 2006, and 2007) also referred to concerns raised by INGOs 
related to environmental degradation and human rights violations in 
Nigeria and Russia86
                                                        
86 Only assurance statements (2005, 2006) refer to this issue in Russia. 
. Although the problem in Nigeria had been 
documented since 1995 (see Lawrence, 2002), it still persisted in 2007. In 
fact, the panel report (2006) referred to the possibility that this company 
was not able to meet the target of ending an environmental problem in 
Nigeria because of continuing conflict in the region and lack of access to 
funding.  Indeed, while the panel of experts asked in 2007 how and when 
the issues in Nigeria would be solved, it appears that the problems still 
remain, as Amnesty International reported in 2009 on the continuing 
deterioration of human rights and the environment in this country. This 
raises doubts as to the responsiveness of this organisation, and the 
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credibility of the assurance process itself, as the social and environmental 
performance of the company in Nigeria remains questionable.  
 
It would be possible to claim, from the perspective provided by the 
normative branch of stakeholder theory, that this companys [C8] 
adoption of the panel of experts is a response to the need to ensure 
accountability to stakeholders by the external examination of its social 
and environmental performance (Power, 1994b).  The company has been 
transparent by acknowledging the social and environmental issues it 
faces. Intriguingly, the panel report does not refer to the social and 
environmental impacts exposed by NGOs in geographical regions other 
than Nigeria and Russia.  Hence, the assurance process seems to be aiming 
at informing powerful stakeholders such as social activist groups in the 
environmental and human rights areas. It is also unclear how the people 
in Nigeria and Russia are being informed of the main activities and 
impacts of this organisation. Therefore, the commissioning of 
sustainability assurance services is not driven entirely by a genuine desire 
to be accountable, and transparent, to all relevant stakeholders. Moreover, 
from the panel of experts statements it could be inferred that the major 
concern for this company has been to ensure the sustainability of the 
business rather than to respond to the environmental degradation and 
social problems that result from its business activities and to ensure 
appropriate redress. Clearly, working in countries where there is social 
conflict represents a major challenge for companies, especially if their 
 245 
 
activities exacerbate social and environmental problems; however, it is 
evident that the economic returns of its activities compensate this issue, 
and motivate the company to continue their operations in these regions. 
Hence, it is clear that economic performance has taken priority over social 
and environmental performance. It is also evident that this company has 
attempted to manage relationships with powerful stakeholders through 
sustainability assurance in order to preserve its economic interests. In 
short, doubts arise about the desire to be accountable to all stakeholders 
via sustainability assurance. 
 
Moreover, leaders of this company have admitted that their reputation is 
an important commercial asset (Lawrence, 2002:197).  According to 
Lawrence (2002:196), through the process of stakeholder engagement 
this company has sought to improve its corporate reputation, to earn its 
licence to operate and to win approval from society. In fact, the 
respondent from this company admitted that the credibility of the 
business increased significantly with the adoption of the panel of 
experts87
                                                        
87 This company has evaluated the impact of adopting a panel of credible experts on the 
credibility of their report and their reputation via an extensive reader survey. 
. In other words, the practice of sustainability assurance is used 
to legitimize its activities and operations. This is consistent with 
Lindbloms (2010) suggestion that organisations create strategies to 
secure legitimacy. It appears that the strategy of this company has been to 
educate and inform society about its real performance in order to reduce 
the expectation gap (Lindblom, 2010), as the panel of experts 
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acknowledged concerns raised by INGOs and indicated the impossibility of 
this company solving its issues efficiently. Further, it appears that an 
additional strategy was to focus mainly on evaluating issues of climate 
change, and in this way to distract attention away from critical issues of 
concern (Lindblom, 2010) that are recurrent problems in Nigeria. Most of 
the interviewees narrated a similar experience, whereby sustainability 
assurance serves the purpose of enhancing credibility and corporate 
reputation. In other words, it serves the ultimate purpose of securing 
legitimacy with external constituencies (Power, 2003a), without 
guaranteeing redress to society.   
 
Swift (2001) argues that corporate performance is close knit with 
corporate reputation. That is, performance is about the achievement of 
the success of the business coupled with societal expectations that an 
organisation will act in a socially responsible manner (Swift, 2001:22). 
However, for some types of business it would be challenging to meet 
societal expectations and therefore to improve their social performance, 
as their social impacts are difficult - if not impossible - to mitigate. This is 
the case of company [C3], whose business, the production of tobacco, lacks 
a good reputation in society88
                                                        
88 Tobacco is an agricultural product which contains an addictive substance commonly 
used as a recreational drug.  
.  Swift (2001:22), reporting Hosmer 
(1995:386), explains that reputation is the result of trustworthy 
behaviour, and that trust is earned on the basis of trustworthy behaviour. 
For her, trust is based upon corporate reputation, dialogue and 
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experience (21). In this sense, she claims that stakeholder engagement 
and egalitarian dialogue between companies and their stakeholders are 
critical to build trust. Further, according to Power (1997/1999), the idea 
of audits sustains the idea of trust in society. Hence, sustainability 
assurance practices with a stakeholder-centred approach aiming to build 
egalitarian dialogue would serve this purpose of building trust in society.  
 
It would be possible to claim that the company C3 is building trust in 
society through sustainability assurance. The respondent from company 
[C3] admitted that through sustainability assurance her company is 
restoring trust with stakeholders: you might not trust us but you can trust our 
[reporting and assurance] process, which is very, very important to us. Through the 
assurance process, the stakeholder sessions89
                                                        
89 Stakeholder sessions held in London. 
 - rather than organisational 
performance - are examined using a stakeholder-centred approach based 
on the AA1000AS, and including the opinion of stakeholders (albeit 
indirectly). This approach reveals that stakeholder concerns are not at the 
centre of the assurance practice (see Dando & Swift, 2003).  Now, this 
perspective evidences a fundamental problem. In reality, in the case of this 
company, sustainability assurance displaces the problem of trust rather 
than solving it (Power, 1994b; 2007b). It seems that society must trust 
their practice of sustainability assurance, and perhaps the integrity of the 
assurance providers conducting the assurance exercise, as it is difficult to 
trust the company itself because the nature of their business is highly 
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questionable. Moreover, the company is restoring legitimacy through 
sustainability assurance (Power, 2003a) by educating and informing 
society of its real activities and impacts, and is in this way reducing the 
expectations of society (Lindblom, 2010). It would be possible to claim 
that this company uses the practice of sustainability assurance as a tool to 
manage stakeholders expectations, and its organisational image, rather 
than as an instrument to operationalize accountability to their 
stakeholders. 
 
The question of whether corporate performance in social and 
environmental issues is enhanced via the practice of sustainability 
assurance, hence ensuring accountability to stakeholders, is clearly 
noticeable in the case of the company from the pharmaceutical sector. 
This company [C6] has reported information on the issue of access to 
medicines in poor nations, and conducted dialogues with stakeholders to 
discuss their main concerns. Further, in 2007, the assurance of the 
information related to this issue was conducted using a stakeholder 
centred approach, as it was based on the AA1000AS, and included the 
direct opinion of stakeholders. In the view of the assurance provider, the 
company was performing well in managing this issue. It appears that this 
company has been responsive (see Dando & Swift, 2003), as in 2009 one 
of its leaders promised to reduce its drug prices on all medicines in 
selected developing countries to no more than 25% of prices in developed 
countries (subject to manufacturing costs), and to invest 20% of expected 
 249 
 
profits in selected developing countries to expand health care systems90
 
. 
Outwardly then, it would appear that sustainability assurance has served 
its purpose of improving the social performance of this company and 
discharging accountability to stakeholders (Power, 1997/1999).   
However, this respondent admitted that through the practice of 
sustainability assurance her company [C6] could manage pressures from 
key activist groups concerning the critical issue of access to medicines in 
poor nations. In other words, the practice of sustainability assurance was 
used to manage the companys relationships with powerful stakeholders. 
Therefore, it might be that the motives behind the commissioning of 
sustainability assurance were unrelated to the need to be accountable to 
all relevant stakeholders. Further, the answerability and responsiveness 
of the company on this issue could also be questioned, as in 2009 the INGO 
HealthGap raised concerns, specifically that the discounted prices are still 
far too expensive for governments or poor consumers in developing 
countries to pay, and that the lower prices might be used as a company 
strategy to oppose the lawful issuance of compulsory licenses to 
medicines for chronic diseases. It seems that this company had 
responded to stakeholder demands and concerns on their own terms. In 
short, it appears that there is managerial opportunism to promote the 
                                                        
90 This information is available on company C6 website.  
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companys economic best interest (Swift, 2001:18)91
 
. That is, the company 
prioritizes economic performance over social performance.  
In sum, one is likely to discern that the practice of sustainability assurance 
corresponds to a managerial strategy designed to gain or expand 
legitimacy in some cases, or to repair lost legitimacy in others (Lindblom, 
2010). This situation evidences a high degree of managerial control over 
the assurance process itself. Power (1997/1999) claims that in society, 
the model of downward accountability prevails. Here, it is clear that 
these companies have discharged downward accountability, as their 
strategy has been to promote an image that they are committed to 
accountability by commissioning an assurance service which, in the 
majority of cases, does not lead to substantive change in their social and 
environmental performance. Hence, sustainability assurance does not 
encourage responsiveness, and therefore does not encourage true 
accountability (see Mulgan, 2000). 
 
A further issue to examine is whether the practice of sustainability 
assurance is being used as a greenwashing practice to repair corporate 
reputations and shape public image or corporate accountability. Laufer 
(2003:255) claims that the term greenwashing reflects an apprehension 
that some corporations use strategies to appear as leaders in issues of 
                                                        
91 Opportunism is defined as self-interest seeking with guile (Williamson, 1975; 
Williamson, 1985, cited in Swift, 2001:17) 
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concerns for society, when in practice, they are using legitimation 
strategies to manage their reputation with society at large.    
 
It appears that this is the case with company [C8] which, according to its 
assurance statements, is leading a fight against climate change, albeit that 
it has been impossible for them to reduce gas flaring in Nigeria (one of the 
most significant sources of greenhouse emissions). It seems that in this 
company the practice of sustainability assurance is used to give a facade of 
leadership in the sustainability area (Laufer, 2003). It might also be 
possible that the endorsement some of these companies show towards 
assurance standards such as the AA1000 might correspond to a strategy of 
securing reputational advantage (Laufer, 2003). However, with a small 
sample size, caution must be applied, as the findings might not be 
transferable to the rest of the FTSE100 companies.  
 
6.3.3 Sustainability assurance and the ideal of stakeholder-
centred accountability 
In general terms, there was awareness among respondents that 
stakeholders are detached from the sustainability assurance process.  For 
example, they acknowledged that stakeholders do not read assurance 
statements. Intriguingly, the majority of respondents expressed a desire to 
bring about their more active involvement (see Power, 1994b). Hence, one 
is likely to conclude that the aim of the business is to transfer control and 
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power to their stakeholders (see Cummings, 2001). However, a more 
detailed analysis of the data reveals a different predominant aim in 
current sustainability assurance practices.  
 
There was little consensus among respondents on how to bring 
stakeholders within the practice of sustainability assurance. Most of the 
respondents did not support the normative view of Adams and Evans 
(2004) that it is necessary to involve stakeholders in appointing the 
assurance provider. What is really surprising is that they were aware of 
the contradiction of preparing sustainability reports for stakeholders, 
whilst addressing assurance statements to the company itself.  However, 
they did not support the idea of addressing assurance statements to the 
stakeholders. Even company [C8], which has been recognized as a leader 
in the process of stakeholder engagement (Lawrence, 2002), was unable 
to support this idea.  It seems that companies in the UK are heavily 
influenced by the stockholder approach (Kaler, 2002). In other words, in 
terms of corporate governance, those running companies in the UK must 
not only report to shareholders but must also be answerable to them 
(Kaler, 2002). The views of these respondents reveal that companies have 
decided to be accountable on their own terms, through the voluntary 
commission of sustainability assurance, and by being answerable only to 
themselves or their shareholders.  In short, they engage in a form of soft 
accountability (Gray et al., 1997), so-called because stakeholders do not 
have real power to hold companies to account (see Swift, 2001 and 
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Cumming, 2001).  Further, in the words of Power, it is a form of 
downward accountability, where assurance becomes a dead end in the 
chain of accountability (Day and Klein, 1987 cited in Power, 
1997/1999:127). Moreover, one respondent explained that accountancy 
firms are a major obstacle to achieve true accountability (see Swift, 2001) 
to stakeholders. A possible explanation for this might lie in the insurance 
role that financial auditors play in financial assurance, whereby users of 
financial statements regard the audit firm as a potential source of financial 
recovery for any subsequent investments losses (Soltani, 2007: 53-54). In 
the same way, assurance providers are protecting themselves from being 
sued by stakeholders.  
 
Notwithstanding the above, most of the respondents supported Powers 
(1994b) view that through sustainability assurance the voices of 
stakeholders could be represented and heard. However, they did not state 
that their voices could be heard as a mechanism that is part of the 
corporate governance structure of the companies. In general, respondents 
were supportive towards diverse forms of the panel of evaluation. For 
example, a few respondents stated that they found the idea of stakeholder 
panel an interesting option. For them, the stakeholder panel represented a 
form of dialogue whereby stakeholders could provide an input as to what 
issues to report on, bring their view on the companies challenges and 
discuss issues they consider relevant, and provide a view on the 
sustainability report. Nevertheless, the respondent from company [C4] 
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considered this idea of stakeholder inclusion through stakeholder panel to 
be unsustainable. This respondent advocated setting panels of evaluation 
at project and local level, with local stakeholders, rather than at company 
level. However, this is not assurance per se, as such exercises do not 
evaluate environmental and social performance at company level. Other 
respondents, [C8, C10], were in favour of including experts rather than 
stakeholders in the panel of evaluation. For them, the critique and 
expertise of certain individuals on critical sustainability issues could 
provide more benefits for their companies.   
 
Now, the question here is, what is the nature of the stakeholder inclusion 
that companies support? None of the respondents referred to any form of 
panel of evaluation as a means to give control or delegate power to 
stakeholders (see also Cumming, 2001). In short, all the forms of panel of 
evaluation represent a soft form of accountability whereby transparency 
is encouraged and critiques are stimulated, but without empowering 
stakeholders to influence and produce substantive change (Power, 
1994b:27). Hence, the strategy of these companies has been to give a 
facade of the displacement of power from companies to stakeholders 
(Power, 2007b). As argued by Power (2000), in this way the public is 
persuaded that something has been done by someone. One is likely to 
discern that this perception of a panel of evaluation corresponds more to a 
strategic response to manage stakeholder expectations (Power, 2007b), 
rather than a true form of stakeholder-centred accountability.  
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6.3.4 The future of sustainability assurance 
In this section, it will be discussed the future prospects of the practice of 
sustainability assurance in the UK from the perspective of companies 
representatives.  
 
There is great uncertainty as to how the practice of sustainability 
assurance will develop in the future (see section 6.1.7). What is clear is 
that none of the respondents articulated the view that the practice of 
sustainability assurance in the UK should be regulated. This constitutes an 
essential problem since, according to Zadek et al. (2004:81), regulatory 
requirements are fundamental to support the development of the practice 
of sustainability assurance. Indeed, the legal accountability mechanism is 
confined to the part of the law which dictates enforcement procedures 
(Mulgan, 2000:564). Without this law enforcement, it is not possible to 
hold companies accountable.  A further problem is that without 
institutional rights of access to sustainability information, as is currently 
the case in the UK, there is no possibility that in the near future 
stakeholders could use sustainability assurance to hold corporations to 
account.   
 
For most of the respondents, the future of the practice of sustainability 
assurance will continue to be driven by the needs of companies to enhance 
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the credibility of reports and to improve management and reporting 
systems, rather than by societys need to see an improvement in the 
environmental and social performance of companies. In these 
circumstances, it seems probable that the added value from the assurance 
exercises will continue to be mainly for companies. Although some 
respondents claimed that there will be more stakeholder inclusion in 
reporting and sustainability assurance practices in the future, there is a 
great deal of uncertainty as to how this can be brought about. These 
respondents propose introducing panels of evaluation in the form of 
stakeholder panels or panels of credible experts.  There are two main 
problems here. First, given the difficulty in identifying suitable 
stakeholders representing diverse interests, it is questionable whether 
true stakeholder inclusivity can realistically be achieved. Second, it 
remains in doubt as to whether truly independent assurance can be 
achieved by a panel of experts (or individual experts); here the main 
concern is to establish clear rules whereby they could act on behalf of the 
interests of society, superseding the interest of the companies.  
 
A few respondents claimed that there is a need to develop a synergy 
between financial and sustainability assurance. If that were to happen, the 
accountancy profession would be favoured, as a number of interviewees 
noted they have the skills needed to perform data verification work. 
Indeed, most of the respondents perceived differences in the assurance 
approach adopted by different providers (Power, 1991). They perceived 
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specialized consultancy firms and certification bodies as having deep 
knowledge in specific areas, and providing assurance on the 
appropriateness of the data. Some respondents were in favour of using 
different assurance approaches to complement each other. However, if 
future sustainability assurance emphasizes data verification, as some 
respondents advocated, this could mean that accountancy firms will take a 
larger slice of the assurance market in the UK.  Power (2000) points out 
that the position of accountants in the economic and political life of the UK 
has been a decisive factor in the rise of auditing. If this is the case, 
accountants might have a leading role and strong influence in the future 
development of sustainability assurance practices in the UK. However, the 
future of accountants as assurance providers will only be resolved when 
there is an answer to the question posed by one respondent: Will the 
value they provide at the early stages of the maturity cycle continue as the 
company moves through the cycle? For the majority of respondents, it is 
clear that assurance providers must prove the value of their work. In this 
sense, it appears that the recent trend of using the AA1000 assurance 
standard in tandem with the ISAE3000 is a response from the accountancy 
profession to provide assurance services with more added value. 
 
Finally, there is also a possibility that sustainability assurance will fade 
out in the future. Some respondents argue that because of the high fees 
attached to sustainability assurance services, the practice is unsustainable 
unless limited assurance exercises become the rule. Another cynical voice, 
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the respondent from company [C6], argued that sustainability assurance 
has gone too far now and needs to be grounded in reality. However, the 
most interesting perspective came from the respondent from company 
[C9], which discontinued external assurance services some years ago. In 
her view, high assurance fees are not an impediment to commissioning 
sustainability assurance services. She claimed that the real issue is that, 
where internal audit systems operate correctly, assurance practices do not 
provide added value to the companies. She argued that a more valuable 
process is the engagement of stakeholders at different levels of the 
organisation.  This perception supports Powers (1994b:44) view that the 
internalization of stakeholders at different levels of the organisation may 
be information efficient to the extent that formal [assurance] would 
become redundant.   
 
6.4 CONCLUSION 
The description and analysis of the views of corporate managers can be 
summarized in three key points: 
(1)Companies are the drivers for commissioning sustainability assurance 
services.  
(2)Sustainability assurance is a means whereby companies manage 
expectations of powerful stakeholder groups. 
(3)Sustainability assurance fails to enhance stakeholder-centred 
accountability.  
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First, in a shareholder oriented country like the UK, the sustainability 
assurance agenda appears to be driven by companies. The real driving 
force of sustainability assurance is internal rather than external. The main 
factors driving the commission of sustainability assurance are: (1) the 
need to enhance trust, and credibility of reports and of company process 
(Power, 1996; 2007b), and to build corporate reputation; (2) the need to 
build, expand, or restore legitimacy with external constituencies (Power, 
2003a); (3) a desire to improve internal management systems, and 
reporting systems (Power, 1994b; 1996). Moreover, it is clear that the 
need to improve performance in environmental and social matters, and to 
be accountable to stakeholders, has been neglected (see Power, 
1997/1999). In short, in reality, sustainability assurance provides major 
benefits mainly for companies. These findings evidence a high degree of 
managerial control over the assurance process itself (see also Ball et al., 
2000; ODwyer & Owen, 2005; Jones & Solomon, 2010; Edgley et al., 
2010).  
 
Second, there is evidence that companies use the practice of sustainability 
assurance to manage expectations of powerful stakeholder groups in 
order to serve their economic interests, hence providing support for the 
managerial branch of stakeholder theory. The strategy of these companies 
has been to listen to the issues raised by social and environmental activist 
groups, and then to refer to these concerns within the assurance process, 
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without clearly indicating strategies for solutions. In most cases, solutions 
presented by companies mainly serve their economic interests and secure 
the sustainable development of the business. In short, there is a high 
degree of stakeholder management through the practice of sustainability 
assurance (see also ODwyer & Owen, 2005; Edgley et al., 2010). In these 
conditions, the assurance process does not promote substantive change, 
and probably only aims at bringing enquiries to an end (Power, 
1997/1999).  
 
Third, the core meaning of accountability requires that companies justify 
their decisions and accept responsibility for these choices and their 
results (Soltani, 2007), and offer redress. However, the absence of 
regulatory enforcement with regard to social and environmental 
matters92
                                                        
92 Soltani (2007:79) claims that although the current system of accountability places 
strong emphasis on financial statements and associated elements, in order to determine 
the performance of companies it is necessary to consider other factors, such as social and 
environmental matters. 
 evidences the need to promote direct civic dialogue within the 
practice of sustainability assurance (Power, 1994b). None of the 
respondents in this study argued for giving control or delegating power to 
stakeholders through the practice of sustainability assurance (see also 
Cumming, 2001). In these circumstances, stakeholders are unable to 
demand substantive change. Hence, it is clear that these companies have 
discharged downward accountability (Power, 1997/1999), as their 
strategy has been to promote an image that they are committed to 
accountability by commissioning an assurance process which, in the 
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majority of cases, does not lead to substantive change in their social and 
environmental performance. 
 
Next chapter will examine the views of representatives of stakeholders 
groups. 
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7 CHAPTER SEVEN: STAKEHOLDERS 
PERSPECTIVES ON SUSTAINABILITY ASSURANCE 
 
This chapter has two aims: 
(1) To illustrate the views of representatives of stakeholder groups on 
emerging issues in sustainability assurance exercises in the United 
Kingdom;  
 (2) To discuss and interpret the interview results across several emerging 
issues using the lens of Michael Powers theory and stakeholder theory. 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Stakeholders are a critical constituency of sustainability assurance 
exercises; however, findings from chapter five show that direct 
participation of stakeholders in sustainability assurance in the UK remains 
minimal. Moreover, results from chapter six evidence that stakeholders 
are detached from the practice of sustainability assurance. Far too little 
attention has been paid in previous research to stakeholders and their 
views on the phenomenon of sustainability assurance. This chapter 
reports the empirical results of semi-structured interviews with 
representatives of stakeholder groups. It explores stakeholders 
perspectives on the sustainability assurance phenomenon, based on their 
responses to questions in the interview schedule (see appendix 3). The 
chapter includes a discussion and interpretation of the empirical results 
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across several emerging issues, using the lens of Michael Powers theory 
and stakeholder theory as conceptualized in chapter 3 (section 3. 3).  
 
This chapter is structured as follows: First, it presents empirical results in 
the form of (1) an examination of views on the added value of 
sustainability assurance exercises, (2) an analysis of concerns regarding 
current sustainability assurance practices, (3) interviewees views on the 
role of stakeholders in the assurance process, (4) their views on the future 
direction for sustainability assurance, and (5) a summary of empirical 
findings. Second, it presents a discussion and analysis of the empirical 
results by examining the following aspects: (1) sustainability assurance 
and the expectation gap, (2) sustainability assurance and the ideal of 
stakeholder-centred accountability, and (3) the future of sustainability 
assurance. Finally, it draws conclusions from the discussions. 
 
7.2 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
This section draws upon the work of Owen et al. (2009:23-28), who 
present an overview of the perspectives of representatives of stakeholder 
groups on emerging issues in sustainability assurance exercises in the 
United Kingdom.  
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7.2.1 Does sustainability assurance add value? 
As interviewees came from a diverse range of civil society sectors, it was 
not surprising that they evidenced very mixed views on whether or not 
sustainability assurance adds value. Whilst INGO sector representatives 
believed that sustainability assurance is a useful exercise, and were 
generally supportive towards it, the trade union official and three 
representatives of the investment community adopted an essentially 
negative stance.  
 
The perception of the INGO sector representatives was that sustainability 
assurance adds value, both for users of the reports, and for the company 
itself:  
I think the purpose of assurance is to, primarily from an external perspective, help 
the external stakeholders to know that the report is transparent, covers issues it 
needs to cover, is accurate.  I think theres also an equal weight of importance for 
the internal stakeholders, the management of the company, to be able to know that 
what theyre doing is acceptable or is right or good enough.  I think assurance in a 
sustainability report can be a very useful way for a company or an organisation as 
a whole to get some kind of feedback and assurance about its activities, not just 
how it reports on those activities. [S6] 
 
The majority of these interviewees echoed the views of the company 
representatives, stating that sustainability assurance adds credibility to 
the reporting process: 
It provides the person who is interested in the company, whether it is the consumer 
or the watchdog or the shareholder, [with] reassurance and confidence that what 
the company is actually saying is true and is the case and is the facts.  [S7] 
 265 
 
I think it gives you some sense that the company is serious about the issue and is 
dealing with it seriously.  [S5] 
[It reassures] the users of sustainability reports about the contents and veracity of 
these reports, that they are reasonably complete,  fairly presented, and accurate 
where there are figures and so on. [S4]   
 
They also believed that, in the long term, sustainability assurance 
improves reporting practices: 
I think that assurance statements over a period of years result in better, and 
ultimately different, sustainability reports.  In other words, if you know that no one 
is ever going to check what you write in your report, by the time youre a few years 
down the line, your report might look quite different to how it would look if you 
know somebody is going to be checking up and reporting on whether its being 
done properly. [S4] 
 
Two interviewees [S4, S5] also noted that sustainability assurance might 
play a role in improving companies performance:  
In the short term, these assurance statements provide some additional assurance to 
the readers, and in the process of doing that, they should provide some feedback to 
the company about how they can improve.  [S4] 
The whole purpose of assurance is to make a company change and progress year 
on year. [S5] 
 
A totally contrary view was offered by representatives of the investment 
sector, together with the trade union official. They adopted a negative 
attitude towards sustainability assurance. 
 
Representatives from the investment sector argued that sustainability 
assurance was irrelevant in the context of their own investment decision-
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making needs; however, they acknowledged that sustainability assurance 
might be useful for other stakeholder groups: 
Do we look at assurance statements?  The answer is not really.  Do we have a huge 
interest in them? Not really. The main reason is that the issues are not that 
important from an investment point of view. Those issues that are important you 
would generally find appearing in the annual report where they will be audited 
and signed off by the auditor. [S1]  
Frankly, on the sustainability side we dont [look at assurance statements]; its not 
really an issue that weve paid much attention to.  Our view, essentially, is that 
what we want companies to do is to have as free a hand as possible to report about 
the issues theyre facing without having too much oversight by advisors in 
whatever form, whether they be the lawyers or the auditing firms. [S2]  
I would say its potentially a small bonus point if there is an assurance statement 
there, but its certainly not a negative point if its not. If assurance is there company 
management obviously want people to understand that they are taking it seriously, 
that they are happy for external verification, that they have sought quality 
assurance on the information that theyve put in the report, that they wish for a 
level of credibility with that assurance and theyre keen for transparency.  But that 
doesnt necessarily mean that what theyre saying is of use to us in our role as SRI 
analyst. [S3] 
 
For these interviewees the main reason behind this negative stance was 
that, in their view, the work of institutional investors is superior to what 
sustainability assurance practices produce. They stated that institutional 
investors are in the privileged position of enjoying easy access to senior 
corporate executives, so that published corporate sustainability reports 
represent only a starting point for discussion:  
Clearly, if theres an issue of concern we would hope its been covered to some 
extent in the report; we can then build from that understanding of where the issues 
are to take the discussion forward.  It is a very helpful foundation to have some 
information so that we can have a more productive conversation. But the 
disclosures will never substitute for that conversation, because the value and 
interest definitely comes from the discussion that we can have.  [S2] 
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Furthermore, these direct discussions between investors and companies 
gave rise to a situation in which investors perceived that they were doing 
assurance themselves:  
Im not sure that we see a significant role for an assurance process because, in a 
sense, were doing assurance ourselves.  [S2] 
Ultimately, you want to interrogate that data; we can just phone up, we say: Look, 
can you get the person who covers this area or is responsible for it? [We want you 
to] come and talk to us and explain what youre doing and explain your strategy. 
[S1]  
 
As interviewee [S3] argued, her job as institutional investor exceeds the 
work of assurance providers as it leads to an evaluation of financial 
performance and the influence of social and environmental issues on it:  
Were looking at silent content and saying: What isnt there, and how does this 
influence the companys financial performance?  Is it impacting on sales? Is it 
impacting on asset value? So in our analysis, we just go way beyond what 
assurance looks for.  
 
The position adopted by the investment community representatives was 
that sustainability assurance does not add value in the context of their 
own work needs.  
 
In a similar vein, the trade union official adopted a very critical position 
towards the added value of current sustainability assurance practices. For 
him:  
Im not so sure that assurance means anything, in the sense that there is no 
guarantee as to what it means. If I see a letter in a sustainability report from a 
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large company related to an accountancy firm or some other large kind of CSR 
enterprise, this means nothing to me. [S8] 
 
In sum, it is clear that there is a difference of opinion as to whether or not 
sustainability assurance adds value. It would be fair to state here that no 
one expressed categorical approval of current sustainability assurance 
practices. It is significant that representatives from the investment 
community evidenced a negative stance as, according to two interviewees 
from the INGO sector [S5, S6], this is the stakeholder group which could 
potentially have a leading role in the development of assurance and 
sustainability reporting.   
 
7.2.2 Stakeholders concerns regarding sustainability 
assurance practices 
All the interviewees were aware of problems in current sustainability 
assurance practices.  
Albeit that the views of INGO representatives revealed a supportive 
position towards sustainability assurance, their opinion also manifested 
scepticism. For example, interviewee [S7] argued that whereas 
sustainability assurance provides meaning to the reporting process, 
quality of reporting influences the quality of assurance:  
However, if reports dont have clear, useful information in them from the start, and 
the way theyre structured isnt useful, then to some extent it doesnt matter how 
good the assurance is, its irrelevant.  So theyre both dependent on each other.  
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For her, a more important challenge was to provide assurance on real time 
information: 
I think with the whole assurance process, by the time the information is produced, 
its often irrelevant.  The data is 18 months old and it only gives the information 
that people on the ground already knew, not the information that they need.  So in 
terms of serving the information needs and transparency needs of communities, Im 
not convinced that assurance serves their primary interest in the most effective 
way. [S7] 
 
She also argued that there was a need for sustainability assurance to focus 
on examining companies policies in action and the associated impacts, 
rather than the policies on paper: 
Often some of the assessments Ive seen have been based on the companys policies, 
but not necessarily [on] the companys practices.  I think often companies 
environmental and human rights policies are very good but theyre not being 
practiced on the ground.  I think this is the main challenge, that assurance 
obviously needs to happen on the ground, to see policies in action, not just whats 
written on paper.  [S7] 
 
This was a view that attracted fairly general support from representatives 
of the INGO sector. As another interviewee put it: 
The whole assurance process isnt just to do with producing a report at the end of 
the year. Its how an organisation conducts its activities through the year and how 
it plans and finds out what issues are relevant to it. I think its more than reporting. 
[S6] 
 
Intriguingly, INGO sector representatives also manifested more radical 
views as to the value of reporting and the associated sustainability 
assurance exercise (see also Zadek et al., 2006). 
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For example, interviewee [S5] commented that: I think theres quite a high 
degree of cynicism around corporate responsibility reports and a general feeling that its 
become an industry of itself. She went on to note that: 
I think probably the state of assurance has improved because theres been a lot of 
focus on it, a lot of thinking gone into it.  My perception is that weve got to reach a 
balance in terms of how much you put into that and how much you put into the 
companies actually doing things to improve their overall responsibility.  
 
Similarly, interviewee [S6] noted that: I dont actually believe that many people 
read these reports. However, for him, a more fundamental problem lies in the 
way sustainability reporting has developed, which in his opinion follows 
the financial model too closely and therefore represents a missed 
opportunity for engaging stakeholder interests. He also pointed out that 
(see also Zadek et al., 2006): 
The trouble is theres too much emphasis on what I call number crunching 
assurance at the moment.  Whereas I think, the really important part about the 
assurance is whether or not the organisation is covering the right issues in its 
reporting, and I dont believe that assurance is really doing that. [S6] 
 
For another interviewee, the problem was much deeper, in that assurance 
providers were:  
trying to give assurance on a report which is almost certainly not doing what it 
says on the tin, in terms of really reporting on sustainability. [S4]  
 
Further, this interviewee [S4] expressed concerns, in common with the 
views of company representatives, on the quality of the assurance 
statements produced by assurance providers: 
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Now, of course I understand the problem. The problem is liability and the big 
accounting firms being accountable and being sued because of statements in the 
report.  And this has resulted in very bland reporting by these accountants who are 
reporting to management or something and then the smaller guys will produce 
more general reports because they think well, if were sued well go bust and no 
ones going to bother because we havent got much money.  I recognize the 
problem but I wish we could find some way through it. 
 
Similarly, interviewees from the investment sector expressed more 
fundamental reservations over current sustainability reporting and 
associated assurance practices. For example, interviewee [S2] noted that 
sustainability reporting attempts to satisfy too many different stakeholder 
interests; he called for fewer sustainability reports to be produced and for 
companies to decide on the relevant issues to be integrated into 
mainstream reporting through business reviews published within the 
financial statement:  
We would rather see fewer sustainability reports, and the relevant aspects of that 
integrated into business reviews. Our position on the business review has always 
been that it needs to be communication directly from the board to the 
shareholders.  Clearly, if youve got issues in the business review, you have the 
auditors oversight of the business review.  
 
For this interviewee, such integration would lead to sustainability 
assurance becoming a natural part of the normal auditing role. 
 
A different perspective was offered by interviewee [S1], who emphasized 
the need for more reporting and associated assurance, focusing on data 
assurance rather than on the narratives: 
 272 
 
I mean, trying to compare company performance even on things like gas emissions 
is very difficult because of [the] lack of clarity around what companies report.  
Companies have an interest in presenting [the information] in a way that best suits 
their purpose; therefore, it is more difficult for the assurors on data to get it right. 
As investors, were interested in data points, not in the narratives.  The problem is 
that the data points in the main arent good.   
 
For this interviewee, this issue gave rise to a further concern: 
Data assurance requires technical skills that I think the big four accountants 
probably dont have.  Most of the big consultants in this area are general service 
providers focusing on auditing and reporting. Actually, very few of them have 
people whom I consider credible or competent in relation to data analysis and even 
data uncertainty.  [S1]  
 
Interestingly, similar concerns over the credibility of those currently 
providing assurance services were expressed by the trade union official 
(see also Zadek et al., 2006):   
I dont think assurance providers are providing anything that is universally 
recognized; I dont think that there is an agreement as to what the rules of 
assurance should be.  Now, I realize that assurance providers say, Oh yes, we have 
this thing here and this thing there, but I dont think that theyre entirely credible 
....its not the same thing as financial reporting at this stage, there is nobody that I 
would consider legitimate to set these rules.... I realize there are several bodies that 
do set rules but I dont think that theyre entirely credible.  So you have a sort of 
upstart industry that is looking for credibility but I dont think that it has it right 
because of the nature of what theyre doing, which is in the environmental and 
social areas.  There are forms of expertise that they dont have... and they want to 
say well yes, were experts in this and in fact theyre not.  And so I think that 
theres a problem there and I dont see it being solved right away. [S8]  
 
He gave as an example the area of labour, in which he doubted assurance 
providers were able to provide a meaningful attestation:  
There is a lot of reason, at least in the labour area, to doubt the ability of assurance 
providers to attest to anything.  To the extent that they have addressed these issues, 
I dont think they have the competency and theyve demonstrated that.... so Im not 
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particularly impressed by that. I wouldnt want to say for environmental subjects 
or consumer issues or something like that, I wouldnt feel very comfortable.  But 
with the labour area, I think that you can challenge the competency of assurance 
providers. [S8] 
 
His views extended to the added value of assurance statements:  
Some of the companies offering assurance services say in the statements: Yes, but 
this doesnt mean anything. It says so in the statement itself.  I think that its 
misleading. Assurance statements are supposed to inspire confidence.  But Im not 
sure they inspire confidence at all.  [S8] 
 
His critiques also addressed more fundamental issues of current 
sustainability assurance practices. First, he argued that sustainability 
assurance does not lead to changes in company practices, making specific 
reference to his experiences with supply chain auditing: 
Even after close to 15 years of this supply chain code of conduct, there hasnt been a 
significant impact in most of the industries, like textile and garment, athletic 
footwear, toys, basic agriculture.  There hasnt been a lot of change in working 
conditions.   Theres a recognition that the system of professional auditors is not 
working.  Theres a very large industry of professional workplace auditors that go 
in and report; theres a lot of evidence that the auditors arent discovering the 
conditions.  The companies falsify the records, the workers are coached, the 
professional auditing companies are themselves falsifying their audits and dont 
make a lot of effort to get at the truth.  So its not a system that works, and its a 
widespread system, and theres lots of companies, lots of money, lots of activity, and 
almost no credibility. [S8] 
 
Second, he questioned the institutional legitimacy of the assurance 
process itself. He expressed reservations over the legitimacy of the 
institutions setting the sustainability assurance standards and rules:  
I think that if you do standard setting you have to base it on certain kinds of 
criteria.  If youre talking about one kind of standard, the answer is going to be 
expertise, and if you talk about other kinds of standards its going to be 
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representation, meaning that [in the first case] you just need to get the people with 
the specialized knowledge in the room, and in other cases you have to make sure 
the interests are adequately and fairly represented.  And, I think its more the 
representative issue than it is the expertise issue. I dont think that AccountAbility 
has that ... they have mainly the people who want to make money from this stuff. I 
dont think they have the process right either. [S8] 
 
He also argued that particular interests, mainly from the accounting 
profession, influence the development of reporting and associated 
assurance practices: 
Im very worried that too much of this is being funded by the accounting industry, 
in the sense of organisations like AccountAbility, a lot of conferences, a lot of books.  
And the debate might be loaded; its not a genuine debate because the questions 
are all going in a certain way, they pre-suppose certain things.  I would be much 
more interested in some discussions amongst stakeholders as to what it would take 
to increase the credibility of these reports, where we didnt have to automatically 
think that it was professional assurance sellers that were going to increase the 
credibility. [S8] 
 
He critiqued the role of the assurance provider as go-between or 
mediating institution between the report preparers and report users: 
And the thing that bothers me is that the go-between says, weve looked at this and 
its alright, we want you to know its alright.  Well, maybe that becomes a way of 
making things less transparent ... and I dont think these assurance providers are 
sufficiently independent that theyre in a position to perform that kind of role 
where they could say dont worry, weve looked and the facts are true.  [S8] 
 
In sum, it is clear that the INGO representatives supported assurance as a 
component of the overall sustainability reporting package; however, they 
expressed important doubts over the usefulness of reporting (see also 
Zadek et al., 2006).  It is also clear that the investment representatives 
adopted a negative stance towards sustainability assurance, probably as a 
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result of their reservations over current assurance practices. The trade 
union official had a sceptical perspective, and provided a very detailed 
critique of current assurance exercises. 
 
7.2.3 Towards a more stakeholder-centric assurance practice 
In contrast to the views of the companies representatives, the majority of 
stakeholder interviewees - all four INGO representatives, the trade union 
official and one of the investors [S3] - expressed a desire to see 
sustainability assurance statements addressed to the stakeholders rather 
than to the company management. One investor representative noted:  
I think it should be addressed to the stakeholder rather than the company 
management; stakeholders would want to see statements addressed to them, yes.  
[S3] 
 
An interviewee from the INGO sector put it in forthright terms: 
Sustainability reports are addressed to society, in fact some of them are even called 
reports to society; I mean, these reports are absolutely for the public, they are not 
for the directors.  If theyre just for the directors, why make them public? These 
reports are for the public space, and all the people who are interested in them and 
want to know whether they are reliable.  Therefore, I believe that the assurance 
statement should be addressed to the readers of the report, whoever they are. 
Sustainability reporting really is for society at large, not just managers or directors 
of the company. So, I think that is an issue. [S4] 
 
The trade union official argued that this was an essential element of 
sustainability assurance practice: 
Yes, it should be to the stakeholders, it should be to the readers of the report. I 
think, though, that theres probably a liability issue there and thats why it has 
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developed in a different way. But I think the purpose of assurance should not be to 
assure the management that theyve prepared their report correctly; it should be to 
the readers to say that the report has been prepared correctly.  So yes, it should be 
to the users of the report, for whatever purpose theyre using it for. [S8] 
 
Whilst interviewees acknowledged the concerns that assurance providers 
have with contractual and liability issues, there was a clear belief that 
something needs to be done. As one interviewee claimed: 
I think this is a hangover from the accounting profession, where the auditors 
statement or the financial statement is addressed to the company.  And lots of legal 
battles have taken place to ensure that it stays that way, which may work for the 
financial side of things, but for sustainability it definitely doesnt ... its trying to 
take one model that works in one area and to [apply it in] another area.  I do think 
that the assurance statement should be addressed to wider stakeholders. [S6] 
 
Nevertheless, one interviewee from the INGO sector identified a major 
obstacle to bringing about this desired change: 
Its very difficult, because its almost as if this whole assurance issue is the product 
of a much broader and fundamental problem with company law and how 
corporations function generally.  To say that the assurance should be addressed to 
stakeholders seems to go in the opposite direction to all other obligations that a 
company has and how a company is formulated in law.  And the [name of a 
coalition of INGOs] believes that, of course, the assurance statements, and the 
reporting of a companys activities should all be focused on stakeholders, not just 
the company itself.  But thats not how company law has been developed, and its 
not the direction its going. [S7]  
 
In contrast with their support for the principle that assurance statements 
should be addressed to the stakeholders, most of these interviewees 
manifested little interest in the idea of stakeholders appointing assurance 
providers or determining the scope of the assurance exercise. The reasons 
for this negative stance were resource constraints (in terms of time and 
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finance), and the fact that stakeholders lack knowledge of the particular 
attributes of different assurance providers, and the full range of key 
sustainability issues facing companies. 
 
As one interviewee pointed out:  
I think it would be good practice to get feedback from stakeholders: Did they find it 
helpful and credible? Did they have any views on it? I mean, stakeholders could say 
whether they liked it or approved of the sustainability report and whether they 
were happy with the work and report of the assurance provider.   But I dont think 
a lot of the stakeholders would have much confidence in selecting the assurance 
provider we all know in practice the directors select that. [S4]93
 
   
This interviewee also argued that stakeholder engagement militates 
against the need for standardization of the assurance practice:  
It seems to me the bigger question about strategy is, how do we move towards 
more standardization? I think that militates, unfortunately perhaps, against too 
much bespoke involvement of stakeholders in the design of the engagement.  
Otherwise, for every company thats got this engagement between its stakeholders 
and the assurance providers, it [the assurance process] ends up completely 
different and theres no comparability from one to another. [S4] 
 
These interviewees were opposed to direct stakeholder participation in 
crucial steps of the assurance exercise such as the appointment of the 
assurance provider or the definition of the scope of the assurance 
exercise. However, there was consensus between the trade union official 
and the representatives of the INGO sector on the need for enhanced 
stakeholder involvement within the assurance process (see also Zadek et 
                                                        
93 A similar opinion regarding this issue was expressed by the representative of company 
C7. 
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al., 2006:44). This view was expressed in a forthright manner by one of 
the INGO representatives:   
I think that reporting and assurance should be devised for the stakeholder, by the 
stakeholder, and therefore all stakeholders should provide the leadership direction 
and development of reporting and assurance standards.  Theres no point in doing 
a report and audit without stakeholders, because thats your target audience, 
thats whos providing you with your data and thats who the data is for. So I dont 
see any way round that. [S7] 
 
Many of the interviewees expressed interest in the establishment of 
panels of evaluation. However, there were different views as to how such 
panels could be constituted, and the functions they might perform.   
 
For example, two representatives of the investment community [S1, S2] 
favoured the model of panel of experts. For them, this kind of panel could 
provide views and commentary on strategic key issues facing the 
companies, whilst operating independently from any associated external 
assurance process:   
Thats the interesting model, and it leads to questions about the disconnect 
between what the company is, or isnt, saying, and the strategic issues being raised 
by the experts. [S1] 
Any sort of external input and thinking on these big and fairly intangible, hard-to-
pin-down issues, is a good thing because no one person has all the right answers. 
[S2] 
 
However, one of these interviewees [S1], together with one representative 
from the INGO sector, acknowledged that the panel of experts approach is 
not equivalent to a form of methodical assurance:  
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I mean, its more like a commentary rather than an assurance out every year. [S1] 
 
They have some serious critiques to make.  And I think thats an interesting insight.  
I think though its more a commentary on the report than an assurance statement.  
It provides some assurance generally but not very systematically.  [S4] 
 
Conversely, the majority of the INGO sector interviewees viewed panels of 
stakeholders as a mechanism to facilitate stakeholder inclusion in 
sustainability assurance exercises. Interviewee [S4] noted that there were 
advantages in following these stakeholder-centred approaches in 
assurance: 
I think it often makes the reports clearly accessible and indeed some companies do 
actually do that.  [S4] 
 
Most of the interviewees from the INGO sector argued that the 
engagement of stakeholders representing civil society is a fundamental 
aspect to be considered at every step of sustainability assurance. As 
interviewee [S7] noted: Stakeholder engagement is a number one priority; [it must 
be] a theme running through all the necessary steps for effective assurance. For her, 
civil society groups have an essential role to play in panels [of evaluation]. The need to 
include the views of stakeholders by using panels of evaluation 
throughout the whole assurance process was highlighted by interviewee 
[S6]:  
And I think stakeholder panels are a way ... not for somebody to come along at the 
end of the process and put a stamp on the reporting, saying, yes thats fine, but to 
be involved during the year in helping the organisation to understand and to test 
the issues that are relevant.  
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Indeed, one interviewee, who was a member of a stakeholder panel, 
expressed frustration about being involved only at the end of the 
reporting process:  
When you come into the assurance process as a [member of a] stakeholder panel, 
the company usually brings you in at the point when they have a draft of the report 
already.  So, you dont know whats incomplete because youve not followed the 
complete activity throughout the whole year. [S5] 
 
She went on to suggest that: 
If youre a stakeholder, if youre going to be on a stakeholder panel, I think the 
company needs to bring you in quite early on in its journey in that its that year of 
reporting where you gain an understanding of the company and the way it really 
deals with issues.  So that by the time you get to the report, and assuring the report, 
you can actually talk materially about whether you think the report reflects what 
the company have done over the year.  [S5] 
 
These interviewees viewed stakeholder panels as an integral part of the 
assurance process. Nevertheless, most of the interviewees were aware of 
the practical difficulties in ensuring that panels fully represent critical 
stakeholder interests: 
But stakeholder is obviously a very general term, and if you want to break it down 
into its constituent parts then it gets complicated, then it gets difficult. Who are the 
stakeholders and who do you give more attention to than others? [S7] 
 
For interviewee [S7] the key challenge was to deal with the diverse nature 
of stakeholders interests: 
In terms of stakeholder engagement, its essential that stakeholders are effective 
elements, and that they are appropriate stakeholders. How you identify who are 
effective and appropriate stakeholders I would imagine is a significant challenge 
for business and for assurance purposes generally.  
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Indeed, this was an issue that interviewee [S5], who was a member of one 
of these stakeholder panels, had addressed to the company that selected 
her: 
I raised this issue right at the beginning. I said I dont feel comfortable 
representing the whole of civil society on this process. My particular knowledge 
and my organisations knowledge is of labour issues, so I cannot feel that I can give 
you  insights on the climate change issue as an environmental NGO would give you.  
 
For her, it was important that stakeholders are selected according to their 
understanding of key issues, so that they could A, ask the right questions, and B, 
see whether the company has really progressed.  
 
An additional problem, this interviewee [S5] argued, was the risk that 
companies would look to big brand INGOs for panel members and that 
small local groups, particularly in developing countries, would be ignored.  
 
The problem of resource constraints was noted by the trade union official 
and by several interviewees from the INGO sector. Interviewee [S7] 
pointed out:  
Most INGOs dont want to be doing assurance, you know.  We dont have enough 
money or resources or capacity to be assuring that companies are doing what they 
say theyre doing; there need to be proper procedures in place within companies 
internally, and independent bodies who are paid to do that, like a lot of good 
assurance companies do.  
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The trade union official claimed that I would be more inclined to think the 
stakeholder panel might be better at this stage; however, he argued that resource 
constraints create a situation in which the model of stakeholder panel will 
become unsustainable: 
I dont think that stakeholder panels are going to be sustainable in the sense that if 
you have a very large number of companies issuing sustainability reports, there 
wont be enough stakeholders to go around to fulfil stakeholder panels and to do 
other kinds of stakeholder involvement.  Its just not going to be possible. [S8] 
 
This issue of stakeholder fatigue was also raised by interviewee [S6], who 
stressed that: 
All INGOs have a mission to fulfil. They are working pretty hard to fulfil that 
mission, and time spent doing other things which may not be directly obviously 
relevant to the core mission, if you dont have time you just dont do that.  So it may 
be that.... people dont see this [the assurance process] as being deeply relevant to 
their activities.  
 
For interviewee [S5], resources constraints lead inevitably to a situation in 
which the assurance process has to be driven by the companies.   
I mean, if you think that a company spends a good 12 months writing its report for 
the next year, I dont think NGOs have that kind of resource.  And I think the process 
still needs to be driven by the company.   
 
Interviewees also spoke about the problem of compromising 
independence. For example, interviewees [S6] and [S7] argued that:  
[One has to be careful about] not getting compromised, or co-opted, because 
organisations which are very much campaigning ones [might see] getting involved 
with an organisation they might be campaigning against as compromising their 
independence, and so might not want to get involved. [S6] 
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You see, most civil society groups who, I think, want to force [name of a company] 
to do better, would be completely cynical about getting involved in any kind of 
stakeholder panel.  You have to have a certain amount of sympathy for [name of a 
company] in order to take part in a panel.  I guess thats just one of the many 
challenges with them. [S7]  
 
In the case that most prominent and radical civil society groups would 
avoid involvement in stakeholder panels, the whole sustainability 
assurance exercise would be at risk of losing credibility. The trade union 
official noted:    
You have the problem of running out of genuine stakeholders.  Not all of the NGOs 
are credible, some are and some arent; but, youre going to run out of the credible 
ones very quickly.  And then the companies will buy in their own NGOs, because 
they will support NGOs in order to enable them to perform this role. [S8] 
 
In these conditions, stakeholder panels would be unable to operate as 
authentic independent voices. Worryingly, he went on to suggest: 
I think that this is somewhat of a problem already in some of the stakeholder 
panels, and I think that if this practice were to expand a lot it would become a lot 
worse. I mean, its not a good system at the end of the day.  [S8] 
 
Indeed, the issue of managerial control over stakeholder groups was also 
raised by interviewee [S5], who claimed that she had faced it as a member 
of a stakeholder panel: 
It felt like they didnt [take account of] our thinking; they just said: this is what 
youre supposed to look at, heres something you should need to think about, these 
are some of the questions that you might want to ask when you decide on writing 
your own statement.  
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In sum, interviewees expressed diverse views on how stakeholders could 
contribute to the assurance process. For representatives from the 
investment community, the panel of experts was the best option, whilst 
the trade union official, together with representatives from INGOs, 
favoured stakeholder representation via stakeholder panels. 
 
7.2.4 Towards a more relevant sustainability assurance 
practice 
Views on how sustainability assurance will evolve in the future were also 
quite diverse.  
 
Interviewees from the investment sector argued that in order to develop 
assurance practice, an improvement in quantitative data assurance would 
be essential; they also suggested that a closer alignment between 
sustainability assurance and financial auditing would be desirable. 
However, only one interviewee [S1] envisaged a role for the internal audit 
function in the assurance process: 
Its not necessarily that all of this data assurance has to be done by external third 
parties; its also that you do monitoring and measuring of the business anyway. The 
issue is, how do you build assurance into that process?  Because, then, the external 
assuror can come in and check your process and just maybe have to do less 
checking.  
 
Another interviewee [S3] argued that there is a need for standardization 
(see also Zadek et al., 2006): 
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If assurance is to grow, it has to become standardized. It would save us a lot of 
problems in some ways; wed be able to compare across companies, across their 
CSR programmes.  A lot of the preliminary work which we do would be done for us; 
that initial work of assessing the CSR report would be done.  
 
The same interviewee stressed the need for the assurance exercise to 
focus on examining companies performance: 
I would value more having someone else go in and say yes, this methodology is 
consistent with last years, the previous years and the year before, and somebody 
evaluating that performance data are consistent and based on the same 
assumptions.  [S3] 
 
These interviewees evidenced little support for stakeholder-centred 
assurance approaches such as that promoted by the AA1000AS. Attitudes 
ranged from direct hostility to indifference. For example, interviewee [S2] 
said that the AA1000AS was redundant and did not help users of 
information.  He went on to note that: 
I do worry that there has been this build up of a big governance structure around 
all of this without anybody asking: Does this really help the consumers of this 
information? Because in practice I really cant see how it does.  
 
Interviewee [S1] added: 
Does the AA1000AS assurance approach give us any more or less confidence in 
reporting?  The answer is no. From our investment perspective, it isnt relevant. But 
it does not mean that a company shouldnt do it.  
 
The overall view of these interviewees regarding the AA1000AS is best 
captured by the following statement: 
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I think the AA1000AS approach is an interesting approach and in principle, 
accountability is a great thing.  But in reality, I question whether the consultation 
approaches really do create any sense of accountability to stakeholders.  I think, in 
reality, a small proportion of stakeholders are actually consulted and that the 
result from that consultation may not be hugely representative and may not be 
very useful.   I question whether the company is really accountable to the 
information that it gets back and really acts on that information.  So, for me 
personally, as an SRI analyst, the integrity of the data is more important than 
whether or not a company have gone out and done a stakeholder consultation. [S3] 
 
In contrast with the views of representatives of the investment 
community, interviewees from the INGO sector noted that the key 
challenge to develop sustainability assurance practice is to promote 
stakeholder-centred assurance exercises with added value. Interviewee 
[S5] commented: 
Is it really going to add value to a report? It cant just be for the sake of stakeholder 
engagement.  If youre going to make reporting valuable, it is going to: A, mark the 
companys progress for the next year: youve got to actually say okay, this is where 
we got up to in 2008, we know that these were the challenges so this is what were 
going to do in 2009;  B, that it gives a real insight into how the company has dealt 
with its responsibilities. Then, theres a value, and therefore progress on the part of 
the assurance process. 
 
Two interviewees [S5, S6], in common with some of the company 
representatives, noted that sustainability assurance goes through a cycle 
of maturity, and emphasized that companies are at the initial stage of this 
cycle:  
I would put it at the teenager stage; its not yet assurance, so you still need a 
certain amount of manoeuvre. [S5] 
I think that its an evolution process, so you need these steps [data assurance] to 
happen before you can do the other stuff [focusing on the right issues, and 
performance], but I think too much effort is now being focused on this sort of stuff 
[data verification].  [S6] 
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For interviewee [S6], in order to gain added value it would be necessary to 
move to another stage of the assurance maturity cycle, where the 
emphasis would be on evaluating whether the report covered key issues.  
 
Interviewees referred to the AA1000AS in generally favourable terms; 
however, the views expressed were not enthusiastic: 
I think theyre fine, but ...  They probably do their best in terms of being able to 
match quite a subjective area with technical standards. [S5] 
 
This interviewee went on to note that: 
I think you still need more room to be able to say, well really these standards are 
what we need in order to move the company forward in their activities. [S5] 
 
In contrast with the apathetic attitude adopted by representatives from 
the investment community, one INGO sector interviewee [S4] evidenced a 
desire to adopt a more proactive position in the development of 
sustainability assurance practice:  
One of the possible ways of [improving assurance practice] is for those who read 
reports to start feeding back, both positively and negatively, to say: we really like 
this or we dont like that, getting demand for this from sufficient places, with 
sufficient sort of clout, that people think, okay, everyone seems to be bothered by 
that, wed better do something about it and get ourselves really geared up for next 
year.  
 
It is clear that the views expressed by representatives of the INGO sector 
differed from those provided by the investment community. However, 
 288 
 
views among interviewees from the INGOs also differed. For example, the 
views of interviewees [S6] and [S7] on the fundamental question of 
whether or not regulation is needed to improve reporting and assurance 
practice were diametrically opposed: 
I think, ultimately, sustainability reporting assurance is going to be best served by 
best practice rather than legislation or mandating what people do.  So I think as 
good practice evolves, then, ideally this would be seen to be useful to companies as 
well as the stakeholders and therefore companies will follow those routes because 
they are simpler, cheaper, more effective.  [S6] 
A key way which is essential to move the debate forward is making reporting 
mandatory for large and medium-sized companies, and for the government to 
ensure that there are clear boundaries in place and areas in which companies 
should report, and that theres a common procedure for reporting so that the 
information that companies provide is comparable. And along with this mandatory 
nature of the reporting that companies must adhere to, these reports must be 
independently audited through effective assurance procedures. [S7] 
 
Although the issue of regulation was not directly mentioned by the other 
two INGO interviewees, one [S4] stated that:  
Theres a macro level change in terms of the whole governance thing; were back to 
company law and the Companies Act and the duty of the directors. We might have 
had the OFR [Operating and Financial Review], which would have provided a very 
useful statutorily based standard framework for some aspects of reporting. This 
could have been quite helpful in helping everybody to move forward and stimulate 
some of the leaders to go a bit further ahead.  So, I think thats disappointing.  
 
Indeed, for three INGO interviewees, a central point to develop the future 
of sustainability reporting and associated assurance practices was the 
need for corporate governance reforms. One interviewee [S7] put it in the 
following terms: 
In terms of corporate governance, yes, fundamental corporate governance reform 
is needed to ensure a more effective place for corporations generally in serving the 
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interests of society instead of society serving the interests of the company, which is 
kind of a bizarre state which we seem to be in now..... In current law theres a real 
lack of accountability of company to the stakeholder; directors duties are 
primarily in the interests of the company.  
 
This point of view concurs with the perception of the trade union official, 
who argued that:   
I think most of the demand for it is really oriented towards the interest in the 
companys success and longevity, and not the interest in societys sustainable 
development. [S8] 
 
For him, a more fundamental problem is that stakeholders who place 
reliance on assurance have no genuine form of redress for any damage 
suffered: 
I dont think theres any genuine redress.  If youre an investor you might have a 
redress against the financial report because it was misleading in some way ... and 
you might actually have a legal basis to make a claim that you were wrongly 
informed.  That really doesnt exist in the case of non-financial reporting, and you 
can even see in some of the assurance statements that some of the companies 
offering assurance in the statements say yes, but this doesnt mean anything and it 
says so in the statement itself. [S8] 
 
This interviewee then echoed the view of interviewee [S7] about the need 
for fundamental reform in corporate governance to empower 
stakeholders in the assurance process. However, for him a key question 
was: 
If the governments get involved in one way or the other at the EU or international 
level, are they going to get involved to protect investors? Are they going to get 
involved ... in a sort of police function? [S8] 
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The essential point being made by this interviewee was that sustainability 
assurance offers only a technical solution to what is essentially a political 
problem: 
I think the solutions to those problems are more political. Ultimately, you cant 
substitute for the role of government.  And here theres sort of a technical solution 
to what in effect is a political problem. The government isnt doing its job and 
theres no real solution to that, theres no real substitute for that.  At one point, you 
have to get to the root of the problem; its not going to be well weve operated in 
countries where the government is not working and weve done this and that ... 
Well, yes, but the labour stuff isnt working, the private solution to labour practices 
isnt working, and that I can speak with some authority on. I cant really talk to you 
about environmental auditing, but the labour stuff is not working ... and I think 
that at the end of the day this requires other ways of solving these problems, 
theyre not going to be solved by companies hiring professional enterprises. [S8] 
 
Notwithstanding his sceptical point of view, he offered practical solutions: 
There has to be a sort of narrowing down of what is meant by assurance.  And 
there should be recognition that certain kinds of subjects cant be done by 
assurance providers, it involves the verification of information through other 
means.  I think the first step is you have to narrow down the issue and then you 
have to set up the rules and the liabilities. [S8] 
 
He then emphasized: 
I think there should be a discussion amongst the large stakeholders as to what 
assurance should be, without the accounting industry present.  And that might be a 
way forward.  [S8] 
 
In sum, interviewees evidenced different opinions on how best to proceed 
to further develop sustainability assurance practices. For representatives 
of the investment community, it was essential to narrow down assurance 
services to examination of quantitative data, to achieve standardization, 
and to focus on companies performance (see also Zadek et al., 2006); they 
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were not keen on the AA1000AS assurance approach. Conversely, INGO 
representatives argued for the development of stakeholder-centred 
assurance approaches (see Zadek et al., 2006); however, they were not 
enthusiastic about the AA1000AS assurance approach. On the need to 
regulate reporting and assurance practices there were two different 
positions: one INGO interviewee advocated for assurance to be voluntary, 
whilst one INGO interviewee and the trade union official perceived a need 
for regulation and corporate reforms to empower stakeholders.   
From this discussion, the overall impression is one of great uncertainty as 
to how sustainability assurance will develop in the future.  
 
7.2.5 Summary of findings 
The discussion in the previous section can be summarized in six key 
points: 
 
First, a majority of company respondents argued that stakeholders are 
detached from sustainability assurance exercises (see section 6.1.6) (see 
also Edgley et al., 2010). However, findings in this study suggest that there 
are stakeholder groups that are aware of the existence of sustainability 
assurance exercises (but see also Zadek et al., 2006). Results in this 
research reveal that representatives of stakeholders groups manifest 
different attitudes towards these exercises. There is a diversity of opinion 
as to whether or not sustainability assurance adds value. For example, 
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only representatives from the INGO sector were broadly supportive of 
sustainability assurance exercises, although conscious of their limitations. 
Conversely, representatives from the investment sector adopted a 
negative stance towards sustainability assurance94
 
, as they firmly believed 
that it was irrelevant to their work needs. A more critical approach was 
adopted by the trade union official, who dismissed current sustainability 
assurance practices as adding nothing of value. 
Second, findings in this research are consistent with those of other studies 
and suggest that stakeholders have different assurance needs (see Edgley 
et al., 2010; see also Zadek et al., 2006). For example, the main concern of 
representatives of the investment sector was that sustainability assurance 
should serve their information needs. Investors spoke about the need for 
assurance to examine the integrity of data, and expressed a desire for a 
closer alignment with financial reporting and audit provision95
 
. Albeit that 
the INGO groups participating in this research have different orientations 
and philosophical positions, and represent different political, social and 
environmental needs, they agreed that assurance should focus on 
examining companies activities and policies in action. A very different 
perspective was provided by the trade union official, who argued that 
current sustainability assurance practices do not satisfy workers needs.  
                                                        
94 An important aspect of the analysis considering that this group could have significant 
influence on the development of sustainability reporting and associated assurance 
practice if they so desired. 
95 The latter desire was also expressed by two corporate respondents. 
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Third, only the representatives of INGOs clearly indicated that assurance 
adds value to companies and the users of the reports. In common with 
companies respondents they expressed the view that the role of 
sustainability assurance goes beyond simply adding credibility to reports, 
since according to them it also enhances reporting practices (see also 
Jones & Solomon, 2010; Edgley et al., 2010). In contrast to the findings of 
Kuruppu and Milne (2010), it is significant that respondents from INGOs 
with different orientations clearly stated that sustainability assurance 
adds credibility to the information released (see also Zadek et. al, 2006), 
and that corporate reputation is enhanced. However, only two 
respondents from this group argued that sustainability assurance might 
play a role in the improvement of corporate environmental and social 
performance (but see also Zadek et. al, 2006).  
 
Fourth, findings in this research show that representatives of stakeholder 
groups are aware of problems in current sustainability assurance 
practices.  For example, INGO respondents raised fundamental questions 
concerning the cynicism around reporting and assurance (see also Zadek 
et al., 2006), and the fact that assurance practices are conducted on 
reports that do not do what they say (reporting on sustainability issues). 
They raised concerns on assurance that closely follows the financial 
assurance model (see also Zadek et al., 2006), and on the quality of the 
assurance statements.  Another issue, investor respondents argued, was 
that current assurance practices focus on the narratives, and try to satisfy 
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too many stakeholder interests. Further, the trade union official expressed 
fundamental reservations regarding the practical competencies of 
assurance providers (see also Zadek et. al, 2006) and the institutional 
legitimacy of the assurance industry itself. The first of these concerns was 
also expressed by one of the investor respondents.   
 
Fifth, the results in this study indicate that, in contrast to the views of 
companies representatives, the majority of respondents from stakeholder 
groups believe that assurance statements must be addressed to the 
stakeholders. One respondent from the INGO sector pointed out that the 
issue of to whom to address the assurance statement is indicative of a 
much more fundamental problem related to UK company law.  Moreover, 
the current study found that there were diverse opinions on the role of 
stakeholders in the sustainability assurance practice. For example, the 
trade union official, and respondents from the INGO sector, expressed a 
desire for more stakeholder involvement (see also Zadek et al., 2006). 
Respondents from the INGO sector called for representatives of civil 
society groups to participate in panels of evaluation. These respondents 
expressed a desire to see more stakeholder engagement through the 
assurance process, albeit that they did not support Adam and Evans 
(2004) argument that stakeholders have a role in selecting the assurance 
providers and defining the scope of the engagement. Notwithstanding 
their support in principle for stakeholder panels, the INGO 
representatives, like the corporate respondents, were aware of the 
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practical difficulties of operationalizing this stakeholder inclusion.  They 
expressed concerns as to the practicalities of gathering panel members 
who could truly represent the interests of critical stakeholders, the 
possibility that big brand international nongovernmental organisations 
could dominate these panels, and the prospect that belonging to such 
panels might compromise the independence of those involved. They 
referred not only to resources constraints, but also to the problem of 
stakeholder fatigue as main obstacles to achieving true stakeholder 
participation via panels of evaluation. Further, the trade union official 
expressed concerns related to managerial control over stakeholder panels 
and the issue of stakeholders not being able to act as independent critical 
voices. Conversely, representatives of the investment community did not 
support direct stakeholder inclusion within external sustainability 
assurance exercises; however, they were in favour of including the views 
of experts in panels of evaluation operating independently of any external 
assurance process. Nevertheless, one of these respondents and one 
respondent from the INGO sector were conscious that this independent 
panel of stakeholders approach is not equivalent to a systematic form of 
assurance.  
 
Finally, respondents manifested different views as to the future direction 
of sustainability assurance. Respondents from the investment community 
argued that there is a need to improve quantitative data assurance, to 
implement standardization and to focus on companies performance. 
 296 
 
Conversely, respondents from the INGO sector claimed that there is a need 
to develop stakeholder-centred assurance exercises with added value. 
Among the respondents from the INGO sector there were two opposite 
positions on the issues of regulation of sustainability reporting and 
assurance, and reforms in corporate governance. One interviewee argued 
for sustainability reporting and assurance to be voluntary. Conversely, 
another representative of the INGO sector, and the trade union official, 
argued in favour of regulation, and claimed that corporate reforms were 
essential in order to move away from the current situation in which 
companies serve their own interests. For them, there is a need for 
companies to fulfil the needs and interests of wider society.  
 
7.3 DISCUSSION AND THEORETICAL INTERPRETATIONS 
This section comprises an interpretation and analysis of the responses of 
the different stakeholder groups described above. The analysis uses the 
lens of Michael Powers theory as conceptualized in chapter 3. One of 
Powers (1997/1999) main concerns with regard to current auditing 
practices is related to the expectation gap; that is, the debate resulting 
from different beliefs about the auditors duties and responsibilities, and 
the messages conveyed by the auditing statements (Soltani, 2007). For 
Power (1997/1999:30), in reality, it is difficult to know what audits are 
for, or what audits produce, or whether audits fail.  Power (1994b) 
contends that there is a problem of perception, a difference between how 
auditors see themselves and how the public see them. One of Powers 
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(1997/1999) main theses relies on the need for the audit practice to 
facilitate civic dialogue, with the goal of upward accountability or the 
achievement of true accountability96. Power (1994b) argues for a model 
of corporate governance in which audits play a role, where the views of 
stakeholders are heard and whereby they are empowered. Power 
(2007b:139) contends that in order to be legitimate representatives of 
society and credible dialogue partners, stakeholders have shifted their 
strategy from one of confrontation to one that promotes two-way 
communication97
 
. These theoretical arguments and criticisms will be used 
to examine the expectations of different stakeholder groups concerning 
the practice of sustainability assurance, and to find out whether their 
views are in agreement with the ideas of Power.  
The analysis also uses the lens of stakeholder theory (but see Belal and 
Owen, 2007). Advocators of the normative branch of stakeholder theory 
claim that organisations need to be accountable to their stakeholders (see 
Medawar, 1976).  Conversely, the managerial branch of stakeholder 
theory argues for an effective management of the organisational 
(powerful) stakeholders with the goal of guaranteeing the survival of the 
organisation (Deegan & Unerman, 2006/2008). Using both theoretical 
arguments, we will examine whether different stakeholder groups expect 
that sustainability assurance can achieve accountability to all 
stakeholders, or whether they support the managerial model, which 
                                                        
96 Power bases this argument on the work of Day and Klein. 
97 Power bases this argument on the work of Friedman and Miles, and Larkin. 
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maintains that organisational strategies are mainly for the benefit of 
organisations.  
 
7.3.1 Sustainability assurance and the expectation gap 
Stakeholders have different assurance needs (see Edgley et al., 2010; see 
also Zadek et al., 2006). In this research, the views of respondents reveal 
two general types of expectation towards the practice of sustainability 
assurance.  
 
First, respondents from the INGO sector expected that the practice of 
sustainability assurance should focus on examining actual corporate 
actions rather than simply the niceties of reporting. Bliss (2002:252) 
claims that most NGOs campaigns aim at influencing and changing 
corporate behaviour to satisfy the needs and demands of citizens. These 
respondents believed that through sustainability assurance, companies 
could actually change their practices and therefore improve their social 
and environmental performance (see also Zadek et al., 2006). Their view 
supports Powers (1994b:8) claim that sustainability assurance has the 
potential to influence organisational performance, modifying it and 
developing it in critical ways.  
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Conversely, the trade union official adopted a critical stance, arguing that 
current sustainability assurance practices mean nothing. Having closely 
followed the development of audit practices concerning the supply chain 
code of conduct in China over 15 years, he had come to the conclusion that 
the system of professional auditors is not working, since workers there 
still face serious problems concerning their labour conditions. He claimed 
that there is widespread fraud among companies, and that auditors are 
being accused of professional misconduct98
 
. For him, it is highly probable 
that the situation with sustainability assurance is very similar. 
Nonetheless, one could infer that the view of this respondent accords with 
the position of the INGO respondents in that (in theory) through 
sustainability assurance companies should change their practices for the 
benefit of society (in this case labour conditions). 
A very different stance was adopted by respondents from the investment 
group. They argued for an assurance practice that satisfies their 
information needs by examining the integrity of the data to ensure 
effective management of intangible assets and to evaluate the risk 
associated with social and environmental issues (see also Zadek et al., 
2004; and Zadek et al., 2006). It is significant that this group expressed 
little support towards the AA1000AS, and stated a desire for a less 
stakeholder-centred assurance practice. In other words, for the 
investment group, sustainability assurance should facilitate the financial 
                                                        
98 The issue of professional misconduct among auditors has not been analyzed in detail 
by Power. 
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evaluation of the company and associated performance, by providing 
reliable information on environmental and social issues that could affect 
this financial performance.  
 
In short, whilst the INGO sector representatives and the trade union 
official advocated for an assurance practice that would serve the interests 
of society, the investment group were in favour of an assurance practice in 
which the main audience were capital providers.  For the latter group, 
financial performance was fundamental, and superseded social and 
environmental performance99
 
. The analysis of Zadek et al. (2004) shows 
that in the view of practitioners, standard setters and the research 
community, one of the main audiences for sustainability assurance, apart 
from companies, is the investment community. If the investment sector 
were to take a more proactive position towards the development of 
assurance practice, and considering that they are in a good position to 
steer the agenda among leaders in the sustainability assurance field, it is 
highly probable that stakeholder-centred sustainability assurance 
practices would fade out and eventually disappear.  
                                                        
99 There exists a difficulty in finding a balance among financial, social and environmental 
performance.  However, there is a need for greater emphasis on social and environmental 
performance in current organisational practices (see also Gray, Bebbington and Gray, 
2010).  
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Now the question is whether there exists a gap between these stakeholder 
expectations and what auditors can and should reasonably be expected to 
do.  
 
In chapter six, it was clear that companies decide on the scope and level of 
the assurance exercise, the type of assurance provider and assurance 
approach, whether stakeholders should be involved in the exercise, and 
the type of stakeholder engagement within the assurance practice (see 
also Ball et al., 2000; ODwyer & Owen, 2005; Jones &Solomon, 2010; 
Edgley et al., 2010). This high level of managerial control influences the 
type of assurance that providers deliver (see also Power, 1997/1999). 
This represents a major challenge for assurance providers, because unless 
the business takes into account the need to improve social and 
environmental performance for the benefit of society and the 
environment, the providers are prevented from providing a service 
according to the expectations manifested by representatives of INGOs and 
the trade union official.  It seems possible that social and environmental 
performance could be enhanced through sustainability assurance, as one 
of the company respondents claimed. However, it appears that the main 
problem is the high cost in assurance fees to achieve these expectations.  
From the perspective of the INGO respondents, sustainability assurance 
needs to be driven by companies and therefore the cost must be assumed 
by them. However, the fact that companies favour a voluntary approach 
raises concerns as to the willingness of businesses to commission a type of 
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sustainability assurance service that incentivizes substantive change in 
society (see Power, 1997/1999). In short, there is a gap between what 
sustainability assurance can deliver in reality, and what the 
representatives of INGOs and the trade union official expect of it (Power, 
1997/1999; 1994b; 2000).  
 
Moreover, in chapter six, companies respondents argued that 
stakeholders receive benefits in the form of credible information for their 
user needs. This perspective echoes the claims of assurance providers that 
sustainability assurance provides benefits mainly for companies but also 
for stakeholders (see Edgley et al., 2010). However, since companies (and 
assurance providers) are reluctant to specify the intended external 
audience for the assurance exercise, it is unclear what stakeholder needs 
they are referring to. Given the relevance of the investment sector for 
companies, one would expect the assurance exercise to meet the needs of 
this stakeholder group. However, representatives of the investment sector 
clearly stated that the type of information assured in these exercises is 
unhelpful in the context of their work needs. These respondents argued 
that companies should assure social and environmental quantitative data. 
However, it seems that this expectation would be difficult to fulfil in the 
near future given the lack of an agreed framework for quantitative 
indicators in reporting (the GRI reporting framework is still under 
development), and the recognized problem concerning the diversity and 
subjectivity of economic, environmental and social indicators (FEE, 2002: 
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43). An additional problem for one of these respondents was that in 
reality, the practice of assurance is unreliable, because the exercise is 
conducted by assurance providers (particularly accountancy firms) who 
lack technical knowledge in social and environmental matters (but see 
also Zadek et al., 2006). In short, the views of these respondents evidence 
great uncertainty as to whether assurance providers could in future offer 
assurance services with added value for the investment sector.   
 
Power (1994b) claims that most users of assurance opinions ignore 
problems affecting the practice of sustainability assurance. However, in 
this research, it appeared that the trade union official and respondents 
from the INGO sector were aware of major problems, since they spoke 
about the cynicism regarding companies honesty and transparency; 
concerns related to the practical competencies of assurance providers, the 
quality of their work and assurance statements; the need to provide real 
time assurance, and the institutional legitimacy of the assurance industry 
itself100
                                                        
100 Intriguingly, two company respondents were also aware of the cynicism of 
stakeholders towards the work of assurance providers. 
. These respondents also saw as problematic that reporting and 
assurance practices are heavily influenced by the financial model, and 
raised concerns regarding the detachment of citizens from sustainability 
assurance. Conversely, for representatives of the investment sector a 
major problem was that reporting and assurance practices try to satisfy 
too many stakeholder interests, without focusing on data assurance. The 
fact that most of the representatives of stakeholders are aware of these 
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problems represents a major challenge for assurance providers. However, 
the views of these respondents evidence that the real problem here lies in 
the conflicting expectations of the investment group and the INGO group. 
It is unclear how assurance providers will deal with this issue in the 
future.  
 
Power (1997/1999) argued that a common tactic on the part of assurance 
providers to reduce the expectation gap has been to provide very little  
information on the work conducted and conclusions reached in the 
assurance statement. It appears that this tactic has been used in the 
sustainability assurance practice. Despite recent moves on the part of 
assurance providers to address public concerns by providing more 
structured information on the work conducted (see also Al-Hamadeen, 
2007), respondents from companies (see section 6.1.2) and stakeholder 
groups expressed doubts as to the usefulness of the information conveyed 
in the assurance statement. In essence, as Power (1997/1999) has argued, 
assurance statements are unable to provide the basis for an open dialogue 
with companies. 
 
Moreover, there is a problem of differing perceptions, between how 
assurance providers see themselves and how the public see them (Power, 
1994b). Assurance providers have claimed that they see themselves as 
the voice of stakeholders (Edgley et al., 2010:554).   However, the trade 
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union official critiqued this role of go-between or mediating institution 
between companies and stakeholders. He pointed out that there is no 
certainty as to the independence of assurance providers, and therefore the 
assurance provided could be questioned. For him, this situation makes the 
assurance process less transparent. In essence, his view concurs with 
Powers (1994b, 1997/1999) argument that an assurance process based 
on the subjective opinion of assurance providers along the lines of dont 
worry, we have looked and the facts are true [S8], is problematic, as it can 
make organisations more obscure for external constituencies who are 
unable to understand the technicalities of the work conducted. 
 
7.3.2 Sustainability assurance and the ideal of stakeholder-
centred accountability  
In essence, the views of the INGO respondents and of the trade union 
official reflect the normative perspective of stakeholder theory. However, 
whilst the views of INGO representatives were optimistic, the trade union 
official manifested disappointment.    
 
Representatives of the INGO sector believed that the practice of 
sustainability assurance could enhance the transparency of organisations 
by providing credible reported information (see also Zadek et al., 2006) 
and improved sustainability reporting practices. Their views concur with 
Power (1996) in that sustainability assurance goes beyond simply adding 
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credibility to reports. Moreover, INGO respondents argued that the main 
audience for sustainability assurance should be the companies 
stakeholders. For one INGO sector respondent, it was clear that there is a 
problem with UK corporate governance arrangements, which prevent a 
significant stakeholder inclusion in the practice of sustainability 
assurance. However, it is worth noting that none of these respondents 
clearly articulated the view that stakeholder-centred sustainability 
assurance exercises are an instrument capable of holding organisations to 
account (see ODwyer, 2005).  
 
Albeit that the view of the trade union official appeared highly sceptical 
and critical, his tone of voice revealed more disillusionment that the 
potential of sustainability assurance to solve critical social and 
environmental issues was not being met. Indeed, he argued for an 
assurance practice in which the main audience would be stakeholders, 
where the voices of stakeholders could be heard, and which would lead to 
substantive change in companies actual practices, supporting the view of 
Power (1997/1999). In his view, the solution to the problems faced by 
sustainability assurance practice is political. In essence, it appears that his 
view concurs with the normative position of theorists who advocate the 
stakeholder-accountability approach towards social and environmental 
accounting and auditing practices (see Brown & Fraser, 2006). However, 
he expressed discomfort with the influence of particular interests in the 
practice of sustainability assurance, and questioned the legitimacy of 
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institutions setting the rules.  This suggests that an important issue for 
future research will be to examine the accountability of institutions such 
as AccountAbility and the GRI.  
In short, respondents from the INGO sector, and the trade union official, 
believed that accountability should be discharged to all relevant 
stakeholder groups in a democratic environment.  
 
Moreover, neither the trade union official nor any of the INGO sector 
respondents argued, as the Social Audit Ltd did in the 1970s (see 
Humphrey and Owen, 2000), for civil society groups to conduct social 
audits rather than relying on the assurance exercise conducted by 
assurance providers. Intriguingly, the trade union official was the only 
respondent to argue for the right of stakeholders to receive redress from 
companies concerning the social and environmental impacts of their 
activities.    
 
In general, the trade union official and respondents from the INGO sector 
did not notice that one means by which to counteract the high level of 
managerial control over the practice of sustainability assurance is the 
active participation of stakeholders, for example in determining the scope 
of the assurance exercise. However, it was evident that their views 
support Powers (1994b) argument that stakeholders should be 
empowered within the practice of sustainability assurance. They argued 
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for stakeholder representation in the form of panels of evaluation. It might 
be, as Power (2007b) has claimed, that the engagement of stakeholders is 
a symptom of erosion of trust in traditional authorities and in their 
capability to counter corporate power.  
 
An important question here, these respondents argued, was to which 
representatives of civil society companies would be able to give power. 
For these respondents it was crucial that representatives of stakeholders 
must be credible, knowledgeable, and independent. This perception 
supports Powers (2007b:139) assertion that stakeholder groups must 
also constitute themselves as legitimate representatives of society and as 
convincing dialogue partners101
 
. However, in the long term, this will mean 
constraints on the number of legitimate stakeholders able to participate in 
the exercise, and in these conditions there is a risk of stakeholder fatigue. 
The problem is exacerbated by the probability that INGO groups with an 
agenda of collaboration with business might be the only stakeholder 
groups willing to participate in these exercises (see Bliss, 2002). However, 
the main obstacle for this process lies in the high cost for companies. 
The view of these respondents also evidences a considerable amount of 
uncertainty as to the impact of giving power to stakeholders through 
sustainability assurance. For example, it might be that the influence of 
                                                        
101 Power bases this argument on the work of Larkin. 
 309 
 
stakeholders would be neutralized by managerial control over 
stakeholder groups participating in the exercise. Moreover, the need to 
include a broad range of stakeholder interests might conflict with the real 
objectives of the organisations, and therefore they will gain little from the 
exercise (see Ribstein, 2005). Furthermore, shareholders might face a 
problem of stakeholder opportunism (see Ribstein, 2005). Conversely, in 
general, the views of the investment group support the managerial model 
of stakeholder theory. They saw sustainability assurance as an instrument 
whereby shareholder value could be enhanced. Most of these respondents 
expressed discomfort with the idea of including the views of diverse 
stakeholders within the practice of sustainability assurance, and preferred 
the involvement of experts. It was clear that they favoured the importance 
of one powerful group, shareholders, above all other stakeholders, and 
viewed sustainability assurance as a natural part of a system that 
discharges accountability mainly to shareholders, and which benefits 
organisations.  
 
7.3.3 The future of sustainability assurance 
In this section, it will be discussed the future development of assurance 
practice in the UK from the perspective of stakeholders. 
 
The views of the stakeholder respondents confirm that there is a great 
deal of uncertainty as to how the practice of sustainability assurance will 
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develop in the future.  It seems that there are two main positions on this 
issue. One supports the business case for sustainability assurance; that is, 
sustainability assurance should mainly serve the interests of business and 
of shareholders (see Brown & Fraser, 2006). In essence, respondents from 
the investment sector argued that the practice of sustainability assurance 
should work under the umbrella of financial auditing, on the grounds that 
it should be highly technical and performance oriented. This would 
facilitate the standardization of practice. One respondent envisaged a role 
for the internal audit function in the development of this type of 
assurance. Proponents of this view were reluctant towards the inclusion 
of stakeholder opinion in the practice of sustainability assurance. Another 
position favours the stakeholder-centred accountability approach (or the 
normative perception of stakeholder theory). The trade union official and 
respondents from the INGO sector argued for an assurance practice in 
which the voices of stakeholders could be heard, and for a focus on 
examining key issues with the goal of producing social change. Albeit that 
one of these respondents acknowledged that the inclusion of stakeholder 
opinion hinders the standardization of practice, he, together with the rest 
of these respondents, expressed a desire to adopt a more proactive 
position to develop sustainability assurance. 
 
The most striking result to emerge from the data is that within the INGO 
sector there are two opposite positions concerning future regulation of 
sustainability assurance. One explanation for this might be that different 
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INGO groups have different styles of campaigning to achieve their goals. 
An in-depth analysis of 40 years of campaigns by NGOs (Bliss, 2002:252) 
revealed two main approaches to influencing corporate change. Initially, 
NGOs used four types of pressure campaigns: enforce the rules; change the 
rules; adopt my values; change the economics. However, during the 1980s 
they began to explore collaborative ways of working. As Power 
(2007b:139) argues, stakeholders have shifted their strategy from one of 
confrontation to one of dialogue102
                                                        
102 Power bases this argument on the work of Friedman and Miles. 
. Views expressed by INGO sector 
respondents evidence these different approaches to influencing corporate 
change. For example, respondent [S7] is affiliated with an INGO that uses a 
change the rules campaign to modify rules governing corporate 
behaviour (see Bliss, 2002). For this respondent, and for the trade union 
official, a political solution was needed to the issues related to 
sustainability assurance.  In other words, they advocated for regulation of 
corporate sustainability reports, and associate and assurance practice, and 
for reforms to existing corporate laws and corporate governance 
structures. Conversely, respondent [S6] belongs to an INGO that uses a 
collaborative campaign to influence corporate behaviour (see Bliss, 2002), 
and acts as technical consultants to companies on sustainability reporting 
and associated assurance. This finding corroborates Powers (2007b) 
argument that stakeholder groups that hold other organisations to 
account have became more business-like in their operations, adopting the 
same risk management ideas and expressions as the organisations they 
seek to engage and criticize. Therefore, they operate to different rules, 
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where partnerships, rather than adversarial campaigns, are paramount. 
Hence, this respondent [S6] advocated for a voluntary approach to 
sustainability assurance. However, under the current political climate in 
the UK, dominated by conservative parties, there is no possibility of 
corporate governance reforms designed to empower stakeholders, or of 
the introduction of mandatory reporting and assurance. Therefore, 
collaborative campaigns by credible INGOs could be fundamental to 
develop strategies in the field which could benefit society at large.  
 
7.4 CONCLUSION 
The description and analysis of the views of representatives of 
stakeholders can be summarized in three key points: 
(1)There is a huge expectation gap in the practice of sustainability 
assurance; 
(2)A great deal of uncertainty prevails concerning the impact of giving 
power to stakeholders through the practice of sustainability assurance; 
(3)Civil society groups have a fundamental role to play in achieving 
stakeholder accountability. 
 
First, there are differences between what sustainability assurance can 
deliver in reality, and what representatives of different stakeholder 
groups expect (Power, 1994b; 1997/1999). Representatives of the INGO 
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sector, and the trade union official, argued that sustainability assurance 
should catalyze social change through the improvement of social and 
environmental organisational performance (see also Zadek et al., 2006). 
However, there are major impediments here related to the business case 
orientation that dominates among organisations, together with the 
additional high cost to companies. Conversely, representatives of the 
investment sector claimed that they need assurance on social and 
environmental quantitative data. The major constraint here is the 
difficulty in developing reliable quantifiable indicators, especially in the 
social area. There is also a problem of differing perceptions between how 
assurance providers see themselves, as representatives of stakeholders, 
and how one sector of stakeholders sees them. According to the trade 
union official, this mediation role [of assurance providers] between 
companies and stakeholders makes the assurance process less 
transparent (Power, 1994b; 1997/1999).  In short, there is a huge 
expectation gap in the practice of sustainability assurance (see also Kamp-
Roelands, 2002).  
 
Second, in the case that sustainability assurance were to become more 
stakeholder-centred in the future, there is no certainty that this would 
benefit society. This is because the impact of the inclusion of stakeholder 
opinion in sustainability assurance practice might be neutralized by 
companies exercising a great deal of control. Moreover, the need to 
include a broad range of stakeholder interests might conflict with 
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organisations real objectives, and therefore they would gain little from 
the exercise (see Ribstein, 2005). There might also be a problem for 
shareholders of stakeholder opportunism (see Ribstein, 2005). Further, 
there are issues concerning which representatives of civil society 
companies should empower. There was a consensus that these 
representatives must be legitimate. Considering that there are few 
credible and knowledgeable stakeholders capable of participating in these 
exercises, there is a possibility of stakeholder fatigue. Another major 
problem is that one sector of the stakeholder groups would exclude 
themselves from participating on the grounds of conflict of interest, which 
could affect the credibility of the exercises. Conversely, the proposition 
from the investment sector of engaging experts rather than stakeholders 
is aimed mainly at benefiting capital providers (with companies also 
indirectly benefiting).  
 
Third, in the UK, civil society groups have a fundamental role to play in the 
further development of sustainability assurance practice. For example, 
taking a long-term perspective, civil society groups that aim to modify the 
rules governing corporate behaviour are important to move forward the 
public policy agenda to a stage where there exists legislation on the right 
of access to information on companies social and environmental impacts. 
This would be a first step towards mandatory assurance on sustainability 
information. Moreover, given that such legislation is unlikely to be 
forthcoming in the UK in the near future, credible civil society groups that 
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aim to influence corporate behaviour through collaborative work with 
companies are fundamental to strengthening a voluntary agenda in the 
field of sustainability assurance that would benefit the common good. 
 
The findings and analysis of the views of companies and stakeholder 
respondents have evidenced public policy issues for consideration. These 
public policy implications will be explored further in the next, concluding, 
chapter.  
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8 CHAPTER EIGHT: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has three aims: 
(1)To present main conclusions with regard to the empirical findings and 
theoretical considerations of the research; 
(2)To  illustrate key policy implications emerging from the research; 
(3)To discuss the limitations of the study and make recommendations for 
further research. 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the conclusions drawn from the preceding chapters; 
it also discusses how the findings contribute to academic knowledge and 
their public policy implications. The chapter comprises six sections. The 
first section outlines main conclusions from the empirical findings of 
chapters five, six and seven; the second brings together the main 
conceptual conclusions from chapters six and seven; the third identifies 
major policy implications of the study; the fourth section summarizes the 
major contributions to knowledge; the fifth identifies strengths and 
limitations of the research; finally, the sixth section suggests possible 
further research in the field.  
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8.2 SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
This thesis has investigated the practice of sustainability assurance from 
the perspectives of companies and stakeholders. The study responds to 
the need to investigate emerging issues in the practice of sustainability 
assurance in the United Kingdom.  These issues were determined during 
the quantitative phase of the research through an analysis of the trends in 
sustainability assurance practice in the FTSE100 companies from 2001 to 
2007. The issues were subsequently investigated during the qualitative 
phase of the research by examining them through the perspectives of 
representatives of selected FTSE100 companies and stakeholder groups. 
Therefore, this is an empirical explanatory follow-up study following a 
mixed-methods research design consisting of a sequential analysis, from a 
quantitative phase to a qualitative phase (QUAN   to   QUAL). The research 
began with general research questions (see chapter two, conclusion), 
which were used to generate the research objective for the quantitative 
phase of the research (see chapter five, introduction), and provided the 
framework to develop specific objectives for the qualitative phase (see 
chapter five, conclusion). This section provides answers to these research 
objectives. 
   
The results of the quantitative phase of the investigation indicate the 
emergence of significant issues and trends in the practice of sustainability 
assurance between 2001 and 2007. Between 2004 and 2007 there was a 
slow progress in the commission of sustainability assurance services in 
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the FTSE100 companies (see also KPMG, 2005, 2008). Moreover, while 
these companies had traditionally opted for the consultancy approach 
(see Al-Hamadeen, 2007), from 2006 there was a trend toward using the 
accountancy approach. It is significant that during this period, the 
FTSE100 companies committed to the use of assurance standards to guide 
the assurance practice, and after 2005 there was an inclination to use the 
AA1000AS in tandem with the ISAE3000 assurance standard.   Albeit that 
these companies showed a preference for the AA1000AS (Al-Hamadeen, 
2007), it is somewhat surprising that this was not leading towards direct 
stakeholder participation in the assurance practice (but see also ODwyer 
and Owen, 2005). The companies opted to commission engagements with 
limited level of assurance; therefore, most assurance procedures 
concerned substantive tests (see Manetti & Becatti, 2009).  An additional 
finding here was that some assurance procedures rely on the internal 
audit function.  
 
Further research was done to investigate issues concerning the emerging 
trends identified during the quantitative phase of the study. First, 
representatives of FTSE100 companies provided their views on the 
reasons driving the commission of the assurance service, the preference 
for a given assurance approach, the assurance standards adopted, and the 
factors influencing restrictions on the level of assurance, together with 
their opinion on the role of the internal audit division in the assurance 
process, and the inclusion of stakeholders views in the assurance 
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exercise. They also stated their views on the future of sustainability 
assurance. Second, representatives of stakeholder groups articulated their 
opinions on the practice of sustainability assurance, together with 
suggestions to promote greater stakeholder accountability. 
 
Findings of the qualitative phase of this study suggest that companies 
reasons for commissioning sustainability assurance services are mainly 
associated with the creation of value. That is, through sustainability 
assurance companies strengthen their management, reporting systems 
and reports, and are able to release reliable information into the public 
domain (see also Jones & Solomon, 2010; Edgley et al., 2010).  Enhanced 
reputation (see Jones & Solomon, 2010), trust-building and the 
improvement of social and environmental performance are additional 
gains. Findings also suggest that company respondents appreciated 
differences between the accountancy and consultancy approaches (but see 
also ODwyer and Owen, 2005), and selected the assurance provider 
according to their capability to provide an assurance service with added 
value. Respondents also expressed support toward the AA1000AS, albeit 
that they did not view this standard as a means to enhance their 
accountability to stakeholders. The findings also suggest that the 
assurance practice is heavily influenced by cost restrictions, which 
determine the level of assurance commissioned. It appears that in the 
future, the internal audit function could play a role in upgrading the 
assurance from limited to reasonable levels. Company respondents were 
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aware of a lack of interest among the majority of stakeholders towards the 
assurance practice (see also Edgley et al., 2010), and expressed a genuine 
desire to see more stakeholder involvement, in the form of a stakeholder 
panel or through the service of external experts, either as a panel or 
providing individual comment in the report. Respondents drew attention 
to the practical difficulties inherent in arriving at a representative panel 
(see also Edgley et al., 2010). Another major finding was that there is great 
uncertainty as to how the practice of sustainability assurance will develop 
in the future, whilst it appears that respondents were in favour of a 
voluntarist approach.   
 
Findings of the qualitative phase of this study also show a clear dichotomy 
in the views of stakeholders representatives towards sustainability 
assurance. In general, their perspectives evidenced that different 
stakeholders have different needs from assurance (see Edgley et al., 2010; 
see also Zadek et al., 2006). Whilst the trade union official and 
respondents from the investment sector adopted a negative stance 
towards the added value of sustainability assurance, representatives of 
the INGO sector argued that sustainability assurance results in a win-win 
situation for companies and stakeholders. They echoed the views of 
companies that assurance improves reporting practices, adds credibility 
to reports, and enhances corporate reputation (see Jones & Solomon, 
2010; Edgley et al., 2010) and social and environmental performance (see 
Zadek et al., 2006). All respondents were aware of the limitations of the 
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sustainability assurance practice. Representatives of the investment 
sector expressed concerns as to the practice trying to satisfy too many 
stakeholder interests. Representatives of the INGO sector were worried 
about the assurance on reports that do not provide clear information on 
sustainability issues (see also Zadek et al., 2006). The trade union official 
expressed deep reservations over both the practical competencies of 
assurance providers - a view shared by one investor respondent - (see 
also Zadek et al., 2006), and the overall institutional legitimacy of the 
sustainability assurance industry.  Similar differences of opinion were 
manifested toward the participation of stakeholder in the assurance 
exercise. Whilst the trade union official and representatives of the INGO 
sector expressed a desire to see more stakeholder involvement (see also 
Zadek et al., 2006), representatives of the investment sector were 
reluctant to support this inclusion, albeit that they were in favour of 
including the views of experts in the form of a panel operating 
independently of the assurance process. Representatives of the INGO 
sector were supportive of stakeholder engagement within the assurance 
process through the implementation of stakeholder panels. Nonetheless, 
the INGO respondents and the trade union official, like the corporate 
respondents, were conscious of problems associated with the 
operationalization of stakeholder panels, and expressed concerns that 
membership of such panels might compromise the independence of 
stakeholder organisations, and that resources constraints would give rise 
to stakeholder fatigue if the panels were to become widespread.  The 
views expressed by the stakeholder respondents also evidenced that it is 
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unclear what the future development of the practice of sustainability 
assurance will be. 
 
One of the more significant findings to emerge from this study is that there 
was substantial disagreement between company respondents and the 
majority of the respondents from stakeholder groups as to whether the 
main audience for sustainability assurance should be external. Companies 
respondents argued that as the company commissions the assurance 
service, is natural that the assurance statement is addressed to the same 
readership. The main argument of the stakeholder groups was that as 
sustainability reporting is addressed to society at large, it should follow 
that the accompanying assurance statement should be addressed to 
society. Similarly, it appears that corporate respondents, together with 
one INGO respondent, favoured a voluntarist approach in the practice of 
sustainability assurance, whilst one INGO representative, together with 
the trade union official, argued for regulation, and claimed that corporate 
reforms were essential to move forward the situation whereby 
sustainability assurance serves the interests of society.  
 
The main conclusion drawn from the empirical findings of this study is 
that the real driving force behind sustainability assurance is internal. 
Nonetheless, there is some evidence of awareness and interest among 
stakeholder groups, particularly the INGO sector, which represents a 
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broad range of stakeholder needs (see also Zadek et al., 2006). The 
practice of sustainability assurance is heavily constrained by 
organisations, and influenced by cost considerations (Jones & Solomon, 
2010; see also Park & Brorson, 2005). Hence, sustainability assurance 
services must provide value for money, with the major beneficiaries being 
organisations and assurance providers. There seems little possibility that 
the service will evolve to provide reasonable levels of assurance. Given 
that accountancy firms have gained an increased share of the assurance 
market in recent years, it appears that there is little probability that 
published assurance conclusions will move from the current situation in 
which they are designed to protect the assurance provider (see also 
ODwyer & Owen, 2005).   
 
8.3 RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS 
The core theoretical argument of this research study is based on key 
arguments of Michael Powers theory concerning the role of audit in 
society, together with key strands of stakeholder and legitimacy theories, 
as discussed in chapter 3.   
 
First, the perspectives of companies respondents were analyzed through 
the normative argument of Power (1994b:47), whereby audit is 
understood as symbolizing ideals of efficiency and quality, governance, 
transparency and accountability. The examination also included an 
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analysis of Powers (1997/1999) main criticisms concerning the failure of 
auditing practices to provide a base for substantive change. Power (1996; 
2003a) contends that the system of audit exports legitimacy. Hence, 
strands of legitimacy theory were used to examine this argument in more 
detail. Power (1994b) advocates for a form of audit in which the voices of 
stakeholders can be heard. Therefore, strands of stakeholder theory were 
used to examine assurance practices related to the inclusion of 
stakeholders views, and companies motivations behind the commission 
of sustainability assurance services.  
 
Second, the views of stakeholder respondents were examined in the light 
of one of Powers (1994b, 1997/1999) major concerns, viz, the issue of an 
expectation gap in auditing.  The analysis also examined Powers 
(1997/1999) argument concerning the role of audit in facilitating civic 
dialogue between organisations and their stakeholders to achieve 
upward accountability. Hence, an important aspect of the analysis was to 
examine whether stakeholder groups expect that through sustainability 
assurance, accountability to all stakeholders can be achieved. Therefore, 
strands of stakeholder theory were used to examine this issue.  
 
The results of this study evidence that although still of limited level, 
sustainability assurance services promote improvements to efficiency and 
quality of management and reporting systems (Power, 1994b, 1996). This 
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development is necessary to counter the expectation gap, and suggests 
that the input by the assurance process is needed to legitimate the 
practice with external constituencies (see Power, 2003a). Moreover, 
through negotiations between assurance providers and companies, within 
the sustainability assurance process the quality of the report is enhanced 
(Power, 1996). In this manner, within the assurance process organisations 
create and control their social image (Power, 1996). Further, the 
strengthening of the internal management control processes, and the job 
of internal auditors, are fundamental to making organisations 
accountable, auditable, and inspectable (Power, 2007b:43). It seems 
possible that in future, the internal audit function might take the role 
currently fulfilled by external sustainability assurance provision (Power, 
1997/1999). The evidence from this study suggests that sustainability 
assurance is a practice restrained by economic pressures (Power, 
1997/1999). Assurance services are undertaken to a point at which 
organisations perceive a win-win situation for themselves and their 
stakeholders. Nonetheless, the major benefits are for the organisations 
and assurance providers.  
 
Power (1994b:8) has emphasized the role of auditing in governance 
through the shaping of organisational performance to ensure 
accountability. However, this study found that assurance procedures in 
the FTSE100 companies that clearly indicated the evaluation of 
organisational performance were limited. The results suggest that the 
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companies were concerned primarily with economic, rather than social or 
environmental performance. In general, therefore, it seems that the key 
motivation behind the commission of sustainability assurance services 
was to secure legitimacy with external constituencies (Power, 2003a), and 
to be accountable to powerful stakeholder groups. For Power (1994b:23), 
audits have the capability to enhance transparency of organisational 
actions to individuals who have an interest in the impacts of those actions. 
Nonetheless, companies discharged transparency only to powerful 
stakeholder groups.  
 
Power (1997/1999) claims that audit sustains the idea of trust in society. 
However, it seems that the unbalanced power between companies and 
stakeholders has an effect here. The problem is that as a result of 
managerial control, there is a displacement of trust. This is evident in 
cases where society considers an organisations activities illegitimate. 
Hence, through sustainability assurance, organisations displace the focus 
of trust to the company process itself (see Power, 1997/1999, 2007b).  In 
these cases, the commission of sustainability assurance services is used as 
a tool to manage organisational image (Power, 1994b, 1997/1999, 1996).  
 
For Power (1997/1999), audits should enable responsiveness and 
substantive change. The evidence from this study suggests that companies 
respond mainly to the demands of powerful stakeholder groups, on their 
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own terms. There are also indications that there is no genuine redress to 
society at large. The results of this research support the idea that as a 
result of the high level of managerial control over the process (see also 
ODwyer & Owen, 2005; Jones & Solomon, 2010), sustainability assurance 
has lost its aim of making organisations fully responsive to all 
stakeholders, and therefore, it is not possible to achieve substantive 
change in the areas of social and environmental organisational 
performance. There are signs that organisations are using sustainability 
assurance as greenwashing.  
 
One of Powers (1994b:23) main theses is that audits are thought to shift 
power; from professionals to the public, from experts to stakeholders. 
Findings in this study indicate that companies do not wish to transfer 
power to stakeholders through sustainability assurance. The evidence 
from this study suggests that, as a result of the influence of the 
stockholder approach in corporate governance systems in the UK, 
sustainability assurance aims mainly to provide answerability and 
responsiveness to companies shareholders. This critical issue is evident 
in the reluctance to address the assurance statements to society at large 
(see also ODwyer & Owen, 2005). It appears that the position of 
accountancy firms, whereby they protect themselves from being sued by 
stakeholders, is a major obstacle to moving forward to the achievement of 
upward accountability (Power, 1997/1999).  
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Power (1994b; but see also Power, 1991) argues for a model of audit in 
which the voices of stakeholders can be heard as principals. In this study, 
representatives of companies proposed engaging stakeholders through a 
panel of evaluation, either a stakeholder panel or a panel of experts. 
Hence, transparency and critique are supported, but this form of 
transparency alone does not empower (Power, 1994b:27); nor does it 
encourage real change. In this manner, companies appear to give power to 
stakeholders (Power, 2007b); their strategy is to persuade the public that 
something has been done by someone (Power, 2000).  
 
Turning now to the discussion of stakeholder perceptions, results from 
this research suggest that there is a huge expectation gap between what 
sustainability assurance could deliver in practice, and the expectations of 
different stakeholder groups towards the outcome of the exercise (Power, 
1994b, 1997/1999). One of the more significant findings is that there are 
conflicting views between representatives of civil society groups and the 
investment sector. Whilst the trade union official, and representatives of 
the INGO sector, argued for an assurance practice focused on changing 
actual organisational social and environmental performance (see also 
Zadek et al., 2006), and which serves the interest of society at large, the 
investment group favoured a practice focused on assuring quantitative 
data, and serving mainly the economic interests of shareholders and 
companies. The results of this study reveal no clear indication from the 
companies of any intention to assume the elevated cost of commissioning 
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a performance-oriented assurance practice which could promote 
organisational change. Hence, it appears that there is little possibility that 
the expectation gap will be reduced. Moreover, results in this research 
indicate a great deal of uncertainty as to whether the practice of 
sustainability assurance could address the assurance needs of the 
investment sector, mainly as a result of the difficulty of quantifying 
indicators in social matters.   
 
Results of this research suggest that stakeholder groups are aware of the 
realities and problems of sustainability assurance practice, contrary to 
Powers (1994b) claim that users of assurance opinions ignore them. The 
findings of this study suggest that despite recent moves on the part of 
assurance providers to address public concerns by providing more 
structured information on the work conducted (see also Al-Hamadeen, 
2007), there are general doubts as to the usefulness of the information 
conveyed in the assurance statement. Findings show that there is a 
difference between what assurance providers think of themselves, and 
what a sector of the stakeholder groups think of them (Power, 1994b). 
First, representatives of the investment group, together with the trade 
union official, raised concerns on the quality of the providers work (see 
also Zadek et al., 2006). Second, the trade union official questioned the 
role of assurance providers as mediators between companies and 
stakeholders. This view concurs with Powers (1994b, 1997/1999) 
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argument that the mediating role of auditors, and the subjectivity of the 
assurance provided, affect organisational transparency.  
 
This study found that in general stakeholder groups from the INGO sector, 
together with the trade union official, supported the view that through 
sustainability assurance accountability must be discharged to all 
stakeholder groups. However, nobody stated clearly that through 
sustainability assurance it is possible to hold organisations to account (see 
ODwyer, 2005). Results in this research suggest a lack of awareness that 
the active participation of stakeholders in selecting the assurance 
provider or defining the scope of the exercise would counter managerial 
control over the practice (see Adams & Evans, 2004). Nonetheless, in 
general, it seems that representatives of stakeholder groups supported 
stakeholder empowerment within the practice of sustainability assurance 
(Power, 1994b, 1997/1999). They were conscious of the need to have 
legitimate stakeholder representatives to conduct a convincing dialogue 
(Power, 2007b), and aware of the practical difficulties in engaging 
stakeholders in the practice. From the evidence of this study, it is unclear 
what will be the future consequences of giving power to stakeholder 
groups.  There exists the possibility of high managerial control over the 
engagement, the issue of conflict with the real objectives and survival of 
the organisations, which means that benefits for society are not 
realistically achievable (see Ribstein, 2005), and potential problems of 
stakeholder opportunism (see Ribstein, 2005). Conversely, the investment 
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group favoured an assurance practice which mainly benefits companies, 
and discharges accountability to one powerful group, shareholders, and to 
the companies.  
 
The overall conclusion drawn from this study is that companies viewed 
sustainability assurance as a managerial tool for creating value for the 
organisation, and as a toolkit whereby organisational legitimacy is built or 
repaired, and corporate reputation is enhanced. In the current climate of 
voluntarism, the risk of using sustainability assurance as greenwashing is 
high. For companies, sustainability assurance should serve the interest of 
the organisation and their shareholders over all other stakeholders. 
Through the assurance process, organisations manage and control key 
powerful stakeholder groups (see also ODwyer & Owen, 2005).  This view 
is supported by one key stakeholder group, the investment community. 
Therefore, the role of other stakeholder groups representing other civil 
society needs is fundamental to ensure that through sustainability 
assurance accountability is discharged to society at large.  
 
8.4 POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
The findings of this study have a number of important implications for 
future sustainability assurance practice. First, the results presented in 
chapter five suggest that there is no significant evidence that the voluntary 
adoption of the AA1000AS is leading to direct stakeholder participation in 
 332 
 
the practice of sustainability assurance. Moreover, this standard has failed 
to achieve its core aims, to be the means whereby organisations are 
accountable to stakeholders and to promote change in organisations 
social and environmental performance. Insufficient external pressure 
from stakeholder groups to comply with the requirements of this 
standard, together with a lack of internal motivation as manifested in the 
responses of companies representatives, means that the standard serves 
mainly to meet the organisations need to enhance their reporting systems 
and sustainability reports, or to be externally certified, rather than to 
discharge accountability to stakeholders.  
 
This raises the fundamental question of whether real change to the social 
and environmental practices of organisations could be accomplished 
through sustainability assurance in the current climate of voluntarism. 
Another key question is whether stakeholder inclusion in the practice of 
sustainability assurance could realistically be achieved in the current 
system of exclusively shareholder-centred corporate governance 
structures. The findings suggest several courses of action to ensure an 
efficient monitoring of the balance of social, environmental and economic 
performance of organisations, and the consequent achievement of 
accountability to stakeholders.  
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First, there is a need for governmental intervention and regulation (see 
also Zadek et al., 2004) on sustainability reporting and associated 
sustainability assurance processes in the UK. This implies an important 
role for stakeholder groups in working towards changes in legislation that 
regulates corporate behaviour in the UK. This role would focus mainly on 
their duty to counteract the interest of influencial stakeholder groups such 
as the investment community, who advocated for an assurance practice 
that mainly benefits shareholders and companies, and to ensure that the 
government acts in societys interest by promoting stakeholder-centred 
sustainability assurance practices rather than protecting the interests of 
investors and organisations, as the trade union official warned. If the 
debate is to be moved forward, it will be necessary to develop a better 
understanding of the appropriate structures of accountability needed to 
hold corporate power to account, and of their composition in terms of 
legislatures, statutory authorities, and courts (see also Mulgan, 2000:563). 
A further study could assess different mechanisms for demanding 
explanation, applying judgement, and imposing sanctions (see also 
Mulgan, 2000:566).  
 
Second, there is a need for reforms to existing corporate governance 
structures (see also ODwyer & Owen, 2005) to ensure the participation of 
stakeholders in organisational decision-making process.  The role of 
sustainability assurance is fundamental to hold organisations to account 
for their decisions and the impacts of those decisions (see ODwyer, 2005). 
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The theoretical work of Gray et al. (1997), Unerman and Bennett (2004), 
Thomson and Bebbington (2005), ODwyer (2005) and Edgley et al. 
(2010), together with the findings of this study, may provide the basis to 
conduct further research to develop a detailed practical specification on 
the arrangement of stakeholder engagements within the practice of 
sustainability assurance to ensure their representation and effective 
influence on changing corporate behaviour (see ODwyer, 2005), and the 
achievement of accountability. 
 
Third, there is a fundamental role for civil society groups working in 
partnership with companies. Through the influence of these groups, the 
voluntary practice of sustainability assurance could develop towards a 
stakeholder-centred approach. Their work will also be critical if the 
practice is to be standardized, to ensure that different assurance needs are 
addressed within the practice. However, to counter corporate power it is 
essential that individuals within these groups become better informed on 
the role of sustainability assurance and its key features. As ODwyer 
(2005:30) argues, to engage effectively these individuals need to develop 
specific skills to argue, understand and develop compromises.  
 
Finally, another important practical implication is the need for a clear 
form of social organisation around issues of corporate power and the 
social and environmental impacts that corporations create. In other 
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words, we need a form of structured social regulation (see Zadek, 2007), a 
network whereby civil society groups could coordinate effective actions to 
influence social and environmental performance of the business. As the 
trade union official argued, a clear discussion on issues concerning 
corporate power, corporate performance and the role of assurance is 
needed among civil society groups to move forward the agenda to a stage 
where benefits are mainly for society at large.  
 
8.5 CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE 
The current findings add to a growing body of literature on sustainability 
assurance in general, and to the understanding of the practice of 
sustainability assurance in the UK context.  
 
First, this study has responded to the call of Deegan et al. (2006) for an 
understanding of the assurance practice within individual countries. This 
is a comprehensive study examining trends from 2001 to 2007 in key 
features of sustainability assurance practice in the UK. The present study 
also provides evidence with respect to trends and developments in the 
participation of stakeholders in the practice in the UK (but see ODwyer & 
Owen, 2005; Al-Hamadeen, 2007; Edgley et al., 2010).   
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Second, against a background in which the practice of sustainability 
assurance is undergoing rapid development, the study has responded to 
the call of Jones and Solomon (2010) for the examination of trends and 
changes in that practice. This research has contributed to the literature by 
exploring these emerging issues from the perspective of companies in the 
UK via semi-structured interviews. Moreover, the present study provides 
additional evidence with respect to companies motivations for 
commissioning sustainability assurance services.  
 
Third, this study has gone some way towards enhancing our 
understanding of stakeholders perceptions on issues in the practice of 
sustainability assurance in the UK. Previous research investigated the 
phenomenon of sustainability assurance in the UK mainly from the 
perspective of companies and assurance providers. The participation of 
stakeholders in the sustainability assurance process is fundamental to 
ensure stakeholder accountability and organisational transparency.  This 
study has made a modest contribution by exploring the views of 
stakeholders in order to understand whether or not, through 
sustainability assurance, organisations could discharge accountability to 
society at large.   
 
Finally, the current findings add to our understanding of Powers theses 
concerning the meaning of sustainability assurance, its purpose, benefits 
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in society and problems, from the perspective of organisations and 
stakeholders. This research provides additional understanding of one of 
Powers key arguments, that is, the potential of sustainability assurance to 
empower stakeholders to achieve stakeholder-centred accountability. The 
findings enhance our understanding of motivations behind the 
commission of sustainability assurance services via their interpretation 
through the lens of stakeholder and legitimacy theories.  
 
8.6 STRENGTH AND LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
The strength of this study lies in the research design, specifically the use of 
mixed-methods research to provide a better understanding of the issues 
faced in the practice of sustainability assurance. This research design 
provided more comprehensive evidence to examine the issues affecting 
the sustainability assurance practice (see Creswell & Plano-Clark, 2007). 
The design enabled triangulation, employing quantitative and qualitative 
data collection techniques and analysis procedures to ensure the validity 
of the research findings (see Saunders et al., 2007:147). Nonetheless, a 
number of caveats should be noted.  
 
First, the research approach adopted was inductive. This study focused on 
finding explanations of emerging issues in the practice of sustainability 
assurance in the UK through the perspectives of individuals. Hence, 
empirical results presented in chapters six and seven appertain to the 
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views of specific individuals on the practice of sustainability assurance in 
the UK. It is acknowledged that the perspectives of these respondents 
might not reflect the position of their respective organisations. Therefore, 
it is not feasible to make generalizations about the entire population. 
Second, results presented in chapter five relate to a specific time period, 
from 2001 to 2007, in the practice of sustainability assurance in the UK. 
Therefore, results cannot necessarily be generalized to other time periods. 
Third, the sample of companies for the analysis presented in chapter five 
comprised the FTSE100 companies; hence, it missed small and medium 
size companies in the UK. Further research examining small and medium 
size companies in the UK might help to establish key features of their 
assurance practice.   
 
8.7 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This research has raised many questions in need of further investigation. 
The most significant are: 
x It would be interesting to assess the effects of the influence of the 
core principles of the AA1000AS on the accountancy assurance 
approach.  
 
x Future research should concentrate on the investigation of a much 
wider range of stakeholder opinions on issues raised by this study, 
 339 
 
and provide pointers towards the development of a more genuinely 
stakeholder-inclusive assurance process. 
 
x There is scope for further work to investigate the assurance needs 
of different stakeholder groups through the use of a comprehensive 
survey, thus generalizing findings (see also Zadek et al., 2006).  
 
x The body of theory known as new institutionalism (but see also 
Smith, Haniffa and Fairbrass, forthcoming) might provide an 
alternative lens for further investigation of issues concerning the 
accountability of institutions setting assurance standards. Such a 
study would examine empirical institutionalism, one of the seven 
approaches to new institutionalism (Lowndes, 2002: 96); that is, it 
would investigate different types of institutions setting standards, 
and analyze their practical impact upon corporate performance 
and accountability. 
 
x Finally, research in the context of developing countries in general is 
needed to explore emerging practices of sustainability assurance, 
and to provide an international perspective on the field of 
sustainability assurance.    
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1: CODING FORM 
         
 
              
 
 
 
Coding Form 
 
 
 
  
     
  
 
 
A  Company name   
 
 
B Does the company have a stand-alone report? 
 
 
B1 Yes   
 
 
B2 No   
 
 
C Year of stand-alone report 
 
 
C1 2001   
 
 
C2 2002   
 
 
C3 2003   
 
 
C4 2004   
 
 
C5 2005   
 
 
C6 2006   
 
 
C7 2007   
 
 
D Does the report have an assurance statement? 
 
 
D1 Yes   
 
 
D2 No   
 
 
D3 No physical evidence of statement   
 
 
E Date of assurance statement   
 
 
F Type of assurance provision 
 
 
F1 Formal   
 
 
F2 Panel of evaluation   
 
 
F3 Other    
 
 
G Assurance provider 
 
 
G1 Accountancy firm   
 
 
G2 Name   
 
 
G3 Specialized consultancy firm   
 
 
G4 Name   
 
 
G5 Certification body   
 
 
G6 Name   
 
 
G7 Other   
 
 
G8 Specify name of other assurance provider   
 
 
H Assurance Standards 
 
 
H1 AA1000AS   
 
 
H2 ISAE3000   
 
 
H3 Other assurance standard   
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Coding Form 
 
 
 
H4 Specify name of other assurance standard   
 
 
H5 No information   
 
 
I Level of assurance 
 
 
I1 Limited   
 
 
I2 Reasonable   
 
 
I3 Other level of assurance   
 
 
I4 Specify name of other level of assurance    
 
 
I5 No information   
 
 
J Assurance Procedures 
 
 
J1 Type 1- Use of analytical procedures      
 
 
J2 Type 2- Confirmation/corroboration of specific data with external parties    
 
 
J3 Type 3- Consistency with underlying systems/data/report   
 
 
J4 
Type 4- Conducting interviews/discussion with management and 
employees   
 
 
J5 Type 5- Inspection/checking of supporting  documentation   
 
 
J6 
Type 6- Reviewing accounting policies/disclosure 
principles/measurement methods/performance/risk/materiality   
 
 
J7 Type 7- Site visits   
 
 
J8 Type 8- Testing/reviewing reliability/accuracy of internal control systems   
 
 
J9 Type 9- Rely on internal audit 
  
 
J10 Type 10-Inclusion of stakeholder views  
  
 
K Stakeholder inclusion methods 
 
 
K1 No information   
 
 
K2 Type 1 - Review of media   
 
 
K3 Type 2-Via secondary data   
 
 
K4 Type 3- Via observations, attending stakeholder sessions   
 
 
K5 Type 4 -Via questionnaires, surveys   
 
 
K6 Type 5- Via meetings with stakeholders, and interviews   
 
 
K7 Type 6 -Via stakeholder panel/views of experts   
 
 
Date     
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Statement of content analysis coding and rules 
Item 
coding 
form 
Rule - Codify as:  
A Name as it appears on the corporate website. 
B Stand-alone report: A report that is (1) not part of any financial 
document set, and (2) exclusively under the following headings: 
environmental, health and safety, environmental, 
social/environmental, corporate social responsibility 
corporate sustainability, and (3) posted on the corporate 
website 
B1 B1 =1 if the condition in B is met 
B2 B2= 1 if (1) the condition in B is not met or (2) there are no 
reports archived on the corporate website or (3) there were 
mergers and acquisitions 
C Year when the stand-alone report was issued 
C1 C1=1 if the report was issued in 2001 
C2 C2=1 if the report was issued in 2002 
C3 C3=1 if the report was issued in 2003 
C4 C4=1 if the report was issued in 2004 
C5 C5=1 if the report was issued in 2005 
C6 C6=1 if the report was issued in 2006 
C7 C7=1 if the report was issued in 2007 
D Assurance statement: (1) A written communication that expresses 
a conclusion about the stand-alone report, and (2) which is issued 
by (a) an external assurance provider; (b) panels of evaluation; (c) 
the internal audit group. 
D1 D1=1 if the condition in D is met 
D2 D2=1 if the condition in D is not met and 
D3 D3=1 if there is not physical evidence of the assurance statement, 
even though its presence is stated in the stand-alone report. 
E Year when the assurance statement was issued 
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Item 
coding 
form 
Rule - Codify as:  
F (1) Assurance services are independent professional services that 
improve the quality of information for decision makers, and 
which are conducted by accountancy firms or specialized 
consultants or certification bodies. 
(2) For the purpose of this research, the assurance service could  
also be conducted by (a) a panel of evaluation, in the form of a 
stakeholder panel or panel of experts; (b) the internal audit 
company group  
F1 F1 =1 if the condition in F point (1) is met 
F2 F2 =1 if the condition in F point (2a) is met 
F3 F3 =1 if the condition in F point (2b) is met 
G (1) Assurance provider is the firm with the final responsibility for 
the assurance service,  in the form of (a) an accountancy firm 
accountancy and professional services firm which handles 
audits for public and private companies; (b) a specialized 
consultancy firm-a firm that provides professional and 
specialized services in corporate social responsibility and/or 
corporate sustainability; (c) a certification body- a firm that is 
qualified to provide certification or qualification in 
business/environment/quality;  
(2) For the purpose of this research, an assurance provider is 
classified under the denomination other in cases where the 
service is conducted by (a) the internal audit companys 
group; (b)a panel of evaluation: group of people representing 
either civil society [stakeholders] or credible experts [as a 
group or individually] in corporate sustainability issues 
G1 G1=1 if the condition in G point (1a) is met  
G2 Name as it appears on the assurance statement 
G3 G3=1 if the condition in G point (1b) is met 
G4 Name as it appears on the assurance statement 
G5 G5=1 if the condition in G point (1c) is met 
G6 Name as it appears on the assurance statement 
G7 G7=1 if the condition in G point (2) is met 
G8 Name as it appears on the assurance statement 
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Item 
coding 
form 
Rule - Codify as:  
H (1) Assurance standards: principles and procedures for, and to 
provide guidance to, practitioners in public practice of 
assurance engagements, namely: (a) Accountability- AA1000; 
(b) Accountancy based-ISA/ISAE3000. 
(2) For the purpose of this research, an assurance standard is 
classified under the denomination other in cases where the 
standard is different from the AA1000 and the ISA/ISAE3000 
standards.  
H1 H1 =1 if the condition in H point (1a) is met 
H2 H2 =1 if the condition in H point (1b) is met 
H3 H3 =1 if the condition in H point (2) is met 
H4 Name as it appears on the assurance statement 
H5 No information provided on the use of a standard to regulate the 
assurance exercise 
I (1) Level of assurance refers to the term used to describe the 
level of assurance provided by the provider about the subject 
matter. In performing the assurance engagement, the IFAC 
stipulates that the provider provides a level of assurance of (1) 
limited level and (2) reasonable level. 
(2)  For the purpose of this research, the level of assurance is 
classified under the denomination other in cases where the 
name used is different from the limited and reasonable 
levels. 
I1 I1 =1 if the provider uses the word limited when describing the 
level of assurance provided in the statement 
I2 I2=1 if the provider uses the word reasonable when describing 
the level of assurance provided in the statement 
I3 I3=1 if the provider uses other words from those stated in I1 and 
I2 when describing the level of assurance provided in the 
statement 
I4 Name as it appears on the assurance statement 
I5 No information provided on the use of a level of assurance 
J Assurance procedures:  Set of procedures established by the 
provider to obtain evidence.   
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Item 
coding 
form 
Rule - Codify as:  
J1 J1 =1 if the provider uses the words: analytical procedures to 
describe the procedure. 
J2 J2 =1 if the provider corroborates information with external 
parties  
J3 J3= 1 if the provider evaluates the consistency of the report with 
(1) underlying systems and/or (2) data 
J4 J4 =1 if the provider conducts  (1) interviews and/or (2) 
discussions with (a) management and/or (b) employees 
J5 J5 =1 if the provider (1) inspects and/or (2) checks supporting 
documentation 
J6 J6=1 if the provider reviews/assess:  
(1) accounting policies  any accounting method selected by the 
company to  prepare the report; and/or  
(2) disclosure principles  general national or international or 
company accounting rules to prepare, present and report 
sustainability information ; and/or 
(3) measurement methods  any measure to track performance, 
risk management; and /or 
J6 = 1 if the provider states explicitly the review of : 
(4) performance; and /or 
 (5) risk - ; and/or  
(6) materiality  
J7 J7=1 if the provider conducts visits 
J8 J8=1 if the provider tests and/or reviews reliability/accuracy of 
internal control systems 
J9 J9= 1 if the provider states their work relies on the internal audit 
company group 
J10 J10=1 if the provider includes the views of stakeholders within the 
assurance process 
K Stakeholder inclusion methods: set of methods to incorporate the 
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Item 
coding 
form 
Rule - Codify as:  
opinion of stakeholders within the assurance process 
K1 K1=1 if no information provided on the use of a method to 
incorporate the opinion of stakeholders within the assurance 
process 
K2 K2=1 if the provider reviews national and/or international media 
[news papers, information on the internet] 
K3 K3=1 if the provider reviews minutes of stakeholder dialogues 
K4 K4=1 if the provider observes stakeholder-company meetings and 
/or attend stakeholder sessions 
K5 K5 =1 if the provider administers questionnaires and surveys 
among stakeholders 
K6 K6= 1 if the provider directly meets with stakeholders, and 
interviews them 
K7 K7 =1 if there is a panel of evaluation in the form of (1) 
stakeholder panel; (2) panel of experts; (3) individual experts    
Date Date of filling in the form 
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APPENDIX 2: RELIABILITY TEST 
 
 
  
                                                        
103 Simstat did not report coefficients in cases where the agreement was 100%.  
 
104 Simstat did not report coefficients in cases where the agreement was 100%.  
 
105 In this list: (1) some items of the coding form are absent since they correspond to 
factual  information such as name of company, or provide a framework for questions; (2) 
items (C, D, F, G, H, and I) correspond to an aggregate of sub-items (C, D, F, G, H and I), 
listed in the coding form.   
   
Pilot103
 
 
 
Final104
 
 
 
Items105 %agreement  
Cohen's 
kappa 
Scott's 
pi %agreement 
Cohen's 
kappa 
Scott's 
pi 
 
C 97 0.962 0.962 97 0.962 0.962 
 
D 100     100     
 
F 100 1 1 100 1 1 
 
G 90.9 0.856 0.856 93.9 0.906 0.906 
 
H 93.9 0.98 0.98 100 1 1 
 
I 93.9 0.829 0.829 97 0.915 0.915 
 
J1 97 0.904 0.904 97 0.904 0.904 
 
J2 97 0.921 0.921 93.9 0.836 0.835 
 
J3 100 1 1 100     
 
J4 97 0.872 0.871 93.9 0.764 0.764 
 
J5 97 0.939 0.939 93.9 0.879 0.879 
 
J6 100     97 0.784 0.784 
 
J7 93.9 0.879 0.879 97 0.939 0.939 
 
J8 100 1 1 100 1 1 
 
J9 100 1 1 100 1 1 
 
J10 97 0.93 0.93 97 0.93 0.93 
 
K1 97 0.939 0.938 100 1 1 
 
K2 100 1 1 100 1 1 
 
K3 97 0.891 0.891 100 1 1 
 
K4 97 0.93 0.93 97 0.93 0.93 
 
K5 100     100     
 
K6 100 1 1 97 0.653 0.651 
 
K7 97 0.653 0.651 100 1 1 
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APPENDIX 3: INTERVIEW QUESTION GUIDE  
Questions to the representatives of companies 
1. What is your role in the organisation? 
2. What involvement do you have in the assurance process? 
3. Who has main involvement in the assurance process in the 
company (e.g. internal audit function)?  
4. What were the reasons for commissioning assurance? 
5. What are the benefits from the exercise? 
6. What factors underpin the assurance approach adopted? 
7. Any restriction in scope? Reasons (e.g. budget constraints)? 
8. What is the role of assurance (i.e. end of the reporting process 
(verification) or during the reporting process (feeds into the 
report)? 
9. What are your views as to the necessary degree of stakeholder 
inclusion (e.g. appointing assurance provider, deciding on scope, 
contact with assurance providers during the exercise, feedback at 
the end of the process)? 
10. What are your views on the assurance process (e.g. satisfaction, 
envisaged changes, organisational, more general)? 
11. Where is assurance going in the future? 
Questions to the representatives of stakeholders 
1. What should the purpose of assurance be? 
2. Do you have any direct experience of engagement in assurance 
(including contacts with assurance providers)? 
3. What is your overall view of the general state of assurance 
provision? 
4. Do you have any comments on the assurance standards? 
5. How might improvements be brought about? 
6. What degree of stakeholder engagement is desirable? 
x Appointing assurance provider 
x Being consulted on the scope of the exercise 
x Dialogue with assurance provider 
x Feedback at the end of the exercise 
7. Are corporate governance changes required (e.g. use of stakeholder 
panels to sign off the assurance statement/ any other 
comments/suggestions), particularly in seeking to enhance 
stakeholder accountability? 
8. Should the assurance statement be addressed to stakeholders (in 
contrast with current practice)? 
9. How will assurance practice develop? 
